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The	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP)	of	the	European	Union	
faces the challenge of evolving towards a multifunctional 
policy that responds to the constantly changing needs 
of society. The CAP must respond to demands related to 
increased	market	efficiency	and	competitiveness;	fostering	
jobs and ‘smart’ growth; contributing to climate change 
mitigation while adapting to a changing climate; ensuring 
responsible and sustainable biologically renewable 
resource management; and still respecting its initial aim 
of ensuring food security.
The present report was carried out by the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) and external experts in the context of the 
JRC’s analytical support to the Directorate-General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development. The report analyses 
the impact on the agricultural sector of stylised scenarios, 
reflecting	 the	 main	 drivers	 of	 policy	 debate	 and	 thus	
providing a framework for further exploration of the 
process of designing the future CAP. While the scenarios 
presented do not represent real policy options, they 
underline the potential for changes to current agri-food 
policies to address societal challenges and demands.
The analysis of the social, economic and environmental 
impacts of various options for the next CAP employs the 
iMAP platform models MAGNET, CAPRI and IFM-CAP in 
an	 integrated	 manner,	 covering	 different	 spatial	 scales	
(global,	EU,	Member	State,	NUTS	2	region	and	individual	
farm	 level).	 The	 use	 of	 three	 different	models	 and	 their	
(soft)	linkages	adds	complexity,	particularly	when	trying	to	
compare	results	across	models	(e.g.	different	commodity	
categories), but allows the analysis of a wider range of 
aspects and details.
The study considers three scenarios, designed beginning 
of 2016, that take polar paths, against a reference 
scenario,	to	characterise	different	visions	for	the	CAP.	The	
first	scenario,	Income	&	Environment	(Inc&Env),	assumes	
a more restrictive compliance with agri-environmental 
objectives needed for direct payment eligibility while 
maintaining	 the	 EU’s	 CAP	 budget	 at	 its	 current	 nominal	
level. The second scenario, Liberalisation & Productivity 
(Lib&Prod), assumes a strong reduction in subsidies (the 
removal of Pillar 1 direct payments, which are returned to 
tax	payers),	with	a	shift	of	Pillar	2	payments	to	productivity-
increasing measures and further trade liberalisation. As a 
variant of the Lib&Prod scenario, the No Policy (NoCAP) 
scenario also eliminates Pillar 2 payments, thus removing 
all budgetary support to agriculture.
The vulnerability of small farms, in particular in marginal 
areas	of	the	EU,	where	agriculture	(and	its	subsidies)	is	far	
more important economically than market income, has to 
be emphasised. The trade liberalisation scenarios reveal 
opportunities for some but risks for most agri-food sectors. 
Special attention must be paid to the complex relations, 
incentives	and	 trade-offs	of	 the	different	 instruments,	 in	
particular regarding the environmental dimension. The 
objective	 of	 direct	 payments	 has	 to	 be	 clearly	 defined,	
as they still represent the largest share of the budget 
dedicated to agriculture and steer most of the sector’s 
responses. If distributional aspects are key, then the target 
population	 needs	 to	 be	 better	 defined;	 if	 environmental	
performance is key, then conditionality has to be better 
designed.
The policy scenarios are assessed with regard to their 
impact on markets (production, demand, trade and prices), 
land use, the environment and farmer income from the 
global	level	to	the	farm	level.	The	figure	below	summarises	
Executive summary
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the impact of the three scenarios on agricultural production, 
farm income, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the 
agri-food sector, nitrogen surplus, utilised agricultural area 
and farm jobs. Negative values show a reduction in these 
indicators under a given scenario and positive values 
an increase. While an increase in agricultural production 
and farm income are considered a positive outcome, an 
increase in  GHG emissions and nitrogen surplus indicate 
a negative impact on the environment and the climate.
Overview of scenario impacts
-25,0% 
-20,0% 
-15,0% 
-10,0% 
-5,0% 
0,0% 
5,0% 
Agricultural production 
Farm income 
GHG emissions agrifood 
Nitrogen surplus  
Utilized agricultural area 
Farm jobs 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCap Reference 
The Inc&Env scenario shows only marginal changes for 
production, land use and emissions. The more pronounced 
focus of this scenario on the environment, implemented 
through extended greening measures and a limit on 
nitrogen use, is associated with a small, economy-wide 
cost, but contributes to an improving trend for agricultural 
nitrogen balance. However, the reduction of about 1% of 
the nitrogen surplus in this scenario compared with the 
reference	is	not	sufficient	to	address	the	nitrogen	balance	
problem	 in	areas	already	 in	surplus.	Under	 this	scenario,	
farm	income	in	the	EU	increases,	but	not	 its	distribution,	
as	measured	 by	 a	 Gini	 coefficient.	 Thus,	 key	 challenges	
14 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
related to the environment and a fair standard of living for 
farmers are only partly addressed, suggesting that even 
more stringent environmental and distributional conditions 
are needed to achieve those objectives.
The Lib&Prod scenario and its even more extreme variant, 
the NoCAP scenario, have a much stronger impact on farm 
income, land use, production and emissions. The decrease 
in agricultural production, leading to price increases in the 
NoCAP scenario, is within the limit of interannual variation, 
but is associated with a pronounced reduction in land use. 
This	affects	 territorial	 balance,	with	marginal	 areas	being	
further marginalised or, at worst, abandoned, possibly 
leading to environmental degradation, with fewer jobs, and 
intensive agricultural areas being further concentrated. Less 
production, in principle, reduces the overall use of resources 
and thus reduces environmental impacts like for example, 
GHG	emissions.	However,	if	GHG	emissions	decline	in	the	EU,	
this decline is likely to be levelled out through the leakage 
effect,	by	which	increased	emissions	occur	in	the	other	world	
regions	to	which	production	is	shifted.	Releasing	land	from	
agricultural uses could also provide an opportunity for the 
creation of carbon dioxide sinks, such as forests and other 
ecological	 areas,	 with	 important	 benefits	 for	 biodiversity.	
However, additional measures would be needed to 
ensure	that	abandoned	land	is	indeed	used	to	benefit	the	
environment. While a reduction in nitrogen use could be 
seen as an environmental improvement, its reduction will 
not be homogenously distributed and might even lead to an 
increase in nitrogen use in some areas, which could increase 
the corresponding envionmental pressure.
Under	 both	 the	 Lib&Prod	 and	 NoCAP	 scenarios,	 there	
would	be	trade-offs	between	slightly	reduced	production,	
a mixed impact on the environment and a strongly 
negative impact on farm income. Beyond the structural 
job contraction common in baseline and all scenarios, 
most	 of	 the	 additional	 impacts	 on	 jobs	 will	 affect	
small	 farms	 in	 the	 net	 beneficiary	 countries,	 and	would	
increase farm income inequality even more and put the 
resilience of many farms at risk. The scenarios show, also 
as a consequence of further trade liberalisation, that 
there would be an increase in the vulnerability of crop 
and cattle/beef farmers. As production decreases and 
consumption remains more or less constant, Europe would 
become a net importer of many commodities under these 
scenarios. This gives rise to concerns about the transfer 
of the positive and negative externalities associated with 
agricultural production to other world regions.
Finally, the aggregated welfare results are contingent 
on	how	effectively	 the	 funds	 released	from	agricultural	
policy are used for alternative public expenditure. Our 
analysis assumes that expenditure in other sectors will 
increase welfare.
Designing an agricultural policy that tackles all of its 
societal objectives is a daunting task. At best, the policy 
will have to focus on key priorities and accept that trade-
offs	 will	 have	 to	 be	 made	 with	 regard	 to	 others.	 An	
internationally competitive agriculture sector in Europe 
might come at the expense of increased environmental 
pressures or further job losses in the sector.
Despite the extreme nature of the scenarios chosen, 
some objectives would be only partly achieved. Further 
■ Key conclusions
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■ Related and future JRC work
During the course of this study, experiences have revealed 
repeatedly that the linkage of models is a challenge and, 
in some cases, the resulting improvement in the quality of 
the analysis is minor. Further research must be dedicated 
to identifying the areas in which investing in model linkage 
does in fact improve analytical capacity. Furthermore, the 
assumptions on key parameters (e.g. the impact on pro-
ductivity of Pillar 2 payments) are crucial to identifying the 
magnitude of some of the shocks (while the direction of 
the	shocks	will	not	be	affected).	The	JRC	should	also	invest	
some additional resources in improving these parameters.
At	the	time	of	finalising	this	report,	the	main	uncertainties	
about the future of the agricultural sector and its related 
policies stemmed from the early stages of discussions on 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 and Brexit 
negotiations. The JRC will continue to support the analysis 
of these topics using the tools described in this report.
increasing the performance of agricultural policy in some 
areas would require even more far-reaching policies to 
be implemented, which might not be possible under the 
current institutional architecture.
The general caveats that apply to all modelling exercises 
(i.e.	 a	 simplified	 representation	 of	 reality,	 no	 forecasting	
models, high uncertainty, etc.) apply to this study.
Moreover, many of the concerns that surround the agricul-
tural policy debate, such as generational renewal, value dis-
tribution along the food chain and structural change, cannot 
be captured in the model results and warrant additional 
investigation before any conclusions are made with regard 
to which policy option best meets them. In this context, ex-
panding the analysis to a food systems approach could pro-
vide further insights into other impacts of the policy options.
1 BACKGROUNDTO SCENAR 2030
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The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has come a long way 
since its inception in 1962. At that time, the focus was to 
design a system of incentives for agricultural production, 
which would put to rest the fear of European food shortages 
in the wake of the Second World War. On this barometer, 
the	 CAP	was	 undeniably	 an	 unqualified	 success.	 By	 the	
1980s,	 however,	 a	 very	 different	 Europe	 had	 emerged	
where peace and prosperity were commonplace and food 
self-sufficiency	goals	had	been	surpassed.	In	fact,	Europe	
now	faced	a	food	problem	of	a	different	kind	–	surpluses	
and heavy storage costs. It became clear that this, now 
antiquated policy mechanism required a rethink to reduce 
food production and free up agricultural markets.
These changing needs of European society prompted a 
series of major reforms in the CAP. The earliest example 
was the reform of the milk sector in the mid-1980s, 
although it was not until 1992 that a whole package of 
reforms was introduced to control production through 
limits to essential inputs (i.e. set-aside and stocking limits). 
The reforms at the end of the 1990s under the auspices of 
‘Agenda	2000’	introduced	for	the	first	time	notions	of	rural	
livelihoods, environmental responsibility and sustainability. 
As a result, the hitherto traditional system of agricultural 
payments was clearly delineated into a market support 
pillar (Pillar 1) and rural development programmes (RDPs) 
(Pillar 2), which have formed the basis for administering 
payments to the present day.
In a further bid to control overproduction, increase 
market orientation and encourage sustainable production 
practices, the Mid-term Review Reforms in 2003 began 
the process of de-coupling support payments from 
output decisions, while ensuring that said payments 
became conditional upon maintaining land in a good 
agricultural and environmental condition and complying 
with good environmental, food safety and animal 
health	 practices.	 Under	 the	 ‘Health	 Check’	 in	 2009,	 this	
template of de-coupling was extended so that almost all 
remaining direct payment schemes and the milk quota 
were	eliminated,	greater	flexibility	was	 introduced	to	the	
process of transferring payments from Pillar 1 to Pillar 
2	 (‘modulation’),	 and	 efforts	 were	 undertaken	 to	 further	
reduce the link between payments and production through 
the ‘regionalisation’ of support to Member States (MSs).
After	 the	 economic	 crisis	 of	 2008-2009,	 the	 needs	 of	
European	 society	 shifted	 once	 again	 and	were	 reflected	
in the reforms of the CAP, agreed in 2013 and enacted in 
2015.	Financial	discipline	came	to	the	fore,	while	efforts	
were stepped up to provide a ‘fairer’ CAP that could both 
distribute payments more equitably within and across 
MSs (‘convergence’ criteria) and limit receipts to larger 
agricultural holdings (‘degressivity and capping’). In a bid 
to tailor the CAP more to the needs of individual MSs, 
greater	 flexibility	 in	 allocating	 payments	 between	pillars	
was granted. Furthermore, the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS) was superseded by the Basic Payment Scheme 
(BPS). In addition to the income support component, 30% 
of the national envelope for Pillar 1 became explicitly tied 
to the provision of non-market or public environmental 
goods (‘Greening’), while additional payments were linked 
to	 specific	 farmer	 status	 (e.g.	 young	 farmers,	 farming	 in	
areas with natural constraints (ANCs)).
The above discussion highlights the need for an evolving, 
multifunctional policy that can respond to the constantly 
changing needs of society. The CAP must meet market-
efficiency	 and	 competitiveness	 criteria;	 be	 a	 motor	 of	
jobs	and	‘smart’	growth;	continue	to	aid	the	fight	against	
climate change as an environmentally accountable policy 
measure; act (in tandem with other policies) as a custodian 
of responsible and sustainable biologically renewable 
resource management; and still respect its initial aim of 
ensuring food security.
Given the above, the design of post-2020 farm policy is 
once again under consultation and includes a wide range 
of policy options, from retaining the status quo to a radical 
reform. The European Commission President’s commitment 
Background to Scenar 20301
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‘to modernise & simplify the CAP’ is a guiding principle. 
Several high-level discussions1 have already taken place, 
in particular under the Dutch Presidency of the Council of 
the	European	Union	(EU)	and	the	Cork	2.0	declaration	on	
rural development. The stakeholder consultation and the 
Inception Impact Assessment (IIA) resulted in November 
2017 in the Communication on the Common Agricultural 
Policy post-2020 “The future of food and farming”2. 
The Communication proposes simpler rules and a more 
flexible	 approach	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 CAP	 delivers	 real	
results in supporting farmers and leads the sustainable 
development	of	EU	agriculture.
The present report, in the tradition of the ‘Scenar 2020’ 
studies, contributes to the analysis of selected scenarios 
and provides a framework for further exploration of the 
process	 of	 designing	 the	 future	 CAP.	 The	 first	 edition	 of	
Scenar 2020 (Nowicki et al., 2007) was presented under 
the	 slogan	 ‘Understanding	 Change’.	 The	 second	 Scenar	
2020 report (Nowicki et al., 2009) focused on ‘Preparing 
for Change’. As a result, the current, and in a way third, 
edition could be viewed as preparation for ‘Performing 
Real Change’.
Scenar 2030 aims to identify major future trends and 
driving factors for European agriculture and rural regions, 
and the perspectives and challenges resulting from them. 
The use of a suite of economic simulation models allowed 
the construction of a well-founded and plausible reference 
scenario	(‘baseline’)	and	different	policy	scenarios	resulting	
in a comprehensive set of outcomes depicting economic, 
social and environmental indicators.
The Scenar 2030 preparatory work began in 2015, more 
than a year before the policy options were announced in 
the IIA. Therefore, of the three scenarios featured in the 
Scenar 2030 study, listed below, two scenarios related 
to	 contrasting	 policy	 options	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	 options	
announced in the IAA:
 Income & Environment (Inc&Env): farmers striking a 
balance between public and private goods.
 Liberalisation & Productivity (Lib&Prod): low-cost farm-
ing in an open world.
 No Policy (NoCAP): farming without a CAP.
To provide the necessary sectoral and regional detail, the 
Scenar 2030 study draws from the iMAP modelling 
platform of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) (M’barek et al., 2012; M’barek & Delincé, 
2015), which hosts a set of complementary economic 
simulation models for the European agri-food sector. The 
iMAP platform supports evidence-based policy-making 
with economic analysis.
The Scenar 2030 study builds in particular on a JRC ex-
ploratory research project with initial results presented 
at the European Association of Agricultural Economists 
(EAAE) 2014 congress (Philippidis, et al., 2014), which led 
to the publication of a full report in spring 2016 (Philippi-
dis, et al., 2016).
For the Scenar 2030 work, the multisector models de-
scribed below were employed.
MAGNET (Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium 
Tool) (Woltjer & Kuiper, 2014) is a global neoclassical 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, whereby the 
standard core based on the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) has been augmented with specialist modules 
tailored	 to	 the	 specific	 focus	 of	 the	 study,	 including	
endogenous land supply treatment, heterogeneous land 
allocation across agricultural sectors, explicit modelling 
of CAP policy, limited factor mobility between agricultural 
and non-agricultural subsectors, and biofuel mandates. 
The ‘in-house’ development of the model by JRC improved 
the representation of CAP support payments (Boulanger & 
1 The well-known blog ‘CAP Reform’ provides a page that brings together relevant contributions from political, think tank, academic, industry and non-governmental or-
ganisation (NGO) sources, as well as relevant blog posts on the post-2020 CAP discussions: http://capreform.eu/bibliography-of-proposals-for-cap-post-2020-nov-2016/.
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_agri_001_cap_modernisation_en.pdf for the IAA and	https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/
future-of-cap/future_of_food_and_farming_communication_en.pdf	for	the	Communication	COM(2017)	713	final.
1.2 | Rationale for the methodological approach – the iMAP 
modelling platform
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Philippidis, 2014; Boulanger & Philippidis, 2015) by fully 
capturing the MS allocation of expenditures across pillars 
and	within	each	pillar	(e.g.	co-financing,	rural	development	
measures, coupled–de-coupled splits) using data from the 
Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS), which gathers details 
of all CAP payments made to the recipients of the EAGF 
(European Agricultural Guarantee Fund) and the EAFRD 
(European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development).
The CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regional-
ised Impact) model (Britz & Witzke, 2014) is a global, 
spatial, comparative static partial equilibrium (PE) model, 
specifically	designed	to	analyse	CAP	measures	and	trade	
policies for agricultural products based on a fully consist-
ent	 dataset	 over	 different	 regional	 scales	 (global,	 Euro-
pean	 Union	 (EU),	MS,	 NUTS	 (Nomenclature	 of	 Territorial	
Units	for	Statistics)	2	region,	farm	type).	The	CAPRI	model	
is designed to analyse a wide range of policies and topics 
related to the agricultural sector, including agri–environ-
ment interactions.
The IFM-CAP (Individual Farm Model for Common 
Agricultural Policy Analysis) (Louhichi, et al., 2017a,b) 
is	a	micro-level	farm	model,	specifically	developed	for	the	ex 
ante assessment of the short- to medium-term adaptation 
of individual farmers to policy and market changes. It 
allows	a	flexible	assessment	of	a	wide	range	of	policies	and	
simulates	their	distributional	effects	on	farm	population.
Over recent years, in addition to stand-alone applications, 
different	tools	of	the	iMAP	modelling	platform	have	been	
used in combination to deliver ex ante assessments of 
policy options. Notable examples are for biofuels (Blanco 
et al., 2010; using the models CAPRI, ESIM and AGLINK-
COSIMO),	EU–Mercosur	trade	(Burrell et al., 2011; using the 
models GLOBE and CAPRI), greening of the CAP (European 
Commission, 2016; using the models CAPRI and IFM-CAP) 
and free trade agreements (Boulanger et al., 2016a; using 
the models AGLINK-COSIMO and MAGNET).
A common feature of these studies is that various models 
are	employed	to	provide	different	perspectives	(a	partial	or	
general perspective) on a policy question, to include both 
the biophysical and the economic dimension of agriculture, 
and/or to further downscale results.
The selection of baseline drivers and the development 
of scenarios in Scenar 2030 were performed through a 
number of participatory workshops with several colleagues 
from the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DG AGRI) representing a broad range of 
expertise.
Although	 important	 efforts	 have	 been	made	 to	 address	
in particular the empirical bases of the impact of policy 
measures, limitations exist and these are conveyed 
throughout the report. Indeed, the main caveat noted in 
the Scenar 2020 report continues to apply, namely that 
‘The reader is reminded that no scenario study can claim 
to present what will happen, but merely can portray what 
may happen.	What	 is	 important	afterwards	is	that	these	
eventualities are debated, and that the necessary choices 
concerning the future of agriculture and the rural world are 
as fully informed as possible.’ (Nowicki et al., 2007).
1.3 | Structure of the report
Chapter 2 explains the rationale behind the selection 
of drivers and describes the scenarios. Chapter 3 gives 
an overview of the models employed in the study and 
how relevant policies are represented in the models. 
Furthermore,	it	details	a	number	of	refinements	that	have	
been made to the parameterisation of the models. Chapter 
3 elaborates on the model chain. Chapter 4 explains the 
design and implementation of the baseline (or reference 
scenario), including the relevant assumptions and how 
they interact with the narratives or storylines within each 
of the scenarios. Chapter 5 presents the results of the 
reference scenario.
Chapters 6 to 9 describe the results. Finally, chapter 10 
provides a consolidated analysis.
In	 many	 places,	 the	 interested	 reader	 can	 find	 links	 to	
additional studies or material. This report is also accompanied 
by interactive infographics available under https://datam.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
2 DEVELOPING DRIVERSAND SCENARIOS
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The agricultural sector, with its multiple linkages to the 
biophysical and socioeconomic spheres, is a central 
element	in	the	EU’s	strive	to	achieve	long-term	sustainable	
development. Several European policy initiatives and 
strategies	affect	and	are	affected	by	the	agricultural	sector	
and the CAP as illustrated in Figure 1.
Developing drivers and scenarios2
2.1 | Drivers of the agricultural sector
FIGURE 1: THE CAP IN THE CONTEXT OF DIFFERENT EU AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES.
Source: own presentation.
In the recent literature, the ‘grand challenges’ are 
exhaustively	 discussed	 and	 different	 pathways	 to	 more	
sustainable development are proposed (see, for example, 
EXPO	 2015	 EU	 Scientific	 Steering	 Committee,	 2015;	
European Commission, 2015; IPES Food, 2015; Maggio 
et al., 2015; European Commission, 2016a; European 
Commission, 2016b; Hubeau, 2017).
For	 the	 present	 study,	 the	 identification	 and	 (in	 part)	
quantification	 of	 drivers	 were	 elaborated	 in	 2016	 during	
participatory	workshops	with	experts	from	different	units	of	
DG AGRI in the preparatory phase of the modelling exercise. 
The	decisions	on	whether	or	not	to	include/change	specific	
drivers were also based on considerations of a time horizon 
of less than 15 years and, in some cases, more pragmatic 
concerns relating to the model’s capabilities.
Concerning environmental drivers, the following aspects 
were considered:
● The impact of climate change on agricultural 
production: this could be a common trend for all 
scenarios. However, given that the main impacts are 
not	 expected	 until	 after	 2030,	 the	 high	 degree	 of	
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uncertainty as to what those impacts might be and 
that the focus of this study is on options for the CAP, 
climate change induced impacts were not included.
● Water availability for agriculture: a diminishing trend is 
anticipated, although within the period in question this 
impact is expected to be relatively limited. Indeed, this 
factor is directly linked to the uncertainty surrounding 
different	potential	climate	change	scenarios.
●	 Yield	growth	in	the	EU	and	the	world:	this	should	follow	
current	trends	with	steady	growth	in	the	EU,	while	the	
rest	of	the	world	is	likely	to	close	the	yield	gap.	The	EU	
trend could foreseeably change in response to legislative 
alterations	 or	 the	 acceptance	 of	 genetically	 modified	
organisms. In broader terms, the question of yield is also 
linked to the development of factor productivity, i.e. the 
uptake of technological advancements. However, such 
issues are not considered in this study.
● Arable land: a continuation of a slightly decreasing or 
stable	trend	in	land	use	in	the	EU	is	expected.
Concerning economic drivers, the following aspects 
were considered:
● Macroeconomic and demographic trends: these are 
expected	to	follow	the	most	recently	available	official	
projections.
● Biomass use: this was seen as a central question. How-
ever, the knowledge base is not yet available. The JRC, 
mandated by several Directorate-Generals of the Euro-
pean Commission, is currently carrying out an assess-
ment	 on	 EU	 and	 global	 biomass	 supply	 and	 demand	
and its (environmental, social and economic) sustain-
ability (https://biobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/page/biomass-as-
sessment-study-jrc).
● Immigration: at the time of the preparation of this 
study, the so-called immigration crisis was culminating. 
For	 CAP	 options	 specifically,	 no	 important	 influence	
could	be	identified.
● The food budget as a proportion of the total budget: 
continuation of the current, slightly decreasing trend is 
expected.
● Structure of the agri-food supply chain: it is expected 
that more foreign and global players will intervene. The 
quantification	of	this,	however,	is	difficult.
●	 Domestic	 agricultural	 policies	 outside	 the	 EU:	
generally, an increase in subsidies in China, India and 
other emerging countries is expected. The impact on 
trade	is	difficult	to	estimate.	A	further	consideration	is	
the need to recognise and include trade liberalisation 
agreements.
● Biofuel use: a renewal of the mandate in 2020 is not 
seen as a realistic option. An intermediate solution 
with the best available assumptions, as in the DG AGRI 
market outlook (December 2015), was agreed.
● Price of energy: given the price volatility in energy 
markets,	 this	 is	 difficult	 to	 gauge.	 The	 report	 should	
include several scenarios of energy price level.
Concerning social drivers, the following aspects were 
considered:
● Enlargement and development policies (Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), food security): compared 
with the status quo, no changes are expected.
●	 Population	 dynamics	 in	 the	 EU:	 a	 continuation	 of	
growth pattern trends is expected. Whereas rural/
urban demographic developments shall have only 
little impact on the food demand side, important 
implications are foreseeable for social issues.
● Social and redistributive policies: no implications for 
the CAP can be foreseen until 2030.
● Consumer preferences: this is seen as an important 
issue. Whereas the trend for increasing animal protein 
consumption worldwide is expected to continue, 
the	 EU	might	 experience	 a	 slightly	 decreasing	 trend,	
with	 the	 prevalence	 of	 fish	 in	 the	 diet	 stagnating.	
Environmental or animal welfare legislation could also 
influence	consumer	preferences.
●	 Number	 of	 farmers	 in	 the	 EU:	 the	 current,	 strongly	
decreasing	trend	could	slow	down	in	response	to	specific	
policies. External factors, e.g. improved competitiveness 
in other countries, are also taken into account.
The outcomes of the driver analysis in the workshops 
were condensed and translated into a consistent reference 
scenario (baseline) framework and two alternative 
scenarios.
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A multitude of scenarios can be imagined. The focus of this 
study is on agricultural policies; however, taking a holistic 
perspective, to develop a framework for coherent policy-
making,	other	influencing	policies	are	also	taken	into	account.
Comparing with a reference scenario, the three scenarios 
described below, developed jointly with various DG AGRI 
experts,	take	polar	paths	to	characterise	different	visions	
for the CAP.
The third scenario (‘NoCAP’), a variation of the second 
scenario (‘Lib&Prod’), is described in the IIA as ‘No policy’, 
and	is	considered	useful	for	demonstrating	the	EU	value-
added of the CAP.
2.2 | Scenario narratives
This	scenario	presents	an	EU	agricultural	policy	developed	
as	part	of	a	broader	EU	strategy,	striving	towards	circular	
and sustainable development for Europe in 2030. Within 
this policy vision, the agricultural sector, as the primary 
custodian of land and environmental management, 
should ensure the sustainable use of natural resources in 
rural landscapes and the provision of wider public goods 
to society. Nevertheless, providing food and agricultural 
products continues to be a priority to ensure food and 
nutrition	security	in	the	EU	and	elsewhere.	Therefore,	the	
main	aim	of	EU	agricultural	 policy	 is	 to	help	 farmers	 to	
find	a	balance	between	the	provision	of	public	goods	and	
ensuring farm incomes from the market.
The equilibrium between providing public and private 
goods	will	differ	between	farms	based	on	their	 individual	
characteristics: location, farm structure, resources availa-
ble, etc. These individual characteristics translate into dif-
ferent farming practices, product typologies and qualities 
of public goods provision. This scenario requires farmers 
to	make	a	rational	assessment	of	their	specific	situations	
and decide what their individual preferences and abilities 
to provide private and public goods are, in order to ensure a 
fair income. For this to materialise, the policy design has to 
be	flexible,	targeted	and	conditional	on	farmer	behaviour.
The key policy assumptions under this scenario are:
●	 The	 EU	 budget	 for	 agricultural	 policy	 is	 kept	 at	 the	
current level.
● The basic direct payment is substantially reduced and 
the process of both internal and external convergence 
is continued. This basic income layer requires that the 
farmer follow some basic practices (further elaborated 
good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC) 
and cross compliance).
● Additional direct payments can be provided to the 
farmer conditional on compliance with more stringent 
requirements (50% of current direct payment). Within 
the reality of the models, this translates into stronger 
greening requirements (crop rotation, 10% ecological 
focus area (EFA) without alternative practices and the 
maintenance of permanent grassland)
●	 Coupled	support	is	minimised	and	is	only	justified	if	the	
production	provides	a	specific	public	good.	An	example	
could be extensive livestock grazing to maintain 
grasslands in less productive areas.
● Price support measures (intervention and threshold 
prices) or supply management do not have a place in 
this scenario, as they target uniform bulk commodities 
where prices are a result of world markets and co-
movement with other commodity prices.
● The reduction of direct payments and market measures 
allows	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 budget	 towards	 programmed	
policies and the current rural development measures.
● Farmers in areas with high natural value or natural 
constraints receive an extra payment. However, this 
payment is conditional on the farming practices 
providing a service to the area. It should not lead to 
the maintenance of the resource damaging production 
systems in those areas.
2.2.1 Income & Environment: farmers striking a balance between public  
and private goods
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● Strong Pillar 2 support is given towards:3
— agri-environmental and climate change measures;
— investment in human capital;
— investment in physical capital: investment should 
contribute either towards the development of 
value-added production or the provision of public 
goods; investment support should not be targeted 
at substituting resources, i.e. labour for capital.
●	 Trade	policies	follow	a	status	quo.	The	EU	preference	
is to advance multilateral trade agreements, as they 
also look at other aspects such as domestic support for 
agriculture. Further free trade area agreements, where 
the focus is solely on market access, have little value 
for	the	EU,	as	it	is	not	interested	in	commodity	goods	
entering	the	EU	market.	However,	progress	is	made	on	
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and non-trade 
barriers (NTBs) as they ensure that imports are in line 
with	EU	consumer	demands	and	ensure	that	EU	val-
ue-added products have access to third countries.
●	 Given	the	EU	push	towards	a	circular	and	sustainable	
economy, environmental policy is stringent. This will 
result in strong greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduc-
tion targets for all economic sectors including agricul-
ture.
● Biofuels based on agricultural products are not active-
ly supported in this scenario following the incorpora-
tion	of	indirect	land	use	change	(ILUC)	values	and	GHG	
emissions	into	EU	energy	legislation.
The	Lib&Prod	scenario	presents	an	EU	agricultural	policy	
focused on providing quality agricultural commodities and 
food	in	a	globally	competitive	market.	As	a	result,	the	EU	
should become a key player in ensuring food and nutrition 
security throughout the world. The agricultural sector is 
treated the same as most other sectors of the economy in 
that it is forced to focus on competitive products and gain 
its income solely from the market. In this scenario, it is 
assumed	that	the	EU’s	agriculture-specific	market	support	
policies will be abolished by 2030. The remaining policies 
mainly focus on ensuring a competitive and innovative 
sector by targeting investment and the restructuring of the 
sector. Market competitiveness is achieved by lowering 
costs and optimising economies of scale. Farmers, sub-
ject to available physical and labour endowments, pursue 
greater market orientation by focusing on those products 
demanded by the global market.
The volatile nature of agricultural commodity markets, 
determined by unforeseen climatic events and animal 
diseases, and a strong co-movement with general com-
modity markets, means that farmers are exposed to price 
and	income	fluctuations.	Therefore,	a	system	is	needed	to	
ensure that farmers can continue to operate under such 
market disruptions. This safety net should support farmers 
in	bad	years	and	be	financed	by	farmers	in	good	years.	Be-
cause of asymmetric information issues and the systemic 
risk of such schemes, a policy to support the setup of such 
an	EU-wide	income	stabilisation	tool	seems	needed.
The key policy assumptions under this scenario include:
● The abolishment of the direct payment scheme. This 
includes both the basic payment and the conditional 
greening part of the payment.
● Coupled production support is abolished.
● No supply management of price support measures are 
foreseen. The markets should regulate themselves to 
ensure an equilibrium between demand and supply
● The RDP is drastically reduced. Some measures are 
maintained and other schemes would complement the 
current system:
— support to young farmers to start or assume con-
trol of a farm, to ensure restructuring in the sector;
3	In	the	MAGNET	model,	all	Pillar	2	measures	are	classified	under	five	categories:	agri-environmental,	LFAs,	investment	in	physical	capital,	investment	
in human capital and other measures.
2.2.2 Liberalisation & Productivity: low-cost farming in an open world
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2.2.3 NoCAP: farming without a CAP
— investment support to modernise the chain and re-
alise economies of scale;
— investments in human capital to ensure a well-ed-
ucated, versatile farmer population.
●	 To	be	globally	competitive,	the	EU	takes	a	strong	step	
towards	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 its	 markets.	 Significant	
progress is made in bilateral trade agreements ensur-
ing increased market access for export-oriented prod-
ucts and access to cheap inputs and commodities.
● Multilateral trade negotiations are not only expected 
to	advance	market	access,	but	would	also	fit	with	the	
view	of	EU	agricultural	policies.
● Climate policy will be a reality by 2030. Binding GHG 
emissions	targets	will	be	set	for	the	different	economic	
sectors.	However,	 the	 impacts	on	EU	agriculture	may	
be moderate, as some of the GHG-intensive sectors 
(livestock) might decrease in this scenario, while the 
modernisation of the sector will ensure that the most 
efficient	technologies	are	used.
This scenario is a variant of the Lib&Prod scenario. In 
addition to the removal of Pillar 1 payments, all Pillar 2 
payments are also eliminated. The assumptions guiding 
trade policy are identical to those in the Lib&Prod scenario.
The IIA describes this option as follows: ‘Option 2 (no 
policy) while dismantling CAP would not be in line with the 
Treaty, hence not realistic nor desirable, this scenario is 
considered	 nonetheless	 useful	 in	 demonstrating	 the	 EU	
value-added of CAP as well as the economic, social and 
environmental	impact	of	the	absence	of	an	EU-wide	policy	
intervention.’
3 THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH OF SCENAR 
2030
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The	 scientific	 literature	 (e.g.	 IPES Food, 2015), pol-
icy-oriented research (e.g. EXPO	 2015	 EU	 Scientif-
ic Steeering Committee, 2015; Maggio et al., 2015; 
European Commission, 2016b) and policy-makers (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016a) stress the need for a sys-
tem-based approach.
The	final	paper	on	a	strategic	approach	for	EU	agricultural	
research and innovation elaborates on socioeconomic 
research	and	support	for	EU	policies:
‘The system-based approach requires socioeconomic 
research to be embedded in all relevant research and 
innovation activities. Indeed socioeconomic research is 
critical	to	the	design	and	implementation	of	efficient	and	
effective	 policies	 affecting	 rural	 territories	 and	 food	 and	
non-food systems. This concerns a range of policies, not 
just the CAP, and requires attention at various levels (e.g. 
both by individuals and society; from local to global, from 
sectoral land use to integrated landscape management). In 
addition, research has a strong role to play in contributing 
to the development of the analytical tools and models 
which	 are	 necessary	 for	 assessing	 the	 EU	 policies	
concerned. In view of the various objectives that apply to 
policies targeting agriculture, forestry and rural economies 
and societies at large (environmental, economic and 
social objectives), it is important that these analytical 
tools and models are able to cover a large range of issues 
at various geographical scales. This may necessitate a 
greater integration of models and data. Socioeconomic 
research needs to be harnessed to assess the economic 
sustainability of the various activities relevant in rural 
areas, including farming and forestry activities, taking due 
account of the social and environmental dimensions. The 
development of suitable standards to measure, assess, 
monitor and ensure a healthy functioning of the food or 
non-food supply chains need to be given due attention.’ 
(European Commission, 2016b, p. 31).
The approach selected in Scenar 2030 acknowledges these 
requirements and addresses many of the challenges raised.
The	use	of	 three	different	models	 (MAGNET,	CAPRI,	 IFM-
CAP) allows the inclusion of a wide range of factors while 
connecting global markets to individual farms (see section 
3.1). All models were updated and equipped with the 
requested policy modules.
The use of partial equilibrium (PE) and CGE models 
enables	the	inclusion	of	different	policies	that	influence	the	
development of the agricultural sector (see section 3.2).
Section 3.3 discusses a number of observations and caveats 
that the reader should be aware of when interpreting the 
results from simulation models.
A	 major	 effort	 was	 undertaken	 to	 improve	 the	 model	
parametrisation. This is crucial to enable the model 
calculations to be based more on empirical evidence, 
e.g. through econometric estimations, updated literature 
searches and consultation with experts.
Broadly speaking, the connection of models can be 
performed	 either	 through	 ‘soft-linking’	 or	 ‘hard-linking’.	
Some	 advancement	 in	 soft-linkage	 has	 been	 made	 in	
harmonising model outlooks through assumptions and 
calibration to the projections of agricultural markets. 
Further improvements focusing on hard-linkages are 
ongoing	and	should	be	implemented	only	after	a	careful	
assessment. Section 3.4 and the annexes provide further 
discussion of these topics.
It should be noted that, throughout Chapter 3, a number 
of	insights	and	links	to	several	scientific	studies	by	well-
known researchers are provided which look at further 
developing the data and modelling tools for Scenar 2030 
and upcoming studies.
The methodological approach of Scenar 20303
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MAGNET (Woltjer & Kuiper, 2014) is a multiregion CGE 
model which is a derivative of the well-known GTAP 
model. It is developed and applied by Wageningen 
Economic	 Research	 (WECR)	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Wageningen and is also employed by the Thünen Institute 
(TI) and the JRC. MAGNET has been recently used at the 
European Commission (JRC) for an economic analysis on 
the	 cumulative	 effects	 of	 trade	 agreements	 on	 the	 EU	
agricultural sector (Boulanger et al., 2016a) as well the 
bioeconomy (Phillipidis et al., 2016). In 2015 the grounds 
for modelling the CAP with MAGNET were developed 
(Boulanger & Phillipidis, 2016).
As a GTAP model derivative, MAGNET is calibrated to 
the GTAP Version 9 database with 2011 as a reference 
year (Aguiar et al., 2016). The GTAP database describes 
production,	use	and	international	trade	flows	of	goods	and	
services,	 as	well	 as	 primary	 factor	 use	 differentiated	 by	
sectors. The GTAP database distinguishes 140 countries 
or	 regions	 (among	 them	 the	 28	 EU	 MSs),	 57	 sectors	
and 5 factor endowments. It is based on country input–
output tables and includes consistent bilateral trade 
flows,	 transport	and	protection	data.	Additional	datasets	
are	 used	 for	 specific	 MAGNET	 modules	 to	 make	 the	
analysis richer. The sources of these datasets include the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization	of	the	United	Nations	(FAO),	the	United	States	
Department	of	Agriculture	(USDA)	and	the	CATS	database	
for CAP analysis. The choice of regions4 and sectors5 from 
the	database	can	be	flexibly	aggregated	to	set	up	a	model	
version	specific	for	the	problem	in	question.
By construction, quantities and values in neoclassical CGE 
models are equal in the benchmark year because of the 
assumption that prices in the model are normalised to 1. 
CGE models employ convenient functional forms which are 
typically linearly homogenous (homogeneous of degree 
1), which implies that quantity changes remain invariant 
to changes in the general price level. In the absence of 
any ‘money illusion’, it means that standard neoclassical 
CGE models typically provide very little insight about the 
role	of	financial	markets.	Hence,	the	focus	of	these	model	
is	 on	 how	movements	 in	 relative	 prices	 affect	 resource	
allocations,	output	and	income	flows	within	the	economy.	
Keeping this in mind, one can quantify CGE model results 
as changes either in quantities or in values. The former 
would	ignore	the	effects	of	changes	in	relative	prices	due	
to changing demand and supply conditions. The latter, on 
the	other	hand,	would	 reflect	 the	changes	 in	values	and	
prices together.
Within this class of mathematical market simulation 
models, MAGNET consists of a system of three types 
of equations. First, ‘behavioural equations’ employing 
‘convenient’ mathematical functions represent, under 
conditions of constrained optimisation, the theoretical 
tenets of neoclassical economic demand and supply. 
Subject to a series of ‘market clearing’ (i.e. supply equals 
demand) and ‘accounting’ equations (i.e. income equals 
expenditure	 equals	 output;	 zero	 ‘economic’	 profits),	 and	
consistent with the underlying accounting conventions of 
the database, the model enforces ‘equilibrium’. To solve 
the model, the number of equations and (endogenous) 
variables within the system must be the same (known 
as the model ‘closure’). Additional variables under the 
direct	 control	 of	 the	 modeller	 (defined	 as	 ‘exogenous’),	
which capture market imperfections (tax rates), factor 
endowments or technological change, can be manipulated 
or	‘shocked’,	whereupon	the	model	finds	a	new	matrix	of	
prices and quantities to arrive at a post-shock equilibrium 
subject to the aforementioned accounting and market 
clearing restrictions.
A key strength of the MAGNET model is that it allows the 
user to choose a la carte those sub-modules of relevance 
to	a	specific	study.	The	user	can	(inter	alia)	choose	between	
different	 nesting	 structures;	 apply	 different	 assumptions	
about	the	workings	of	the	factor	markets;	include	different	
agricultural, trade and biofuel policy mechanisms; and 
incorporate dynamic assumptions relating to investment 
allocation over time.
To characterise the peculiarities of agricultural markets, 
the model accounts for the heterogeneity of land use by 
3.1 | Models used
3.1.1 MAGNET
4 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/regions.asp?Version=9.211.
5 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/v9/v9_sectors.asp.
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agricultural activity; a regional endogenous land supply 
function; the sluggish mobility of capital and labour 
transfer between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors 
with	associated	wage	and	rent	differentials;	the	inclusion	
of	explicit	substitution	possibilities	between	different	feed	
inputs in the livestock sectors; and additional behavioural 
and	accounting	equations	to	characterise	EU	agricultural	
policy mechanisms (e.g. production quotas, the Single Farm 
Payment (SFP), coupled payments, rural development 
measures) (Boulanger & Philippidis, 2015).
The results of the MAGNET model are typically presented 
in value terms or in price and quantity percentage chang-
es. The MAGNET model compiles a large number of in-
dicators,	 in	 particular	 related	 to	 production,	 trade	 flows,	
consumption, use of endowments, intermediate input use, 
income and price changes, land use, emissions and em-
ployment. An overview of the standard GTAP variables can 
be found here: https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/mod-
els/setsVariables.asp.
As an additional tool of analysis, this study draws on the 
GEMPACK decomposition method known as ‘sub-
totals’ based on the pioneering work of Harrison et al. 
(2000).	More	specifically,	on	 running	a	complex	scenario	
with	an	array	of	shocks	(i.e.	endowments,	tariffs,	technol-
ogy change, etc.), it is possible to calculate the part-worth 
of the resulting endogenous variable change that corre-
sponds	 to	 a	 specific	 exogenous	 shock,	 or	 pre-specified	
group of exogenous shocks. Thus, when comparing each 
of the scenarios with the reference scenario, the compara-
tive ‘part-worth’ importance of the four policy indicators is 
evaluated in order to better understand the role that policy 
has to play (if any) in shaping bio-based market trends.
3.1.2 CAPRI
The CAPRI modelling system is a comparative static PE 
model for the agricultural sector developed for policy and 
market impact assessments from global to regional and 
farm-type scales. The model has been used for the ex ante 
impact assessment of various agricultural, environmental 
and trade policy options. Typical model results include 
simulated impacts on agricultural production, trade, 
commodity prices, and producer and consumer welfare, 
as well as environmental indicators, calculated in a 
consistent modelling framework. Examples of relevant 
model	 applications	 include	 the	 first	 Scenar	 2020	 study	
(Nowicki, et al., 2007), the assessment of the impact of 
the CAP ‘Health Check’ reforms on the dairy sector (Witzke 
et al., 2009), the assessment of the impacts of a possible 
EU–Mercosur	trade	deal	(Burrell	et	al.,	2011),	the	analysis	
of	the	effects	of	the	expiry	of	the	EU	sugar	quota	system	
(Burrell et al., 2014), an examination of agriculture in the 
context of climate change mitigation (Van Doorslaer et al., 
2015) (Pérez Dominguez et al., 2016) and an assessment 
of the impacts of CAP greening measures (Gocht et al., 
2017).
The following brief description of CAPRI is based on 
the most recent CAPRI documentation (Britz & Witzke, 
2014). More details are available (including the list of 
commodities and geographical coverage) on the CAPRI 
web page (www.capri-model.org).
The core of the CAPRI modelling system consists 
of European-focused template6 models for primary 
agricultural supply linked to a spatial multicommodity 
model for global agri-food markets. The supply models are 
independent, non-linear programming models covering 
the	 EU,	 Norway,	 the	 Western	 Balkans	 and	 Turkey.	 They	
represent the major agricultural production activities at 
regional level7 (Gocht & Britz, 2010). The programming 
models follow a positive mathematical programming 
(PMP) approach (Howitt, 1995; Heckelei et al., 2012) that 
combines linear cost terms for variable inputs with non-
linear	cost	terms	capturing	the	effects	of	labour	and	capital	
on farmers’ decisions, and allowing perfect calibration. The 
non-linear cost function allows perfect calibration of the 
models and a smoother simulation response than linear 
approaches. Each regional programming model optimises 
the	 profit	 of	 the	 representative	 farm	 under	 restrictions	
related to land availability, nutrient balances for cropping 
and animal activities, and, if applicable, policy obligations. 
Decision	 variables	 of	 the	 profit	 maximisation	 models	
include crop areas, herd sizes, fertiliser application rates, 
irrigated	 water	 use	 and	 a	 cost-effective	 feed	 mix.	 With	
6	The	supply	models	for	all	regions	or	farm	types	are	structurally	identical;	differences	are	due	to	parameterisation.
7	Regional	level	refers	to	NUTS2	under	the	Classification	of	Territorial	Units	for	Statistics.	Currently	CAPRI	has	225	regional	aggregate	programming	
models	for	the	EU-28.
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respect to policy implementation, the CAP is depicted in 
great detail in the regional supply models (including both 
Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 instruments). Direct payments are 
linked	 to	 specific	 production	 activities,	 while	 a	 number	
of rural development and agro-environmental subsidies 
are linked to agricultural land. Prices are exogenous to 
the supply module; they are updated and provided by the 
global market module in each iteration.
The global market module is a multiregional and 
multicommodity model for about 60 primary and processed 
agricultural products, covering about 80 countries/country 
blocks, which are organised into 40 trading blocks. 
The market module is a squared system of equations 
consisting of behavioural equations representing supply 
and demand for primary agricultural and processed 
commodities (including human and feed consumption, 
biofuel use and import demand from multilateral trade 
relations), balancing constraints and model-endogenous 
policy	 instruments	 (e.g.	 tariff	 rate	 quotas).	 Agricultural	
land	 is	 identified	 as	 a	 specific	 production	 factor,	 and	
total	 utilised	 agricultural	 area	 (UAA)	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	
an equilibrium between land demand for production 
activities and potential land supply, taking into account 
estimated	 land	 buffers.	 Import	 demand	 is	 modelled	
following the Armington approach (Armington, 1969); 
products	 are	 differentiated	 by	 place	 of	 origin,	 allowing	
the	simulation	of	bilateral	trade	flows	and	the	calibration	
to simultaneous imports and exports (cross-hauling) 
of	 the	 same	 commodity	 that	 is	 often	 observed	 in	 trade	
statistics. Bilateral import prices are derived by taking 
into account trade policy measures at the border, such as 
tariffs,	 tariff-rate	 quotas	 (TRQs),	 variable	 levies	 and	 the	
entry-price system for fruits and vegetables. Some further 
market measures, such as public intervention and export 
subsidies, are also implemented. The market module of 
CAPRI delivers (equilibrium) commodity prices for the 
supply	module,	 and	allows	global	market	 effects	on	 the	
EU	and	national	scales	to	be	pinned	down.
The CAPRI system features an agricultural database on 
EU	 and	 other	 European	 countries	 compiled	mainly	 from	
Eurostat datasets and made consistent with the model 
structure, named CoCo (for complete and consistent). 
CAPRI includes a routine to break down CoCo consistently 
to	 the	 regional	 (NUTS	 2)	 and	 farm-type	 levels,	 named	
CAPREG. The database of the global CAPRI market 
model is mainly based on FAOSTAT datasets on market 
balances and international trade, extended with trade 
statistics	from	COMEXT	and	UN-COMTRADE.	Global	trade	
policies	for	non-EU	countries	are	mainly	calibrated	to	the	
MAcMap-HS6 data of the International Trade Centre (ITC). 
Other important data sources include the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and the CORINE 
Land Cover databases.
CAPRI also takes advantage of projections derived by 
other simulation models. The AGLINK-COSIMO model of 
the OECD and FAO provides inputs for the development of 
agricultural and food commodity markets. PRIMES provide 
information on the development of bioenergy-related 
agricultural production at the national level. GLOBIOM 
provides vital information on the costs of GHG mitigation 
technologies in agriculture.
With regard to the behavioural parameters, the regional/
farm-type	 supply	 response	 is	 technically	 defined	 by	 the	
PMP calibration approach which builds on time series 
data on land use, price and cost developments (Jansson 
& Heckelei, 2011). The parameters of the global market 
model are synthetic, i.e. to a large extent taken from the 
literature and other modelling systems, but consistency 
with microeconomic economic theory (e.g. homogeneity 
conditions, correct curvature) is ensured by several 
elasticity calibration routines.
Following a comparative static approach for impact 
assessment, CAPRI requires a comparison point, a so-called 
baseline, against which the counterfactual scenarios are 
evaluated. The baseline is in fact a projected equilibrium 
state of the economy. For medium-term baselines, the 
price-quantity structure of the model is calibrated to the 
annual	report	‘Medium-term	prospects	for	EU	agricultural	
markets and income’ of the European Commission (DG 
AGRI, 2015). To produce longer-term baselines, as was 
done for this study, trend estimations and other model 
projections also need to be exploited.
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3.1.3 IFM-CAP
The IFM-CAP model is designed for the economic and en-
vironmental analysis of the European agricultural systems 
at the farm level. Rather than to provide forecasts or pro-
jections, the model aims to generate scenarios — or “what 
if” — analyses. It simulates how a given scenario, for ex-
ample a change in prices, farm resource, or environmental 
and	agricultural	policies	might	affect	a	set	of	performance	
indicators important to decision makers and stakeholders. 
Performance indicators include, among others, changes 
in crop allocation, input use, crop and animal production, 
farm income, livestock density and CAP expenditures.
The	IFM-CAP	is	a	PMP	model,	which	builds	on	the	EU-FADN	
data,	 and	 is	 complemented	 by	 other	 relevant	 EU-wide	
data sources such as Eurostat, the Farm Structure Survey 
(FSS), the CAPRI database, etc. In order to achieve the best 
representativeness and to capture the full heterogeneity 
of	the	EU	farm,	all	farms	represented	in	the	FADN	sample	
in the year 2012 (around 80,000 farms) are individually 
modelled (Louhichi et al., 2017a, b).
The IFM-CAP model distinguishes 53 activities.
Crop	 activities	 (38):	 soft	 wheat,	 durum	 wheat,	 rye	 and	
meslin, barley, oats, grain maize, other cereals, rape, sun-
flower,	 soya,	other	oilseed,	other	 industrial	 crops,	nurser-
ies,	flowers,	other	crops,	new	energy	crops,	fodder	maize,	
fodder root crops, fodder other on arable land, permanent 
grassland, rough grazing, rice, olive, pulses, potatoes, sug-
ar	beet,	flax	and	hemp,	tobacco,	tomatoes,	other	vegeta-
bles, apples pears and peaches, other fruits, citrus fruits, 
table grapes, table olives, wine, fallow land, set aside.
Animal activities (15): dairy cows, male adult fattening, 
heifers fattening, suckler cows, heifers raising, calves 
male fattening, calves female fattening, calves male rais-
ing, calves female raising, pig fattening, sows, sheep and 
goats for milk production, sheep and goats for fattening, 
laying hens, poultry fattening.
Data: the primary data source used to parameterise the 
IFM-CAP is individual farm-level data from the FADN da-
tabase (FADN, 2015) for the period 2007-2012. The FADN 
data	are	complemented	by	other	external,	EU-wide	data	
sources such as the FSS and CAPRI databases for varia-
bles not available in FADN (Figure 2). However, most of 
these external data are not directly used in the model but 
used as inputs in the estimations. All farms represented in 
the FADN sample in the year 2012 (around 80,000 farms), 
used as the base year, are included in the model. Howev-
er, in order to improve the model parameterisation, past 
observations (2007-2012) on yields, prices and input unit 
costs for these farms are also exploited (e.g. to construct 
price expectations).
Dynamics: as the IFM-CAP is a comparative static sup-
ply model that does not take into account the dynamics 
of market developments and market interlinkages (price 
feedback), the baseline construction relies on an external 
baseline. We use the CAPRI baseline to construct the IFM-
CAP baseline for the year 2030, taken as the time horizon 
for running policy simulations.
To construct the IFM-CAP baseline, three assumptions are 
adopted: (1) a continuation of the current CAP up to 2030; 
(2)	an	assumed	 inflation	 rate	of	1.9%	per	year	for	 input	
costs, as for the CAPRI baseline; and (3) an adjustment 
of baseline prices and yields using growth rates from the 
CAPRI baseline. As the CAPRI growth rates of yields and 
prices	are	defined	at	NUTS	2	level,	we	impose	the	same	
growth	rate	on	all	farms	belonging	to	the	same	NUTS	2	
region. It is assumed that all the other parameters (e.g. 
farm resource endowments and farm weighting factors) 
will remain unchanged up to 2030. The generated base-
line is used as a reference point for the comparison of the 
effects	of	the	scenarios.
This harmonisation of the IFM-CAP baseline with the CAPRI 
baseline ensures a relatively similar starting point for sub-
sequent scenario analyses. However, despite this harmoni-
sation,	the	simulated	effects	may	not	always	be	the	same,	
as	both	models	differ	in	a	number	of	methodological	as-
pects.	For	example,	the	IFM-CAP	assumes	a	fixed	supply	of	
agricultural land, whereas CAPRI allows for changes in the 
total agricultural land. CAPRI features an upwards-slop-
ing land-supply curve, which allows for land leaving and 
entering the agricultural sector in response to relative 
price	or	policy	changes.	Other	methodological	differences	
between the IFM-CAP and CAPRI include farm-level im-
plementation of polices versus regional-level implemen-
tation of policies, and baseline simulation versus baseline 
calibration, for the IFM-CAP and CAPRI, respectively. These 
methodological	differences	between	models	might	lead	to	
different	responses	of	the	IFM-CAP	and	CAPRI	to	the	policy	
changes simulated in this report.
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Indicators: the IFM-CAP generates a set of indicators cov-
ering land use, animal numbers, production, farm income, 
farm utility, etc. (Figure 2). These indicators can be reported 
at	different	aggregation	levels,	from	MS	and	farm-type	lev-
els up to distribution across the farm population.
Recently, the IFM-CAP has been used for the following pol-
icy assessments:
● to	assess	the	economic	impacts	of	crop	diversification	
measures (Louhichi et al., 2017a);
● as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	 Staff	
Working	Document	‘Review	of	greening	after	one	year’	
(European Commission, 2016c);
● Economic Impacts of CAP greening: An application of 
an	 EU-wide	 Individual	 Farm	 Model	 for	 CAP	 analysis	
(IFM-CAP) (Louhichi et al., 2017b).
■
■
■
■
FADN data 
•Utilised  Agricultural Area (arable 
& grassland)  
• Set of crop and livestock activities  
• Yields, Prices & Subsidies  
• Sugar and milk quota right (when 
available)  
• Observed activity levels  
• Farm level feed costs  
• Farm weighting factor  
• Land and milk quota rental prices 
(prior) 
• Variance  matrix of revenue (prior) 
EUROSTAT data 
• Carcass weights  
CAPRI data 
• Prices and yields for fodder crops 
at MS level  
• Feed prices at MS level  
• Feed nutrient content  
• Price and Yield trends  
• Animal feed requirement functions 
(prior) 
• Elasticities  for feed demand at 
NUTS2 level (prior)  
• Supply elasticities for livestock 
Other data (prior)  
•Out-of quota prices for sugarbeet  
(Agrosynergie , 2011)   
•MS sugarbeet  in-quota production 
(DG-AGRI,2014)  
• In- quota prices for sugar beet 
(Agrosynergie , 2011)  
•Supply elasticities  for crops at 
NUTS2 level ( Jansson  and 
Heckelei , 2011)  
DATA 
• Optimise farm’s 
objectives:     
Expected utility 
maximisation = 
linear gross 
margin - 
quadratic 
behavioural 
function                   
-risk component 
• Subject to: 
• Land constraints 
(arable & 
grassland)
 
• Policy constraints  
(CAP 1 pillar - 
decoupling, 
quotas, greening) 
• Feeding 
constraints (feed 
availability vs. 
feed requirement, 
max share of 
roughage & 
concentrates) 
MODEL 
• Activity levels 
(ha & head) 
• Production 
(Tons) 
• Land use (ha) 
• Input use 
• Farm proﬁt 
(EUR) 
• Farm utility 
(EUR) 
• Environmental 
indicators  
OUTPUTS 
FIGURE 2: IFM-CAP DESCRIPTION.
Source: own presentation.
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The future evolution of the CAP is a key factor for the de-
velopment of the scenarios mentioned above. In general, 
all three models represent the national implementation of 
the CAP. Agricultural policy that is sourced directly from 
national	governments	(vis-a-vis	the	central	EU	budget)	is	
only represented in the MAGNET model using the OECD’s 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE) at MS level.
MAGNET
The JRC has improved the representation of the CAP in the MAG-
NET model (Boulanger & Philippidis, 2014; Boulanger & Philip-
pidis, 2015), fully capturing the allocation of all CAP expendi-
tures, using data from CATS, which gathers details of all CAP 
payments made to the recipients of the EAGF and the EAFRD.
3.2 | The representation of policies in the models
3.2.1 Overview
CAP – direct payments MAGNET CAPRI IFM-CAP
Decoupled payment allocation Subsidy to land, capital and labour Subsidy to land Subsidy to land
SFP model: from historical to regional system ü ü ü
SFP entitlement value convergence, within MSs ü ü
SFP entitlement value convergence, between MSs ü ü ü
Transfers between pillars ü ü ü
Redistributive payment Pillar 1, i.e. top-up to basic payment ü ü
Capping ü ü ü
Voluntary coupled scheme ü ü ü
Green	payment	–	crop	diversification ü ü ü
Green payment – permanent grassland ü ü ü
Green payment –ecological focus area (EFA) ü ü ü
Young farmer scheme
CAP – market measures
Sugar quota (including C sugar) and quota expiry ü ü ü
Isoglucose quota ü
Dairy quota ü ü ü
Intervention and threshold prices ü
Export refunds ü ü
CAP – rural development policies
Area with natural constraints (ANC) ü ü
Agri-environmental measures ü ü
Investment measures (physical and human capital) ü
Other ü
Other policies
Climate change policies ü ü
Biofuel policies ü ü
Trade policies ü ü
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE POLICIES COVERED BY THE THREE MODELS
Note: Complementary National Direct Payments are modelled in CAPRI and IFM-CAP.
The	 models	 represent	 the	 policies’	 details	 in	 different	
ways. Table 1 provides an overview of the policies covered 
by the three models.
3.2.2 Common Agricultural Policy
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Pillar 1 expenditures are represented by both coupled and 
decoupled payments. In the case of decoupled support 
(including greening payments), payments can be assigned 
exclusively and uniformly to land (this guarantees that 
the payments are fully decoupled) or allocated to more 
than	 one	 production	 factor	 according	 to	 pre-specified	
coupling factors. Remaining payments (i.e. coupled direct 
payments, market measures, additional direct transfers, 
other EAGF payments, agri-monetary transfers) are linked 
to	 their	 specific	 output-,	 input-	 and	 endowment-subsidy	
variables in each agricultural activity.
There	are	five	classes	of	Pillar	2	payments:	(1)	investment	
in human capital (vocational training, assisting young 
farmers, use of advisory services, etc.); (2) investment in 
physical capital (modernisation of agricultural holdings, in-
frastructure investments, adding value to agricultural and 
forestry products, etc.); (3) agri-environmental payments 
(Natura 2000 payments, forest-environment payments, 
etc.); (4) less favoured areas (e.g. payments to farmers 
in mountainous areas); and (5) wider rural development 
schemes	 (diversification	 into	 non-agricultural	 activities,	
encouragement of rural tourism, village renewal and 
development, etc.). By their nature, ‘agri-environmental 
schemes’ and ‘least favoured areas’ are almost complete-
ly tied to the land factor, while other Pillar 2 measures 
are linked (in varying degrees) to land, capital, both la-
bour types and intermediate inputs based on the aims of 
the policies and discussions with experts. Concordance 
between 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 Pillar 2 measures 
is not straightforward given (1) changes in the scope of 
measures, (2) the existence of sub-measures, and (3) the 
setup of new measures. In the appendix, based on current 
2007-2013	measure	classification/breakdown	in	MAGNET	
(Tables	A.1	and	A.2)	and	latest	EU	regulations,	breakdowns	
of 2014-2020 RDP measures by MAGNET categories and 
by	GTAP	subsidy	wedges	and	payment	classification	are	
proposed in Tables A.3 and A.4, respectively.
In terms of endogenous CAP payment-induced productivi-
ty	effects,	agro-environmental	schemes	and	greening	pay-
ments	have	land	endowment	productivity-inducing	effects	
(positive and negative, respectively). Investments in phys-
ical capital are posited to lead to increases in productivity 
in agricultural capital, while investments in human capital 
are assumed to increase productivity in agricultural labour.
From the perspective of the own resources of the budget, 
75%	of	each	EU	MS’s	tariff	revenue	 is	collected	(the	re-
maining 25% is assigned to administrative costs), while 
the	proportion	of	this	tariff	revenue	that	finances	the	‘CAP	
budget’	 is	 extrapolated	based	on	 the	CAP’s	 share	of	 EU	
budget expenditure. In line with the European Council 
Agreement of February 2013, from 2014, in addition to the 
Netherlands and Sweden, Denmark has also received an 
(exogenous) annual lump sum transfer payment. The cost 
of these intra-budgetary transfers is met endogenously by 
the	remaining	MSs	as	a	function	of	their	value	share	of	EU	
gross domestic product (GDP). Further equations are used 
to	account	for	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	rebate	and	subse-
quent	corrections	for	other	MSs.	In	accordance	with	the	EU	
budgetary	agreement,	the	UK	rebate	is	calculated	as	66%	
of its net contribution. The (negative) value of rebates for 
remaining	EU	Member	States	 (MSs)	 is	assigned	 to	other	
EU	MSs	by	their	GDP-value	shares	of	the	UK	rebate.	This	
calculation	has	been	modified,	however,	to	account	for	the	
fact that Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
pay	only	25%	of	their	GDP-share	contribution	to	the	UK’s	
rebate,	 which	 is	 compensated	 for	 by	 the	 remaining	 EU	
MSs	in	proportion	to	their	EU	GDP	value	shares.	Addition-
al switch variables are employed to incorporate Croatia 
within	the	CAP	budget’s	own	resources,	the	UK	rebate	and	
subsequent MS correction mechanisms.
Common Market Organisation instruments, such as quotas 
for milk and sugar production, are taken into account even 
though	not	directly	modelled.	In	MAGNET,	EU-28	milk	and	
sugar production are tied to AGLINK. Because no compre-
hensive data are available on quota-constrained changes 
for each and every MS, they are not explicitly modelled.
CAPRI
The implementation of the latest post-2014 CAP reform 
in the CAPRI model implies changes in terms of both the 
budget and applicable policy measures. The interaction 
between premium entitlements and eligible hectares for 
the newly established BPS, Single Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS) and other payments remains explicitly considered. 
For the CAPRI baseline, it is assumed that MS decisions/
notifications	will	not	change	after	2015.
The current CAPRI version explicitly covers those Pillar 1 
direct support measures of the CAP that can be imple-
mented at the national or regional level, such as national 
ceilings for direct payments, basic payments or single area 
payments, and voluntary coupled support (VCS). This level 
can	be	covered	by	CAPRI	at	NUTS	2	level.	The	specificity	of	
the basic payment in terms of its dynamic implementation 
and	the	target	option	(regional,	flat-rate	or	‘tunnel’	model)	
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is also captured. VCS is explicitly modelled by assigning 
the payments to activities eligible for that particular type 
of support. Decoupled area payments are allocated to el-
igible-for-payments	land	and	hence	afterwards	are	attrib-
uted to agricultural activities. Measures that need to be 
implemented at farm level, e.g. payment for agricultural 
practices	 beneficial	 to	 the	 climate	 and	 the	 environment	
(so-called green payments), are captured by application of 
the Shannon index calculated in the CAPRI farm module. 
The shares accounted for by EFA and permanent grass-
land as well as crop diversity requirement are considered. 
Voluntary redistributive payment is implicitly covered in 
the underlying market projections (European Commission, 
2015) as well as by allocating part of the envelope, which 
will, however, be treated as the basic payment and not 
made explicit, since this would require the use of the CA-
PRI model at farm level. The young farmers’ payment, the 
small farmers’ scheme, the reduction of higher payments 
in	cases	where	redistributive	payment	for	first	hectares	is	
applied, and areas with natural constraints are modelled 
in a similar way to basic payment.
The Pillar 2 agri-environmental measures, including in 
relation to areas with natural constraints and Natura 2000 
payments, are implemented as area payments, and the 
share of envelopes is assumed to remain the same, as for 
similar measures in the previous policy planning period.
The	 Common	 Market	 Organisation	 instruments	 –	 tariffs	
and	 tariff	 rate	 quotas	 –	 are	 maintained	 at	 the	 current	
implementation level or schedule, unless new trade 
agreements have already been concluded.
IFM-CAP
The IFM-CAP models all major Pillar 1 measures of 
the 2013 CAP reform. This includes both coupled and 
decoupled direct payments. However, neither the young 
farmer scheme nor the small farmer scheme are modelled 
in IFM-CAP because of data limitations. Rural development 
measures are also not modelled in the current version of 
the IFM-CAP.
Following the 2013 CAP reform, the IFM-CAP takes into 
account the transfer of funds between direct payments 
(Pillar 1) and RDP (Pillar 2), as well as the external 
and internal convergence of the direct payments. The 
modelling of direct payments takes into consideration MS 
heterogeneity in the implementation of the policy.
For decoupled payments, the IFM-CAP considers the 
following policy elements:
● Entitlements: the IFM-CAP considers the maintenance 
of the pre-reform entitlements or the allocation of new 
entitlements depending on the actual implementation 
by a given MS.8	 The	 entitlements	 are	 defined	 based	
on the 2012 base year data for which the IFM-CAP is 
calibrated.
● Internal convergence of decoupled payments (conver-
gence within MSs): this concerns MSs that implement-
ed the historical model or the static hybrid model prior 
to	the	2013	CAP	reform.	Other	schemes	allocated	flat-
rate payments prior to the reform (i.e. SAPS, a regional 
model	or	a	dynamic	hybrid	model	that	moved	to	a	flat	
rate) and thus are not subject to the convergence re-
quirements. The IFM-CAP applies full convergence or 
partial convergence of decoupled payments depend-
ing on the actual implementation in a given MS. This 
implies that the entitlement values are heterogeneous 
across IFM-CAP farms within MSs that apply the par-
tial convergence of decoupled payments.
● Redistributive payment: the redistributive payments 
were considered in the IFM-CAP. In empirical terms, 
the entitlement value of each farm is adjusted by the 
value of the redistributive payment.
● CAP greening: the IFM-CAP models the greening 
payment (30% of the total direct payment) and 
all	 three	 greening	 measures	 (crop	 diversification,	
maintenance of permanent grassland and EFA). The 
implementation of greening restriction is compulsory 
and	farm	specific.
8	Note	that	there	are	several	implementation	restrictions	that	MSs	could	choose	when	allocating	entitlements.	For	example,	for	the	first	option,	MSs	
could impose an additional restriction that the number of entitlements does not exceed the eligible area in 2015. For the second option, MSs could 
limit the allocated entitlements to the minimum between the eligible area in 2013 and the declared eligible area in 2015. Furthermore, for both op-
tions,	MSs	could	choose	to	allocate	fewer	entitlements	for	grassland	(i.e.	to	apply	the	reduction	coefficient)	or	to	exclude	land	cultivated	with	vineyards	
and greenhouse. Alternatively, MSs could grant new entitlements to farmers that were not eligible to receive direct payments under the old system 
(in 2013) such as vegetable producers, vineyards producers, etc. We consider these elements when relevant, but consider 2012 for determining the 
eligible area.
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● Capping of payments: the IFM-CAP accounts for a re-
duction of basic payments to large farms in the MSs in 
which it is implemented.
The IFM-CAP models all major VCS schemes. The model 
takes into account the VCS eligibility restrictions at farm 
level (i.e. VCS is allocated to only those farms and/or spe-
cific	sectors	that	are	eligible	for	support	as	defined	by	MSs).
The IFM-CAP models, as closely as possible, the CAP 
greening as adopted by the 2013 CAP reform. The 
implementation of greening restrictions are at farm level.
The modelling of the crop diversification measure 
considers farm-level land allocation in determining which 
farms need to adjust their crop choices. This, following the 
2013 CAP reform, applies to only farms with an arable 
area greater than 10 ha. Farms with more than 75% of 
their total eligible land covered by grassland and farms 
with 75% of their arable area cultivated with forage 
are	also	not	 subject	 to	 the	 crop	diversification	measure.	
Furthermore, there are stricter requirements for farms 
with more than 30 ha of arable land than for farms with 
an arable land area of between 10 and 30 ha. The latter 
farms	need	to	have	at	 least	two	different	crops	and	the	
main crop should not exceed 75% of the arable land area. 
The former farms are required to have at least three crops, 
the main crop should not cover more than 75% of the 
arable land area and the two main crops together should 
not cover more than 95% of the arable land area.
For the maintenance of permanent grassland 
measure, the IFM-CAP imposes land use restrictions at 
farm level on concerned farms, requiring them to maintain 
a ratio of grassland to total agricultural area of not lower 
than 5% of the reference ratio. Furthermore, under this 
measure, farms are restricted in term of ploughing and 
converting permanent grassland in areas designated by 
the MS as environmentally sensitive.9 Two grassland types 
are considered in the IFM-CAP: permanent grassland and 
rough grazing area. The IFM-CAP assumes that farmers 
may rotate between permanent grassland and arable 
land if relative returns change, while rough grazing area is 
assumed to be non-substitutable with other crop activities 
(i.e.	it	is	assumed	to	be	fixed),	as	this	type	of	land	is	usually	
of lower quality. Only permanent grassland is subject to 
the greening measure.
We consider the base year 2012 as the reference year 
for modelling grassland measures, as this is the last year 
for which data are available in the IFM-CAP. That is, we 
calculate the ratio of grassland to total agricultural area 
for 2012 and compare it with the ratio in the baseline. If 
in a MS/region10 the ratio is more than 5% lower in the 
baseline than in the base year, the grassland obligation 
is	imposed	at	farm	level.	Following	the	EU	regulation,	the	
exception is applied to the grassland measure for regions 
where the proportion of forest area is large relative to 
total area. In these regions, the grassland measure is not 
implemented irrespective of the magnitude of grassland 
change. For environmentally sensitive areas, Natura 2000 
grassland is assumed to be subject to the grassland 
measure restriction of no conversion to arable land.11
The EFA measure requires farms larger than 15 ha 
to allocate at least 5% of the farm’s eligible area 
(excluding areas under grassland restriction) to EFA. Areas 
that	 qualify	 as	 EFAs	 include	 land	 left	 fallow,	 terraces,	
landscape	features,	buffer	strips,	agro-forestry,	areas	with	
short	rotation,	afforested	areas,	catch	crops	and	nitrogen-
fixing	crops	(EU,	2013;	EU,	2014).	MSs	can	choose	which	
land elements are eligible to be EFAs. The eligible land 
elements	have	different	weightings	in	contributing	to	EFA	
levels (varying between 0.3 and 30), depending on their 
conversion and weighting factors.
The IFM-CAP considers the following four land elements 
as potential EFAs: (1) fallow land (including voluntary 
set-aside),	 (2)	 afforested	 areas,	 (3)	 catch	 crops	 and	 (4)	
nitrogen-fixing	crops,	with	their	corresponding	weightings	
as	defined	in	the	CAP	regulations.	Other	land	elements	are	
not included in the IFM-CAP because there are no data 
available to capture them at farm level.
Under	 EU	 regulation,	 only	 specific	 crops	 (selected	 by	
each MS) are eligible to be considered catch crops/
green	cover	or	nitrogen-fixing	crops.	Given	 that	 the	 IFM-
CAP has aggregated some activities linked to these land 
 9 These areas could be within ‘Natura 2000’ or outside ‘Natura 2000’.
10 Depending on whether the grassland measure is applied at the national, regional or sub-regional level.
11	Note	that	FADN	contains	information	if	the	majority	of	the	UAA	of	a	farm	is	situated	in	a	Natura	2000	area.	IFM-CAP	assumes	that	the	grassland	area	of	these	farms	
is	an	environmentally	sensitive	area.	Note	that	some	MSs	could	include	areas	outside	Natura-2000	as	sensitive	permanent	grassland	(LV,	LU,	CZ	and	UK-Wales),	whereas	
MSs are not obliged to include all grassland located in Natura 2000 as environmentally sensitive areas. These two elements are not considered in the IFM-CAP as there are 
no information on the exact locations of sensitive grassland area outside Natura 2000 and which Natura 2000 grassland is not designated as sensitive area.
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elements,	 they	 cannot	 be	mapped	 exactly	 with	 specific	
crops as implemented by MSs. We assume that all cereals, 
pulses	 and	 other	 crops	 (as	 defined	 in	 the	 IFM-CAP)	 are	
eligible	 catch	 crops.	 Regarding	 the	 nitrogen-fixing	 crops,	
in	the	IFM-CAP	the	specific	eligible	crops	are	grouped	as	
pulses and/or soya activities. In addition, MSs can specify 
management practices (sowing period, input restriction, 
mixtures,	presence	in	the	field,	geographical	criteria)	that	
need to be applied to the EFA. These additional constraints 
are not incorporated into the IFM-CAP.12
The simulated greening scenario considers EFA imple-
mentation at farm level by assuming a 5% EFA rate. Sim-
ilar	to	the	crop	diversification	measure,	farms	with	more	
than 75% of their total eligible land covered by grassland 
and farms with 75% of their arable area cultivated with 
forage are not subject to the EFA measure. In addition, 
exemptions from the EFA measure are considered for 
MSs with relatively large forest areas.13
12 FADN does not contain information on the farm location; as a result, the collective implementation of EFA (applied in NL and PL) is not considered in IFM-CAP.
13 That is, for regions with forest covering more than 50% of their land surface and if the ratio of forest land to agricultural land is higher than 3:1. Note that, due to data 
limitations	(i.e.	exact	farm	location	is	not	available	in	FADN),	this	exemption	is	applied	at	NUTS	3	and	not	at	LAU-2	as	defined	in	the	regulations.
3.2.3 Climate change policies/greenhouse gas emissions accounting
MAGNET
Under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 GTAP	 consortium,	 the	
development of a global database of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
non-CO2 (methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O),	 fluorinated	
GHG (F gas)) and CO2 equivalent (CO2e) emissions for all 
economic activities is available, benchmarked to 2011 
(compatible with Version 9 of the GTAP database). The 
MAGNET GHG module includes a series of technical 
coefficients	linking	fertiliser	and	combustion	emissions	to	
intermediate input usage by sector and non-combustion 
emissions to sectoral output changes (it is assumed that 
emission	factors	for	different	activities	 remain	constant).	
Carbon	taxes	are	also	included	for	different	configurations	
of environmental emission reduction schemes (e.g. 
ad	 hoc	 single	 sectors,	 diffuse	 sectors,	 domestic	 and/
or international permit trading schemes). The resulting 
tax-induced price changes in tandem with assumptions 
of input substitutability determine the input and output 
changes, consistent with the hypothetical exogenous 
changes in GHG emissions. This application of MAGNET 
does not take into account a more detailed picture of 
climate	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 inclusion	 of	 differentiation	
between	 sectors	 belonging	 to	 the	 EU	 Emissions	 Trading	
Scheme (ETS) and non-ETS sectors, auctioning in the 
power sector and renewable energy targets as laid out 
in the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy policies 
(European Commission, 2014). Thus, country-/region-
specific	 top-down	 shocks	 to	 GHG	 emissions	 could	 be	
applied to generate the emergence of a single country-/
region-wide carbon tax.
CAPRI
The agricultural sector is a large contributor of non-CO2 
GHG emissions, namely methane and nitrous oxide, and 
the CAPRI modelling system is adapted to calculate 
these emissions based on agricultural activities. The 
regional supply models in CAPRI capture links between 
agricultural production activities in detail (e.g. food and 
feed supply and demand interactions or animal life 
cycle, explicit feeding and fertilising activities, i.e. the 
balancing of nutrient needs with availability). Based on 
the inputs and outputs of these activities, agricultural 
GHG emissions are endogenously calculated following 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
guidelines (IPCC, 2006). Generally, a Tier 2 approach is 
used for the calculation of GHG emissions; however, for 
activities where the relevant information is missing, a Tier 
1 approach is applied (e.g. for rice cultivation). The CAPRI 
model’s reporting of agricultural GHG emissions mimics 
the	reporting	of	emissions	by	the	EU	to	the	United	Nations	
Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC).	
A detailed description of the general calculation of 
agricultural emission inventories on activity level in 
CAPRI is given in Leip et al. (2010), Pérez Domínguez et 
al. (2012), and Van Doorslaer et al. (2015). The latest 
model	 developments	 on	 specific	 technological	 GHG	
mitigation options and related improvements regarding 
emission accounting are presented in Van Doorslaer et 
al. (2015), Pérez Dominguez et al. (2016) and Fellmann 
et al. (2017).
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CAPRI also incorporates a module to account for emission 
leakages	 to	 non-EU	 countries.	 Changes	 in	 EU	 policies	 can	
result in changes in imports and exports that can induce 
production	increases	in	non-EU	countries,	and	hence	lead	to	
higher emissions in these regions (i.e. ‘emission leakage’). To 
account	for	emission	impacts	outside	the	EU,	CAPRI	incorpo-
rates	a	specific	module	to	estimate	emission	factors	for	agri-
cultural	products	for	non-EU	countries.	For	a	detailed	descrip-
tion of the CAPRI emission leakage methodology, see Pérez 
Domínguez et al. (2012), Van Doorslaer et al. (2015), Bar-
reiro-Hurle et al. (2016) and Pérez Dominguez et al. (2016).
The calculation of GHG emissions allows the CAPRI 
model to report the impact of (general) policy changes on 
agricultural	GHG	emissions	in	the	EU,	including	the	impact	
of possible climate change-related policies targeting 
reductions in agricultural GHG emissions. Furthermore, 
CAPRI can account for and report policy-induced emission 
leakage	to	non-EU	countries.
IFM-CAP
The	IFM-CAP	does	not	model	climate	policies.	The	effects	
of the climate policies modelled by CAPRI are accounted 
for	 only	 indirectly	 through	 price	 effects,	 as	 the	 IFM-CAP	
uses price developments from CAPRI in all scenarios.
3.2.4 Energy/biofuel policies
MAGNET
EU	biofuel	mandates	are	explicitly	modelled	(with	varying	
degrees of ambition) by imposing exogenous blending 
limits, which are targeted by endogenous subsidies 
on biofuel usage in petroleum paid for by taxes on 
final	 purchases	 of	 petroleum	 (budget	 neutral).	 In	 the	
MAGNET	 database,	 both	 first-generation	 (bioethanol	
and biodiesel) and second-generation (biochemical and 
thermal technologies) biofuels are included, while the 
data also capture animal feed distillers, dried grains and 
solubles (bioethanol by-product), and oilcakes (biodiesel 
by-product). However, it should be noted that no biofuel 
policy change is included in the present exercise.
An enhanced version of the MAGNET database includes three 
fertiliser activities and commodity usage (sub-divided into 
nitrogen (N), phosphorus (as P2O5) and potassium (as K2O)) 
in all agricultural crop sectors for all regions (Von Lampe et 
al., 2014). The original chemical sector is split into four parts 
(inorganic nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium fertilisers, 
plus other chemicals) using data from the International 
Fertilizer Association (IFA) and FAOSTAT; the intermediate 
consumption of fertilisers is calculated for each agricultural 
activity in each region. Given the strong link between 
fertilisers and energy (in particular between nitrogen and 
natural gas, which accounts for the largest proportion of 
the cost involved in producing nitrogen), this database 
improves the link between energy prices, agricultural inputs 
and	agricultural	final	prices,	depicting	more	realistically	the	
current situation of agricultural markets.
CAPRI
CAPRI includes a behavioural market representation for 
biofuels and biofuel feedstocks. The biofuel module is a 
detailed representation of global biofuel markets, covering 
first-	 and	 second-generation	 production	 technologies,	
biofuel by-products, bilateral biofuel trade and a link 
to global fuel markets. From a methodological point of 
view, CAPRI provides an endogenous representation of 
biofuel markets (ethanol and biodiesel), meaning that 
biofuel	 supply	 and	 feedstock	 demand	 react	 flexibly	
to biofuel and feedstock prices, and at the same time 
biofuel	demand	and	bilateral	trade	flows	react	flexibly	to	
biofuel and fossil fuel prices. The CAPRI biofuel module 
allows a detailed analysis of most relevant biofuel 
support instruments, such as consumer tax exemptions or 
quota	obligations,	at	the	EU	MS	and	international	levels.	
In addition, the model permits the analysis of scenarios 
regarding biofuel trade policies and the availability of 
second-generation technologies. For this, the CAPRI 
database includes biofuel information based on many 
sources (the PRIMES and AGLINK-COSIMO models, as 
well as Eurostat, F.O. Licht and national sources). A more 
detailed description of the treatment of biofuels can be 
found in Blanco et al. (2013).
In	the	baseline,	biofuel	production	in	the	EU	stands	at	15.9	
billion	tonnes,	of	which	11.7	billion	tonnes	come	from	first-
generation biofuels and the rest includes a small supply of 
second-generation biofuels (0.2 billion tonnes of ethanol) 
and biofuels from non-agricultural sources. This use of 
39Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
biofuels by the transport sector implies that biofuels will 
account for 7.6% of total fuel use by 2030, of which 1.9% 
of total fuel use will come from biodiesel and 5.7% from 
bioethanol.
IFM-CAP
The IFM-CAP does not model biofuel policies. Similar to cli-
mate	policies,	the	effects	of	the	biofuel	policies	modelled	
by CAPRI are accounted for only indirectly through price 
effects,	as	the	IFM-CAP	uses	price	developments	from	CA-
PRI in all scenarios.
MAGNET
In its ninth version, the trade data component of the GTAP 
database	captures	gross	bilateral	trade	flows	between	140	
regions worldwide, with accompanying bilateral transport 
margins.	 For	 each	 of	 these	 bilateral	 flows,	 average	 ad 
valorem	 applied	 tariffs	 and	 export	 taxes/subsidies	 are	
included. The price transmission from region of origin, 
‘r’, to region of destination, ‘s’, therefore faces several 
stages, from market prices to free-on-board prices to cost, 
insurance and freight (CIF) prices to destination market 
prices. In addition, the model allows additional explicit 
modelling	 of	 TRQs	 (although	 these	 must	 be	 supported	
by	relevant	secondary	data	on	fill	rates,	lower	and	upper	
tariff	 rates)	and	trade	bans	 (Elbehri	and	Pearson,	2005).	
Unfortunately,	 the	 model	 database	 does	 not	 currently	
represent	 non-tariff	 measures	 (NTMs)	 because	 of	 the	
difficulty	 in	 quantifying	 how	 much	 they	 restrict	 trade.	
Typically,	such	measures	can	be	inserted	for	specific	trade	
policy scenarios by employing one of a range of indirect or 
direct estimation procedures. This omission from the GTAP 
database represents a source of bias in the measurement 
of trade losses and gains when undertaking FTA impact 
assessments.
To	model	 two-way	 trade	 flows	 (i.e.	 inter-industry	 trade),	
the MAGNET model does not currently have an explicit 
endogenous treatment approach for product varieties, 
although this is under development. Instead, it follows an 
exogenous	treatment	approach	for	product	differentiation	
by region of origin using the Armington (1969) assumption. 
More	specifically,	in	the	lower	nest	of	the	import	demand	
function, an extraneous elasticity of the substitution 
parameter	 between	 tradable	 ‘j’	 from	 different	 regions	
of origin is inserted. The higher the elasticity, the more 
homogeneous the product (i.e. rice, wheat, etc.) and 
therefore the more sensitive imports are to changes in 
relative prices from competing regions of origin. In the 
upper nest, a further substitution elasticity parameter is 
inserted	 to	differentiate	between	domestic	products	and	
the composite import. In the GTAP database, the elasticities 
of substitution are based on econometric estimates (Hertel 
et al.,, 2016), while upper-nest elasticities are assumed to 
be half the value of those of the lower nest.
CAPRI
CAPRI follows the Armington (1969) assumption for 
modelling	bilateral	 trade,	 i.e.	goods	are	differentiated	by	
their country of origin. A substitution between domestically 
produced and imported goods, as well as between imports 
from	different	origins,	 in	 the	optimal	consumption	mix	 is	
possible and is driven by changes in relative consumer 
prices. The Armington assumption allows cross-hauling 
(simultaneous import and export of the same commodity) 
to be modelled and facilitates the calibration of the model 
to observed bilateral trade patterns.
A number of trade policy instruments applied on the border 
are implemented in the standard CAPRI model, such as 
import	 duties,	 TRQs,	 export	 subsidies,	 an	 entry	 price	
system	for	fruits	and	vegetables	(for	the	EU),	and	variable	
levies. Those border policy instruments are translated into 
a	mark-up	or	price	wedge	on	CIF	prices,	which	define	final	
producer prices. Consumer prices, on the other hand, are 
derived from the average domestic market prices taking 
into account consumer price margins in the benchmark.
The detailed trade policy instruments normally allow for 
a	detailed	 implementation	of	 the	FTA	tariff	schedules	 in	
CAPRI,	 including,	 for	 example,	 reduction	 in	 specific	 and	
applied	tariff	rates	as	well	as	quota	expansions	under	the	
TRQ.	Nevertheless,	in	this	study	we	opted	for	a	simplified	
representation of trade agreements simply because 
detailed	 tariff	 schedules	 are	 not	 yet	 available	 for	 the	
majority of the covered FTAs. That missing information 
forced	 us	 to	 design	 simplified	 scenarios	 for	 increased	
market	 access,	 such	 as	 eliminating	 tariffs	 altogether	 or	
3.2.5 Trade policy
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reducing them by 50% for sensitive products. To facilitate 
the	implementation	of	simplified	tariff	cuts,	all	trade	policy	
instruments were converted into an ad valorem equivalent 
AVE	 tariff	 rate	 in	 the	 benchmark.	 That	 tariff	 conversion	
introduces potential biases in the simulated results. An 
ad	 valorem	 equivalent	 of	 a	 specific	 tariff,	 for	 example,	
depends on the benchmark import prices, and therefore 
can	lead	to	under-	or	overestimated	tariff	reductions.	Not	
having	explicit	TRQ	functions	in	the	model,	to	give	another	
example,	 possibly	 overestimates	 the	 impact	 of	 tariff	
reduction,	as	a	sudden	increase	in	applied	tariff	rates	after	
reaching the quota level is no longer present in the model.
As for all numerical models working with aggregated prod-
uct categories, CAPRI is also subject to aggregation bias: 
trade policy instruments need to be aggregated from the 
tariff	 line	 level	 (where	policies	are	usually	defined)	 to	 the	
composite goods of CAPRI. Both the level and the method of 
aggregation	influence	the	magnitude	of	the	bias.	In	general,	
fixed	weight	 tariff	aggregators	 lead	 to	biased	welfare	 re-
sults,	as	they	do	not	take	into	account	the	different	marginal	
impact	of	tariff	changes	on	consumer	expenditures	versus	
tariff	revenues	(Anderson, 2009; (Laborde et al., 2017). Al-
though	 welfare-consistent	 tariff	 aggregation	 has	 already	
been implemented in CAPRI (Himics & Britz, 2016), it was 
not applied in the current study due to data constraints.
NTMs, such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
or technical barriers to trade, are not considered in this 
study, as there is a lack of an adequate database on agri-
food NTMs at the global scale. Modern trade agreements 
often	 include	 important	 chapters,	 or	 even	 mainly	 focus	
on, facilitating market access via NTM reduction. Agri-
food	markets	are	specifically	impacted	by	a	large	number	
of sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other food 
safety regulations that can impede trade. Therefore, not 
considering potential NTM reduction in this study leads 
to	an	underestimation	of	the	impacts	of	the	EU’s	current	
trade agenda on domestic agricultural production and 
global food trade.
IFM-CAP
The IFM-CAP does not directly model the interaction be-
tween farm production decisions and agricultural markets, 
and thus trade policies are not explicitly captured in the 
IFM-CAP simulations. The impacts of trade policies are 
captured	only	 indirectly	 in	 the	 IFM-CAP.	The	price	effects	
simulated by CAPRI are introduced as an exogenous shock 
in the IFM-CAP model. Note that the price changes simu-
lated	by	CAPRI	are	a	combined	effect	of	all	policy	changes	
considered in the scenarios and not only trade policies (e.g. 
climate policies, biofuel policies).
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Economic models provide a conceptual framework that 
allows the representation of the economy in a structured 
but	 schematic	and	simplified	manner.	By	definition,	 they	
cannot reproduce reality in its fullest complexity and thus 
have shortcomings and limitations.
The three models employed here are designed as tools 
for conducting policy experiments, in which a reference 
scenario	or	baseline	is	first	simulated	over	a	future	period	
and	then,	after	changing	one	or	more	underlying	assump-
tions (policy settings, exogenous macroeconomic develop-
ments, weather trends, etc.), a new scenario incorporating 
these changes is run over the same period.
Comparison of the new scenario with the reference scenario 
at a given point in the simulation period, usually in terms 
of	 percentage	 differences,	 establishes	 the	 direction	 and	
relative magnitude of any impacts on all the endogenous 
variables of the change that is depicted in the hypothetical 
scenario at that point in time. In this study, the year of in-
terest is 2030, and the alternative states of the world cor-
respond	to	different	assumptions	regarding	EU	agricultural	
policy	and	trade	between	the	EU	and	third	countries.
Although these models can be used to project individual 
values of particular variables, it must be stressed that 
simulation models are not designed to predict economic 
trends in the future (i.e. for forecasting). These models 
merely use the best available current knowledge of the 
market to project over a future time horizon – called a 
baseline. The strength of simulation models is their ability 
to describe the mechanisms that drive departures from that 
baseline ascribed to a policy change, productivity changes 
or some other shock to the market. There are limited 
examples of forward-looking inter-temporal neoclassical 
CGE models, although the investment mechanisms are 
still rather ad hoc, while the notion of market uncertainty 
within a deterministic framework is not treated at all.
Although	this	type	of	model	is	calibrated	to	fit	a	given	year,	
its solutions become less reliable the further into the fu-
ture it goes because of structural economic change. Given 
the very large number of assumptions, estimated or cali-
brated	parameters,	and	stylised	specification	features	that	
these models assemble, each of which is ‘plausible’ up 
to	only	an	(unknown)	probability,	it	is	difficult	to	establish	
exact	confidence	intervals	or	margins	of	error	around	indi-
vidual projected numbers.
Finally, but equally important, the quality of the model 
output is directly related to the input data. Whereas cali-
bration procedures allow matching key exogenous vari-
ables such as production, trade or GDP, the parameters, 
in	particular	the	behavioural	elasticities,	often	remain	un-
changed	over	 time	 in	 the	models.	A	particular	effort	has	
therefore been made to improve the parameterisation in 
the policy areas particularly relevant for this study. More 
specifically,	these	relate	to	available	land	uptake,	agricul-
tural	payment	productivity	effects	and	first	pillar	payment	
coupling factors (see also the next sub-sections).
3.3 | Observations and caveats related to the approach
3.3.1 General caveats of all modelling exercises
14	Conducting	an	impact	analysis	of	the	Uruguay	Round,	Anderson	and	Tyers	(1988)	predicted	in	their	study	that	a	fall	in	the	economic	welfare	of	the	developing	countries	
would follow liberalisation by industrialised nations due to the rise in international food prices, with consumer losses outweighing producer gains. The same scenario was 
conducted	under	CGE	conditions	(Burniaux	and	Waelbroeck,	1985;	Loo	and	Tower,	1989)	both	of	which	showed	welfare	gains	due	to	the	effects	of	the	non-agricultural	
sectors.	Noting	the	reconciliation	of	the	structural	differences	between	the	model	approaches,	Anderson	and	Tyers	(1993)	reverse	their	initial	estimates	from	a	sizeable	loss	
(1985;	USD	14	billion)	into	a	significant	gain	(USD	11	billion).
3.3.2 Model linkage
A fundamental point to understand is that any type of 
model	linkage	is	fraught	with	difficulty,	since	major	model	
differences	 exist	 in	 terms	of	 the	 data,	 the	assumed	be-
havioural parameters and the underlying structural mech-
anisms of the models. This, however, does not mean that 
such a linkage should not be attempted, but, rather, one 
should have realistic expectations of what can be achieved 
when	trying	to	harmonise	different	modelling	approaches.
It is well known that PE and CGE models have structural 
differences,	in	terms	of	both	the	data	and	the	behavioural	
elements (i.e. explicit or implicit elasticities), that can 
generate divergent results, while precedents in the 
literature even show that CGE and PE models can generate 
contradictory	 findings	 for	 the	 same	 scenario.14 Although 
this is recognised within the modelling community, in the 
policy	arena	it	can	often	be	hard	to	reconcile	the	findings	
42 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
of both types of model when presenting a consistent 
argument for a given policy reform.
In the past, DG AGRI-commissioned research established 
a	 ‘soft’	 model	 linkage	 (see,	 for	 example,	Nowicki et al., 
2007; Nowicki et al., 2009; Helming et al., 2010), such 
that	 different	 types	 of	 models	 generated	 a	 mutually	
consistent	 storyline.	 Typically,	 a	 soft	 linkage	 is	 driven	by	
an ad hoc assessment of the overall results (i.e. are the 
models broadly telling the same story?), while one plays to 
the strengths of each model to serve as a source of input 
to the other. For example, the CGE model, with an explicit 
or endogenous treatment of factor markets, world trade 
and macroaggregates, could conceivably be used within 
a PE model. Similarly, the sectoral detail and econometric 
foundation in supply response that serves some PE 
models well could be employed to assess and improve the 
veracity of CGE model results.
The	advantage	of	the	soft	approach	is	that	it	is	relatively	
straightforward to implement in terms of the necessary 
modelling	 modifications.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ‘soft’	
approach adopted in the Scenar 2020 project through the 
linkage of variables was, as noted above, implemented 
on more of an ad hoc basis rather than by following a 
systematic framework. Thus, subject to the prejudices 
of the model scenario (i.e. the scenario design, the type 
of shocks, etc.), the choice of variable linkage could 
conceivably vary considerably.
In Philippidis et al. (2017), a ‘test bed’ study, which 
considered	a	class	of	‘soft’	model	linkage	between	CAPRI	
and MAGNET, was carried out as a preparatory step 
of the Scenar 2030 study. The aim of the study was to 
ascertain the extent to which the MAGNET model results 
diverge between two experiments, a ‘standard’ MAGNET 
experiment and a scenario where MAGNET implements 
agri-food output results from the CAPRI model directly 
by performing a closure swap with a Hicks neutral output 
productivity variable, while sectoral prices are allowed to 
be continually adjusted endogenously.
The aim of the exercise was to ascertain the extent to 
which MAGNET model results diverge from the ‘standard’ 
results	when	soft-linking	to	CAPRI	and	to	assess	the	degree	
of compromise required in MAGNET to accommodate said 
changes. It was found that the standard MAGNET model 
and the CAPRI model predictions implemented in MAGNET 
‘more	often	 than	not’	predict	 the	same	signs	 for	output.	
In	the	EU-15,	however,	where	a	more	significant	number	
of agri-food sectors are linked, there are quite a few sign 
differences	 between	 CAPRI	 predictions	 and	 those	 of	 the	
standard	 MAGNET	 model,	 while	 in	 the	 non-EU	 regions,	
the level of convergence is generally good. This evidence 
suggests that there is a need to have some form of linkage 
between	the	models,	especially	if	the	focus	is	on	the	EU.
The choice of a ‘hard’ linkage to forge a union between the 
structural or behavioural elements of the model (see, for 
example, Britz & Hertel, 2011; Pelikan, et al., 2015) becomes 
appealing	because	it	follows	a	very	specific	methodological	
approach, but it requires considerably more modelling 
expertise to implement, while the potential robustness of 
the two models being linked is, at the current time, under 
scrutiny and far from certain.15 In the abovementioned 
papers, an elegant method for structurally linking CAPRI to 
a	specific	GTAP	model	version	was	applied.	The	approach	
does not have to impose heavy restrictions in either of the 
two models (especially if, in CAPRI, one does not pass back 
crop supply prices from the GTAP model). Such an approach 
would be worth pursuing for potential policy-orientated 
work, and a ‘pilot’ study is currently under development 
involving CAPRI and MAGNET modellers.
These tests and literature reviews give insights into the 
scientific	 dimension	 of	 how	 to	 link	 models.	 As	 research	
and trials with large-scale models, mainly with CAPRI and 
MAGNET, are still ongoing, Scenar 2030 takes a more 
pragmatic approach. In a follow-up study, it is hoped that 
a more sophisticated, ‘hard-linkage’ approach will be 
pursued to link CAPRI and MAGNET.
Chapter 4 further outlines the detailed implementation of 
the baseline and the scenarios in Scenar 2030.
15 Within the two cited studies, the policy shocks were very discrete, while a more aggressive set of policy shocks (i.e. projections, etc.) which are typically used to characterise 
policy outlooks have, hitherto, not been attempted.
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3.3.3 Improved land supply elasticities in MAGNET
The land supply elasticity with respect to the land price 
(land rent) is a key parameter in determining the land 
responsiveness arising from economic shocks and 
policies, and the resulting impacts on food prices and food 
and nutrition security. However, values for land supply 
elasticities are rarely available in the literature. Because 
of reliable time series data on land prices and concerns 
about	the	quality	of	UAA	data,	such	values	are	available	
for only some countries of the world.
As a result of the relatively limited documentation and 
literature concerning land supply elasticities, the choice of 
these elasticities for medium- and long-term projections 
can be rather subjective. This can be illustrated by the 
choice of elasticities used in the MIRAGE model (Decreux 
and Valin, 2007). The MIRAGE model uses a land supply 
elasticity value of 0.25 for land-constrained countries and 
a value of 1 for other countries. This model was used by 
Bouët and Laborde (2010) for the evaluation of Doha 
trade liberalisation proposals. In the MIRAGE-BIOF model 
used	 in	 the	 study	 ‘European	 Union	 and	 United	 States	
Biofuel	 Mandates,	 Impacts	 on	 World	 Markets	 (Al-Riffai	
P., et al., 2010), the land supply elasticity value was set 
at	0.02	for	the	EU	and	the	USA,	and	at	0.035	for	Brazil.	
In	a	similar	study	by	the	same	authors	(Al-Riffai	P.,	et	al.,	
2010a), varying regional elasticity values of between 
0.05 and 0.1 were used. Finally, in another study using the 
MIRAGE-BIOF model (Laborde and Valin, 2012), elasticity 
values of between 0.01 and 0.05 were employed. As 
the authors of these papers point out, the land supply 
elasticity is an uncertain parameter and they advise that 
sensitivity analyses around its chosen value be conducted 
in the simulation experiment.
This overview of land supply elasticities suggests that 
these response parameters are rather inelastic. This is 
confirmed	by	statistical	data	which	show	that	agricultural	
areas for the majority of countries increase very slowly 
or have even decreased since 2000, while agricultural 
value-added	per	unit	of	agricultural	area	often	increases	
significantly.
The approach adopted in the work of Tabeau (2017) is 
to follow the work of Gurgel et al. (2007) and Barr et al. 
(2010).	 More	 specifically,	 land	 supply	 elasticity	 values	
were calculated directly from the observed percentage 
changes	in	UAA	and	the	percentage	changes	in	the	total	
return to agriculture per unit of agricultural land. This 
approach therefore assumes that returns from agricultural 
production are capitalised in land prices in the long 
run, and therefore percentage changes in the return to 
agriculture per unit of agricultural land serve as a proxies 
for unobserved percentage changes in land prices. To 
support this work for the GTAP regions, time series data are 
taken	 from	both	 the	CAPRI	database	 (UAA	and	 changes	
in average gross margins) from FAOSTAT16 and the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database.17
On completing the estimation of land supply elasticities, 
a selection procedure for MAGNET was based on the 
following criteria:
● As the default, rather than choose calibrated elasticities 
from the MAGNET database, land supply elasticities 
were taken from agricultural land and return time 
series for all countries for which data were available.
● We chose an elasticity value of 0.015 for countries 
that are analysed but for which data do not show an 
increase in agricultural area since 2000 and at the 
same time show an increase in agricultural return 
(e.g.	European	countries,	the	USA,	South	Korea,	Japan,	
Oceania, Australia and India). This elasticity value is 
close to zero but, at the same time, does not make the 
land supply function too inelastic, which could create 
problems.
● For selected countries for which the elasticities cannot 
be calculated because of a lack of time series data, 
neighbouring countries’ data were used based on the 
ratio of the calibrated and time series land supply 
estimates	 for	 that	 specific	 neighbouring	 country/
region. This ratio was then applied to the calibrated 
land supply estimates for MAGNET regions for which 
time series data were unavailable.
● A land supply elasticity value of 0.015 was chosen for 
all remaining, mostly small, countries.
16 http://faostat.fao.org/.
17 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.
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The impact of agricultural subsidies on productivity has 
long been discussed in the literature without any clear 
conclusions.	 Depending	 on	 the	 model	 specification,	
statistical method and data source, mixed results 
are reported. The empirical evidence shows that 
there is still a large knowledge gap in the literature 
regarding the understanding of the role of CAP Pillar 
2 subsidies on agricultural productivity. Indeed, few 
studies comprehensively examine the impacts of CAP 
subsidies	at	NUTS	2	level	for	the	EU	MSs	and	compare	
the	productivity	effects	across	the	different	CAP	subsidy	
categories. Furthermore, most studies use farm-level 
data (mostly from FADN), while capturing private returns, 
and do not consider the public or social returns that are 
obtained from public investment. Moreover, in most of 
the studies, agricultural subsidies are treated ad hoc and 
as	a	uniform	category.	However,	as	Minviel	and	Latruffe	
(2014) point out, when separating the individual subsidy 
groups,	 the	 productivity	 effects	 of	 subsidies	 might,	 in	
fact, be positive.
From examining the relevant literature, it appears that a 
significant	proportion	of	 the	empirical	evidence	 is	based	
on the use of a parametric stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) or a non-parametric data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) method. The general consensus of these studies is 
that	a	negative	technical	efficiency	effect	from	subsidies	
is observed. However, as shown in various papers, this 
negative	impact	on	technical	efficiency	is	not	incompatible	
with	a	positive	effect	on	productivity.18
It should also be pointed out that all existing studies have 
looked	at	the	effects	on	total	factor	productivity,	whereas,	
in	reality,	different	types	of	CAP	subsidies	might	provoke	
a factor-biased technical change (e.g. human capital 
subsidies are expected to stimulate labour productivity 
more than land productivity). Finally, none of the studies so 
far can provide reliable inputs for the parameterisation of 
economy-wide models (e.g. partial or general equilibrium 
models such as MAGNET or CAPRI) because of the 
different	uses	of	functional	forms	(typically	Cobb–Douglas	
or translog functions, instead of constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES), are used) and the prevalence of micro-
level	studies	(causing	difficulties	in	generalising	the	results	
at the sector level).
This lack of understanding is both a constraining factor for 
policy-makers that are interested in the ex post evaluation 
of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	 investments	 and	 for	
modellers	who	need	a	reliable	quantification	of	subsidies’	
impact on productivity in their ex ante exercises such as in 
Scenar 2020 (Nowicki, et al., 2007; Nowicki, et al., 2009).
The latest published research by Dudu & Smeets Kristkova 
(2017) contributes to bridging this gap by providing a 
comprehensive empirical assessment of the role of CAP 
subsidies	 on	 productivity	 across	 EU-27	 countries.	 More	
specifically,	the	contribution	of	this	work	is	three-fold:	(1)	
the	study	uses	regional	 (NUTS	2)	 level	data	which	allow	
us to capture sector- rather than farm-level behaviour; (2) 
the	 effects	 of	 the	 four	major	 types	 of	 Pillar	 2	 subsidies	
on factor-augmenting technical change can be compared 
in a systematic way; and (3) the adopted methodological 
framework enables the simultaneous estimation of both 
CES and productivity parameters, which can be readily 
used in impact assessment models.
Combining this research with expert opinion, the 
following	assumptions	of	 the	effects	are	made:	 (1)	agri-
environmental payments = 0; (2) human capital payments/
investments = 0.025%; and (3) physical capital payments/
investments = 0.015%.
The following example explains how to interpret the 
numbers: if the proportion of human capital-related 
subsidies of total production value is doubled, then one 
can produce the same amount of output by using 2.5% 
less human capital; or if one uses the same amount of 
human capital, output will increase (by how much depends 
on	the	coefficients	of	production	function,	i.e.	substitution	
elasticities and factor shares).
The econometric estimations and the application of 
different	 productivity	 rates	 clearly	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	
need for more research related to the key parameters 
used for CAP analysis.
18	While	productivity	can	be	expressed	as	the	ratio	between	outputs	and	inputs,	efficiency	can	be	defined	as	the	distance	between	a	certain	input–output	relationship	and	
the optimum input–output relationship on the production possibilities frontier.
3.3.4	 Productivity	effects	of	EU	domestic	support
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3.3.5	 Modelling	EU	decoupled	payments
In the work by Boulanger et al. (2016b), literature analysing 
the	 effect	 of	 the	 SPS	 and	 SAPS	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 reviewed.	
This	detailed	 literature	 review	explores	how	the	EU	SPS/
SAPS	payments	affect	farm	decisions	though	a	number	of	
coupling channels such as the capitalisation of the payment 
in land rents/land sales prices; impacts on the farmers’ 
perceptions of risk; access to credit; uncertainty about 
future	policies;	 and	on/off	 farm	 labour	allocation.	Within	
this literature review, the emphasis is on understanding, as 
far as reasonably possible, the empirical evidence arising 
from relevant studies and to use this as a basis for making 
an informed decision about how to allocate (i.e. couple) 
the SPS/SAPS across production factors in each of the MSs 
within the MAGNET simulation model.
However, reviewing the literature according to this 
objective reveals several limitations and obstacles. 
Although there has been a steadily growing number of 
studies investigating the impact of decoupled payments 
in	EU	MSs	in	recent	years,	most	of	the	research	has	been	
conducted on the basis of data obtained before the 
introduction of the SPS. Empirical results addressing the 
second	period,	from	2013	to	2020,	are	difficult	to	find.
In addition, several studies cover only relatively short data 
periods, so that they do not fully capture long-term rent 
adjustments. Furthermore, the duration of land rental 
contracts	differs	widely	between	the	EU	MSs.	Consequently,	
the	 effects	 for	 the	 post-2013	 period	 are	 difficult	 to	
derive. Third, most of the empirical analyses apply FADN 
data, which, of course, are a good point of departure 
for	 comparing	 different	 studies,	 but,	 nevertheless,	 the	
experimental	 design	 differs	 considerably	 across	 studies	
with regard to selected countries or regions within a 
country, various sectors, farm types and payment types.
Fourth, some studies, particularly those assessing the 
extent to which the SFP is linked to production via future 
expectations, have applied individual farm-level data 
and survey results, giving rise to the question of how to 
generalise the results to the aggregated sector level. In 
addition,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 transfer	 qualitative	 effects	 of	
surveys assessing farmers’ intentions into numbers that 
can be used in a simulation model environment.
The empirical results that may serve as a starting point for 
generating parameter adjustments in CGE or PE models 
examine the capitalisation of the SPS/SAPS into land 
rents. Michalek et al. (2014) utilised the most realistic 
data	and	provided	estimations	of	the	effects	for	all	of	the	
EU-15	MSs	that	reveal	that	these	MSs	have	an	average	
SPS capitalisation rate of between 4 and 18%. Ciaian & 
Kancs (2012) conducted a study estimating the degree 
of	 capitalisation	 in	 selected	 new	 EU	MSs	 that	 suggests	
a capitalisation rate, in these MSs, of 5 to 18%. These 
studies therefore indicate that much of the remaining 96 
to 82% of the SPS/SAPS may be coupled to production via 
other channels, which suggests that the SPS needs to be 
distributed to other, non-land, factors such as labour and 
capital.
Although there are estimates determining the 
capitalisation rate of the SPS into the value of land, 
appropriate estimation results that can be used to improve 
the distribution of the SPS in CGE models are still not 
available. Thus, this literature review emphasises the need 
for further research to obtain better estimates of the SPS’s 
effect	on	production	decisions	that	can	be	used	in	CGE	or	PE	
models. Moreover, on the basis of existing information, the 
favoured approach is to divide the allocation of the SPS/
SAPS	into	two	components.	The	first	component	should	be	
based on the share of the SPS/SAPS that capitalises into 
the value of land as a uniform country-wide land subsidy 
rate (based on the literature estimates cited above) and can 
be regarded as fully decoupled from production decisions. 
The	second	component	 should	 capture	 the	effect	of	 the	
SPS through the remaining four coupling channels – risk, 
credit constraint, future expectations and labour. Owing 
to the lack of clear empirical evidence on the strength of 
each of these coupling channels, best practice seems to 
be the distribution of the second component of the SPS 
as a uniform subsidy rate across all agricultural factors of 
production in the MAGNET model.
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The	considered	trade	scenarios	investigate	only	the	effects	
of	 tariff	 liberalisation,	 but	 do	 not	 consider	 the	 possible	
reduction of NTMs. In fact, since there are currently no 
widely accepted estimates of NTMs for the agricultural 
sector at disaggregated level, and given the limited time 
to complete the exercise, it was decided to omit them 
from	 the	 study.	 The	 non-quantification	 of	 trade	 impacts	
arising	 from	 NTMs	 may	 hide	 important	 benefits	 for	 EU	
exporters, as several trade partners impose cumbersome 
and	 unjustified	 procedures	 that	 are	 usually	 streamlined	
in	an	FTA.	On	the	other	hand,	regarding	EU	imports,	past	
experience	 shows	 that	 the	 EU	 has	 not	 compromised	 its	
standards of consumer protection in any FTA chapter, for 
example when authorising so-called growth promoters 
or	 modifying	 its	 science-based	 genetically	 modified	
organism	approval	process.	These	barriers	to	EU	 imports	
stay in place (e.g. the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement),	even	when	tariffs	are	removed	or	reduced.
NTMs	can	be	considered	any	policy	measure	that	affects	
trade	 other	 than	 ordinary	 customs	 tariffs.	 NTMs	 are	
classified	 according	 to	 their	 scope	 and/or	 design	 and	
include a wide range of instruments such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, pre-
shipment inspections and other formalities, contingent 
trade-protective measures, intellectual property rights, rule 
of	origin,	etc.	(UNCTAD,	2015).	In	contrast	with	transparent	
and	measurable	tariffs,	there	is	no	common	agreement	on	
the	 aim,	 collection,	 quantification	 or	modelling	 of	NTMs,	
although several initiatives have contributed to a more 
transparent record of the inventory of measures in place 
(such as the TRAINS-NTMs database, promoted by the 
United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Trade	 and	 Development	
(UNCTAD)	 and	 other	 institutions,	 and	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization (WTO) Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal 
(I-TIP)). Agri-food sectors are among those which face 
many	 different	 NTMs.	 Indeed,	 meat,	 dairy,	 and	 fruits	
and vegetables (and cereals to a lesser extent) are the 
commodities for which the highest number of NTMs can 
be found.
Because	of	their	inherent	nature,	the	quantification	of	the	
trade impact of NTMs, and the estimation/calculation of 
ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of NTMs, is problematic, 
with the result that there is currently no globally consistent 
bilateral database on NTM AVEs. On a unilateral level, 
though, Kee (2009) provide a highly disaggregated 
database with NTM AVEs by sector and by country.
Gravity models have gained much attention as a method 
for estimating the trade restrictiveness of NTMs and their 
AVEs	 for	 insertion	 into	 simulation	models.	 The	 scientific	
literature has provided the theoretical underpinnings and 
the appropriate estimators, as well as allowing improve-
ments	 in	the	model	specifications,	 that	have	contributed	
to making the gravity equation the workhorse for NTM 
AVE	 estimation	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 UN/WTO	 (2012)	 and	
Piermartini & Yotov (2016) for a thorough set of practical 
recommendations). Nevertheless, the estimation results 
depend on the approach followed (quantity-gap versus 
price-gap), the quality of the underlying data (e.g. elas-
ticities of substitution to convert the quantity impact of 
NTMs	on	tariff	equivalents;	the	NTM	indicator	variable;	the	
prices if a price-gap approach is used) and the decisions 
undertaken in terms of the sample chosen for estimation 
(trade partners, years, sectoral aggregation).
Furthermore, an aggregation problem exists when matching 
the typically disaggregated NTM results from econometric 
studies with the more highly aggregated nature of activities 
typically found within the GTAP database. Finally, the literature 
is not conclusive on the correct representation of NTMs within 
a CGE framework, and provides several options for NTM 
representation. Thus, NTMs may be modelled either as a 
component of border support (with associated rent-seeking 
impacts)	or	as	a	 type	of	efficiency	gain	 (representing	NTM	
harmonisations	that	reflect	the	‘sand-in-the-wheels’	of	trade	
flows).	 In	 addition,	 when	 considering	 the	 burden	 bestowed	
upon	EU	trading	partners	from	the	adoption	of	EU	product	
standards and regulations, it is necessary to accommodate 
this	 observation	 through	 an	 adjustment	 in	 the	 (fixed)	 cost	
structure for partner countries’ economic activities.
Importantly, liberalising trade does not mean eliminating 
all NTMs. Many NTMs are not of a protectionist nature 
but serve legitimate purposes, such as for food safety, or 
address market failures (e.g. asymmetry of information 
between producers and consumers, externalities) or 
enhance consumer demand for goods by increasing 
quality attributes (e.g. production process requirements or 
standards). Eliminating those NTMs is not the objective of 
any trade negotiation. Therefore, quantifying the size of 
the reduction in NTMs due to trade agreements remains 
difficult.	For	instance,	in	Bureau	et	al.	(2014),	NTMs	were	cut	
between 15% and 30% in the context of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), while in Francois 
et al. (2013), they were reduced by 10-25%.
3.3.6 Assumptions on trade policy modelling
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Finally, non-members of a trade agreement (third 
countries)	can	also	benefit	from	any	NTM	harmonisation	
(reduction) if it decreases the cost associated with export 
to	 both	 markets.	 Quantifying	 this	 secondary	 (spill-over)	
effect	 is	 difficult,	 and	 often	 neglected,	 although	 further	
bilateral AVEs in the CGE models should be assessed and 
reduced for relevant third-country exporters.
For the above reasons, NTMs are not modelled explicitly and 
no	assumptions	are	made	on	possible	NTM	quantification,	
modelling or reduction arising from the FTAs in our 
baseline design.19 The trade-restricting impact of NTMs 
is implicitly considered in the underlying trade database 
of MAGNET, as far as it concerns the current (observed) 
pattern of international trade. Thus, the modelling results 
will	underestimate	the	magnitude	of	the	potential	effects	
of	the	current	EU	FTA	agenda.	The	quantification	of	NTMs	
is an area that requires considerable additional research.
Finally, another issue that the study does not consider, 
although	 it	 could	 certainly	have	 implications	 for	EU	 free	
trade	 negotiations,	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 UK’s	 departure	
from	 the	 EU.	 On	 conceptualising	 the	 study	 design,	 the	
conditions of this separation were far from clear. It was 
therefore decided that rather than speculate on a single 
possible outcome and its associated impacts in terms of 
trade	flows,	production	and	(in	the	case	of	the	CGE	model)	
welfare, the current status quo would be preserved.
19 It is pertinent to note that, owing to many of the considerations highlighted in this section, OECD (2016) does not contemplate NTMs when examining the possible 
impacts of multilateral trade reforms. 
4 IMPLEMENTATION  OF BASELINE  
AND SCENARIOS
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This chapter describes how the macroeconomic assump-
tions, policies and improved parameters are implemented 
in the baseline and scenarios, focusing also on each model 
individually.
Implementation of baseline and scenarios4
4.1 | Baseline implementation
4.1.1 Overall concept and inclusion of policies
The	baseline	 in	Scenar	2030	 is	based	on	 ‘EU	Agricultural	
Outlook:	Prospects	for	EU	agricultural	markets	and	income	
2015-2025’, published in December 2015 (DG AGRI, 2015).
It is therefore similar to Option 1 (baseline) described in the 
IIA.20 Option 1 (baseline) assesses ‘the impact of the CAP 
remaining	as	it	currently	stands,	except	for	simplifications	
already adopted or proposed, including in the Omnibus 
proposal, based on the most recent agricultural market 
outlook developed by Commission services’.
The most recent agricultural market outlook was 
published in December 2016, so could not be used 
in this comprehensive study with an extended time 
horizon and complex scenarios. However, the changes 
from the 2015 edition are small and it is not envisaged 
that	 these	will	 significantly	alter	 the	overall	 results	of	
the study.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the baseline (Option 1) 
construction.
20 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_agri_001_cap_modernisation_en.pdf.
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FIGURE 3: CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL CHAIN BASELINE
Source: own presentation.
The CAPRI and MAGNET models use the same macroeco-
nomic	assumptions	(GDP,	population)	as	in	the	EU	Agricul-
tural Outlook (DG AGRI, 2015).
As	 the	 time	horizon	of	Scenar	2030	 is	five	years	 longer	
than	that	of	the	EU	Agricultural	Outlook	time	horizon	(DG	
AGRI, 2015) and because no projections from AGLINK-CO-
SIMO are available, linear time trends are assumed and, in 
the case of CAPRI, additional information from GLOBIOM 
and PRIMES is used to reach the year 2030.
To further harmonise the future agricultural market situ-
ation in CAPRI and MAGNET with the projections of the 
EU	Agricultural	Outlook,	specific	calibration	measures	were	
carried out. This is further explained in the individual mod-
el chapters below.
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It should be noted that the IFM-CAP runs with prices and 
yields taken from CAPRI.
The CAP in the baseline represents the current implemen-
tation in as much detail as possible according to the spe-
cificities	of	the	models	employed.
Following	 the	 DG	 AGRI	 (2015)	 outlook	 ‘The	 effects	 of	
“greening” are also taken into account to the extent pos-
sible.	At	 the	EU	aggregate	 level,	 the	effects	on	area	al-
location,	especially	crop	diversification,	are	rather	limited.	
Further work is under way to estimate better the impacts 
of “greening” on individual farmers.’
Thus, CAPRI and MAGNET mimic the AGLINK approach, 
whereas the farm model IFM-CAP by nature shows a more 
detailed picture.
Variations of the CAP, particularly in relation to greening, 
are featured in the scenarios.
The trade policies in the baseline follow the assump-
tions made in the 2015 DG AGRI market outlook. More 
specifically:
‘As regards international trade negotiations and agree-
ments, it is assumed that all commitments under the 
Uruguay	Round	Agreement	on	Agriculture,	in	particular	on	
market	access	and	subsidised	exports,	will	be	fulfilled.	No	
assumptions are made as to the outcome of the Doha De-
velopment Round. The implications of the Bali Ministerial 
Declaration and the upcoming Nairobi Declaration have 
not been explicitly taken into account.
The Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia, 
as provisionally applied since 1 September 2014, are tak-
en into account. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement	with	Ukraine,	which	is	part	of	the	Association	
Agreement, applying as of 1 January 2016 is factored in. 
However, bilateral and regional trade deals that have still 
to	be	ratified,	e.g.	the	FTA	with	Canada,	are	not	taken	into	
account.’ (DG AGRI, 2015).
In one of the scenarios, a deviation from the status quo is 
presented.
Climate change policies: the reduction in GHG emis-
sions will be treated as a continuation of the baseline and 
the scenarios.
The DG AGRI baseline does not explicitly take into account 
environmental	 policies;	 ‘however,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Ni-
trates Directive and the need to reduce GHG emissions are 
factored into the analysis.’ (DG AGRI, 2015).
MAGNET is calibrated to the GTAP database Version 9, 
with 2011 as the base year.
For the purposes of this study, the MAGNET model distin-
guishes 25 groups of commodities:
● nine in primary agricultural sectors: (1) wheat; (2) other 
cereal grains; (3) vegetables, fruits, nuts; (4) oilseeds; 
(5) sugar cane, sugar beet; (6) other crops; (7) bovine 
cattle, sheep, goats, horses; (8) other animal products 
(mainly pigs and poultry, but also features (inter alia) 
other live animals and eggs); (9) raw milk;
● eight in processed food and related agricultural input 
supplying sectors: (10) bovine meat products (i.e. red 
meat); (11) other meat products (i.e. white meat); (12) 
vegetable oils and fats; (13) dairy products; (14) pro-
cessed rice; (15) sugar; (16) other food products; (17) 
beverages and tobacco; (18) feed; (19) fertilisers;
● those in four primary sectors: (20) natural resources 
(forestry	and	fishing);	(21)	crude	oil;	(22)	extracted	gas;	
and (23) coal; those in (24) a composite sector for all 
manufacturing sectors; and those in (25) a composite 
sector for all service sectors.
In terms of regions, the database has been disaggregated 
into	 35	 countries	 or	 regions:	 (1-28)	 each	 of	 the	 28	 EU	
MSs; (29) NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) 
countries	(i.e.	Canada,	Mexico	and	the	USA);	(30)	Mercosur;	
(31)	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand;	 (32)	 China;	 (33)	 Asian	
countries	 signing	 an	 FTA	with	 the	 EU	 (Indonesia,	 Japan,	
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam); (34) least developed 
countries (LDCs); and (35) Rest of the World.
The baseline for 2011-2030 was calibrated so that MAGNET 
represents, as closely as possible, the assumptions and 
market	projections	of	the	medium-term	prospects	for	EU	
agricultural markets and their income for 2015-2025 (DG 
4.1.2 MAGNET
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AGRI, 2015). This market outlook was based on information 
available at the end of October 2015 for agricultural 
production	and	the	EU	version	of	the	OECD–FAO	AGLINK-
COSIMO model, used by the European Commission. The 
macroeconomic developments (GDP, population growth 
rate, world crude oil price) were exogenously imposed on 
the model in accordance with the forecasts adopted in the 
DG AGRI outlook. While population, land productivity and 
non-land endowment changes remain exogenous in the 
scenarios, GDP and world fossil fuel price projections are 
targeted by exogenous economy-wide productivity and 
global	fossil	tax	shifter	variables,	respectively.
To	 replicate	 the	 EU	 Agricultural	 Outlook	 trends	 (produc-
tion,	 imports	 and	 exports)	 for	 the	 different	 commodities	
in	MAGNET,	 relevant	exogenous	shifter	parameters	need	
to	be	adjusted.	Thus,	to	mimic	specific	AGLINK	agricultural	
sector production trends, a sectoral productivity parameter 
was	employed.	To	replicate	EU-28	net	trade	balances	for	
agri-food	commodities,	taste	shifters	within	the	Armington	
import	functions	are	used.	Given	that	the	EU	outlook	pro-
duces	only	total	extra-EU	imports	and	exports,	the	bilater-
al	trade	flows	of	main	commodities	in	the	baseline	were	
adjusted on the basis of expert knowledge.
The baseline and scenarios were implemented in MAGNET 
over	four	periods.	More	specifically,	 the	model	 runs	from	
the benchmark year (2011) to 2016 then to 2020 and 
2025,	and	finally	to	2030.
In terms of the CAP, Pillar 1 includes 30% greening by the 
end	of	the	first	period,	which	is	maintained	until	the	end	
of the simulation run. Pillar 2 follows the standard CAP 
baseline, based on data from DG AGRI (2015) (Table 2).
The 2016-2030 period
Trade policy (trade)
•	 EU-28	enlargement	elimination	of	border	protection	between	incumbent	EU-27	members	and	Croatia.
•	 Extension	to	Croatia	of	an	EU	common	external	tariff	(CET)	on	third-country	trade	and	reciprocal	third-country	CETs	extended	to	
Croatia	as	an	EU-28	member.
•	 Elimination	of	remaining	EU-28	tariffs	with	Peru,	Columbia	and	South	Korea.
Agricultural policy (CAP)
•	 Pillar	1	and	Pillar	2	nominal	expenditures	are	reduced	by	13%	and	18%,	respectively.	This	corresponds	to	a	15.2%	reduction	in	
nominal CAP budgetary funding, consistent with the 2014-2020 MFF agreement.
•	 Phasing	in	of	decoupled	payments	for	2007	accession	members	and	Croatia.
•	 Greening	of	30%	of	Pillar	1	payments,	represented	as	Pillar	2	agro-environmental	payments.
•	 Pillar	2	payments	extended	to	Croatia.
•	 Abolition	of	raw	milk	(2015)	and	raw	sugar	(2017)	quotas.
•	 Croatia	incorporated	within	the	CAP	budget	and	UK	rebate	mechanism.
•	 Projected	reduction	in	CAP	expenditure	share	of	the	EU	budget	consistent	with	a	15.2%	cut	in	nominal	CAP	budget	reduction.
•	 Change	 in	Swedish,	Dutch	and	Danish	 lump	sum	rebates	corresponding	 to	CAP	expenditure	share	 in	EU	budget.	UK	 rebate	 is	
maintained.
TABLE 2: ASSUMPTIONS SHAPING THE BASELINE SCENARIO (2016-2030).
Source: own presentation.
4.1.3 CAPRI
CAPRI was calibrated to a projected equilibrium state of 
the global agri-food markets for the year 2030 in order to 
perform a comparative static impact assessment in the 
scenarios.	The	main	source	of	data	for	calibrating	the	EU	
agricultural	markets	was	 the	European	Commission’s	EU	
Agricultural Outlook (DG AGRI, 2015) with the projection 
year being 2025. These projections have been extended to 
the	final	projection	year,	2030,	of	this	study	by	using	trend	
data from external sources (GLOBIOM, PRIMES, etc.). The 
calibrated model provides the benchmark (or baseline) for 
further comparative static analysis.
The baseline requires assumptions on model-exogenous 
economic	 and	 policy	 variables	 that	 can	 be	 classified	 as	
policy, macroeconomic and market assumptions. Regard-
ing policy assumptions, agricultural and trade policies 
approved to be implemented until the simulation time 
horizon	are	 included.	Policy	measures	of	the	EU	CAP	are	
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covered in detail, including the latest 2014-2020 reform 
options. Regarding trade policies, the baseline does not 
anticipate any potential multilateral or regional agree-
ments in the future (even if such agreements are under 
negotiation). Some environmental policies, such as the 
limits on nitrogen application as a consequence of the 
Nitrates Directive, are also taken into account. The policy 
and market assumptions in the baseline scenario are fur-
ther outlined below.
CAP assumptions
The policy assumptions in CAPRI until 2014 are described 
in detail in Britz and Witzke (2014). The latest CAP reform, 
however,	implies	significant	budgetary	shifts	and	a	different	
structure for direct payments in order to better target three 
key areas of priority: economic, environmental and territorial 
challenges. The former SPS has been replaced by the BPS, 
while the SAPS remains in place. Both external and internal 
convergences are core elements of the reform, both of which 
lead to more uniform levels of payment entitlements (within 
and	 between	 MSs).	 Additional	 flexibility	 is	 built	 into	 the	
CAP that enables MSs to transfer funding between the two 
pillars,	and	to	provide	(limited)	coupled	support	for	specific	
agricultural sectors. The environmental performance of the 
CAP is strengthened with the greening component, which 
is	 subject	 to	 compliance	 with	 specific	 farming	 practices	
guaranteed by three types of greening measures: crop 
diversification,	maintenance	of	permanent	grassland	and	the	
establishment of EFAs. The CAPRI baseline assumes that the 
MS	decisions/notifications	 for	 the	 national	 implementation	
options communicated in December 2015 apply.
The current CAPRI baseline covers those direct support 
measures of the 2014-2020 CAP reform that can be 
implemented at the national or regional level, such as 
PILLAR 1
Instrument Base year 2008 Baseline 2025 and 2030
Direct payments
As	defined	in	the	2003	reform	and	the	2008	
Health Check; covering SFP (or SAPS)
The 2013 reform (partially) implemented
Decoupling Historical/regional/hybrid schemes BPS
Coupled direct payment options
As	defined	in	the	2003	reform	(including	 
Article 68/69 and CNDPs)
VCS	according	to	the	options	notified	 
by MSs up to 31/08/2015
Redistributive payment NA Not implemented
Young farmer scheme Not implemented Not implemented
Green payment NA
Green payment component granted without 
restriction (only limitation: no conversion of 
permanent grassland)
Capping Modulation implemented
Implemented according to 2013 reform. 
Capped budget redistributed over rural 
development measures
Convergence NA Included
PILLAR 2
Instrument Base year 2008 Baseline 2025 and 2030
Agri-environmental schemes
Less favoured area (LFA) and Natura 2000 
payments
ANCs and Natura 2000
Business development grants/
investment aid
Not considered Not considered
Common Market Organisation
Instrument Base year 2008 Baseline 2025 and 2030
Sugar quotas Yes Abolition of the quota system in 2017
Dairy quotas Yes Quota	system	expires	in	2015
Tariffs,	TRQs Yes
Maintained at current implementation level or 
schedule
Export subsidies Yes Not applied in 2025
TABLE 3: POLICY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CAPRI 2016 BASELINE.
Note: NA = not applicable; Source: own presentation.
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national ceilings21 for direct payments, basic payments22 
and VCS.23	This	 level	can	be	covered	by	CAPRI	at	NUTS	2	
level. Measures that need to be implemented at farm level, 
e.g.	 payment	 for	 agricultural	 practices	 beneficial	 to	 the	
climate and the environment24 (so-called green payments), 
are captured by the application of the Shannon index 
calculated in the CAPRI farm module. Voluntary redistributive 
payments25 are implicitly covered in the underlying market 
projections (DG AGRI, 2015) but not made explicit, since 
that would require the use of the CAPRI model at farm level. 
The core policy assumptions on the CAP in the current CAPRI 
baseline are summarised in Table 3.
The Nitrates Directive
The Nitrates Directive aims to protect water quality across 
Europe by preventing nitrates from agricultural sources from 
polluting ground and surface waters. The Nitrates Directive 
forms an integral part of the Water Framework Directive.26
Most indicators in the CAPRI model that can be related to the 
Nitrates Directive are rather robust pressure indicators and 
can	be	calculated	based	on	fixed	parameter	approaches	from	
the endogenous variables of the regional aggregate supply 
models (Pérez Dominguez et al., 2016). The CAPRI model 
captures the input allocation for fertilisers and calculates 
the nutrient balances. The calculation of nitrogen balances 
ensures compliance with the Nitrates Directive at the 
regional level (i.e. the maximum nitrogen surplus (N-surplus) 
as prescribed by this directive shall not be exceeded at the 
average	NUTS	2	regional	level).
Macroeconomic and market assumptions
The CAPRI baseline integrates a multitude of external 
information sources for assumptions on macroeconomic 
and market developments. Exogenous macroeconomic 
indicators	 cover,	 for	 example,	 GDP	 growth	 rates,	 inflation	
rates, exchange rates and population growth, while 
exogenous market indicators comprise, for example, 
assumptions on biofuel production from agricultural 
feedstock, use of mineral fertilisers and agricultural markets 
in general. For example, GDP and population growth rates 
are taken from AGLINK/Global Insight (from 5 November 
2015); however, for the biofuel module, input from the 
PRIMES model is used. The key macroeconomic and market 
assumptions for the current CAPRI baseline are summarised 
in Table.
21	Regulation	(EU)	No	1307/2013,	Article	6.
22	Regulation	(EU)	No	1307/2013,	Article	22.
23	Regulation	(EU)	No	1307/2013,	Article	53.
24	Regulation	(EU)	No	1307/2013,	Article	47.
25	Regulation	(EU)	No	1307/2013,	Article	42.
26	Directive	2000/60/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	23	October	2000	establishing	a	framework	for	Community	action	in	the	field	of	water	policy.
Variable Source What is determined
Macroeconomics 
(inflation,	GDP	growth)
AGLINK/PRIMES/FAO/IFPRI and elsewhere.
Some nominal prices, position of demand functions, 
starting point for future simulations.
Demographics AGLINK/PRIMES/FAO/IFPRI and elsewhere.
Position of demand functions, starting point for 
future simulations.
Market	balances	for	EU
DG AGRI (2015), supplemented with national/
industry	sources,	sometimes	defined	by	
constrained trends.
Target values for CAPRI trend estimator (e.g. beef 
supply).
World markets 
European Commission (2015)/FAO/IFPRI 
projections plus data consolidation.
International market variables, position of 
behavioural functions, starting point for simulations.
Biofuel policy European Commission (2015)/F.O. Licht/COMEXT.
Implicitly harmonised with those in DG AGRI 2015) 
through calibration to biofuel supply/use and trade.
Yields 
European Commission (2015)/FAO/IFPRI or 
constrained trends.
Market results, position of behavioural functions, 
starting point for simulations.
Technological progress 
Often	own	assumptions	(e.g.	maximum	yields,	
0.5% input saving per annum), sometimes taken 
from IIASA studies (emission controls). 
Market results, position of behavioural functions, 
starting point for simulations.
Fertiliser use 
European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association 
projections and over-fertilisation/availability 
parameter trends.
Environmental indicators, farm income.
TABLE 4: MACROECONOMIC AND MARKET ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CAPRI 2016 BASELINE.
Note: IFPR = International Food Policy Research Institute; IIASA = International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; Source: own presentation.
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IFM-CAP baseline scenario is simulated taking CAP 
subsidies, prices, yields and input costs as given over 
the simulated time horizon. This modelling implies that 
farmers adjust output and area allocation to changes of 
these parameters.
The development of CAP subsidies, prices, yields and input 
costs in IFM-CAP are made consistent with CAPRI. That is, 
the decoupled payments are harmonised between CAPRI 
and the IFM-CAP in the baseline (BPS, SAPS, greening 
and redistributive payments), so that the average unit 
payments at MS level in both models are equal. This 
assumption was made for the purpose of maintaining 
the heterogeneity of payments among farms in a MS, 
while at the same time ensuring consistency with CAPRI. 
The unitary coupled payments (per head or hectare) (VCS 
and coupled complementary national direct payments 
(CNDPs)) are taken from CAPRI. This implies that IFM-
CAP indirectly considers the adjustments in the unitary 
payments when the overall envelope is exceeded.
In line with CAPRI, IFM-CAP baseline assumes an 
adjustment of baseline prices and yields using growth 
rates	from	the	CAPRI	baseline	and	inflation	rate	of	1.9	%	
per year for input costs.
4.1.4 IFM-CAP
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The main concept of the Inc&Env scenario (Figure 4) is 
that a more restrictive compliance with agri-environmental 
objectives is required to be eligible for direct payments. 
Trade policies remain with the status quo, as in the baseline.
In Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, budget totals remain unchanged 
compared with the baseline over the 2020-2030 period. 
In the 2020-2025 period, Pillar 1 payments are distributed 
as follows: 40% is dedicated to decoupled payments, 
40% is dedicated to greening, 5% is allocated to coupled 
support (assuming the same payment structure as the 
baseline), and the remaining 15% is allocated according 
to CAPRI (in function of high nature value (HNV) farms) 
and modelled as an agro-environmental payment.
4.2 | Scenario implementation
4.2.1 Scenario 1: ‘Income & Environment’
Various indicators on different spatial scales 
Prices Yields 
Extended greening, 
Nitrogen limits 
Policies 
Data flow 
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FIGURE 4: CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL CHAIN FOR SCENARIO 1 (INC&ENV).
Source: own presentation.
MAGNET implements, in the 2020-2025 period for Pillar 
2, a 60% reduction in investments in human and physical 
capital. This saving is redirected into agri-environmental 
schemes. In the 2025-2030 period, the new distribution of 
first-	and	second-pillar	payments	is	maintained.
The narrative that drives the results in the Inc&Env scenario 
is	based	on	two	main	groups	of	assumptions.	The	first	is	a	
restructuring of both the Pillar 1 budget, by reducing coupled 
support, and the Pillar 2 budget, by switching 80% of the 
budget from human and physical capital investments to 
agri-environmental	area	payments.	The	shift	in	the	Pillar	2	
budget directly increases the average income per hectare 
while	creating	mainly	negative	productivity	effects.
The second group of assumptions includes (1) a limit 
imposed on nitrogen input for agricultural activities, which 
leads to lower expected crop yields, and (2) restrictions 
regarding livestock stocking density, which lead to a 
reduction	 in	 livestock	 in	 NUTS	 2	 regions	 with	 highly	
intensified	 production,	 while	 providing	 more	 favourable	
conditions for extensive production.
The	 distribution	 of	 Pillar	 1	 payments	 across	 different	
policy areas in IFM-CAP is the same as in CAPRI. The 
same holds for modelling the BPS and coupled support, 
with the exception that the IFM-CAP implements 
eligibility criteria for coupled support at farm level. 
The	 main	 difference	 between	 IFM-CAP	 and	 CAPRI	
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lies in the modelling of greening measures, which is 
naturally a consequence of the complementarities of 
the two models. Because IFM-CAP can capture farm-
level implementation of greening requirements, similar 
to baseline, the greening restrictions are imposed at 
individual farm level. IFM-CAP assumes more stringent 
rules	 for	 crop	 diversification	 and	 EFA	measures	 in	 the	
Inc&Env scenario than in the baseline. All farms with 
an arable area of more than 3 ha are assumed to be 
subject to crop diversity requirements, i.e. the main crop 
should not cover more than 75% of the arable land and 
the two main crops together should not cover more than 
95% of the arable land. The EFA measure assumes that 
a greater proportion (7%) of land needs to be allocated 
to ecological uses than is considered in the baseline. For 
both measures, this scenario considers similar exemption 
rules related to grassland and forage area as in baseline 
(i.e. that farms with a grassland or forage area of more 
than 75% of the total eligible area are exempt). The 
assumptions for the grassland measure are the same as 
in the baseline in IFM-CAP.
For	 the	 IFM-CAP,	 the	 following	 specific	 assumptions	 re-
garding scenario implementation have been made:
● In the scenarios, the unitary values of subsidies in the 
IFM-CAP were taken directly from CAPRI, i.e. for the 
BPS, greening, VCS and coupled CNDPs.
● Since the unitary payments for the VCS and coupled 
CNDPs	 (as	 well	 as	 the	 livestock/crops	 benefits)	 are	
taken from CAPRI in the baseline and the scenario, 
this implies that the IFM-CAP indirectly considers the 
adjustments in the unitary payments derived from a 
potential overshooting of the envelope.
● A Natura 2000 area is assumed to be an HNV area in 
the Inc&Env scenario, as there are no FADN data that 
can be used to distinguish HNV areas.
● The	uniform	EU-wide	HNV	payment	was	calculated	by	
dividing	the	EU	budget	envelope	of	HNV	(taken	from	
CAPRI) by the Eurostat Natura 2000 area.27 This uni-
tary payment was distributed over the total area of 
farms located in Natura 2000 areas.
● To be consistent with the Inc&Env scenario assumption 
of	a	fixed	Pillar	1	budget	(i.e.	the	same	budget	in	base-
line and the scenario), the calculated HNV payment 
was	modified	when	necessary.	That	is,	if	the	total	val-
ue of the Pillar 1 budget was overshot in the Inc&Env 
scenario relative to the baseline, the HNV payments 
were reduced accordingly. The reverse adjustment was 
made in the case of a Pillar 1 budget undershot. In MSs 
where there are no farms in Natura 2000 areas in the 
FADN sample (e.g. in Finland), the HNV payment was 
distributed across all farms.
27 We use Eurostat for Natura 2000 areas because in FADN is not well represented.
28	If	human	capital	related	CAP	Pillar	2	payments	increase	by	A%,	and	the	coefficient	is	0.032,	then	labour	productivity	increases	by	0.032*A%.	If	human	capital	payments	
rise by 100%, labour productivity rises by 3.2%.
4.2.2 Scenario 2: ‘Liberalisation & Productivity’
In the Lib&Prod scenario (Figure 5), Pillar 1 (including the 
funds dedicated to greening) is eliminated in the 2020-
2025 period.
The total Pillar 2 budget is assumed to be the same as in the 
2020-2030 baseline, but payments are redistributed as fol-
lows in the 2020-2025 period: all LFA payments are eliminat-
ed; agri-environmental payments are reduced by 50%; and 
the resulting saving from both of these measures in each MS 
is distributed equally to each of investment in physical capital 
and investment in human capital. In the 2025-2030 period, 
the new distribution of Pillar 2 payments is maintained.
MAGNET,	having	a	specific	module	on	Pillar	2	measures,	
differentiates	 among	 the	 measures,	 which	 are	 grouped	
into	 five	 broad	 categories:	 (1)	 agri-environmental	
measures (land-augmenting productivity impact), (2) LFAs 
(no	productivity	effects),	(3)	investment	in	physical	capital	
(capital-augmenting productivity impact), (4) investment 
in human capital (labour-augmenting productivity impact), 
and (5) wider rural development measures (no productivity 
effects).
Based on the most recent estimations (Dudu and Smeets 
Kristkova, 2017), the percentage change in productivity 
of factors used in agricultural production is calculated by 
multiplying the percentage change in CAP payment types 
with	a	constant	coefficient	based	on	econometric	estima-
tion and expert opinion.28 These productivity changes are 
applied in both MAGNET and CAPRI. Indirectly, they are 
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taken up by the IFM-CAP through the transmission of CA-
PRI prices and yields.
The trade liberalisation follows the theoretical ambitious 
scenario,	 providing	 full	 tariff	 liberalisation	 for	 98.5%	 of	
Harmonized	System	(HS)	six-digit	lines,	and	a	partial	tariff	
reduction of 50% for the other lines (sensitive products) 
for	the	ongoing	and	upcoming	FTAs	between	the	EU	and	
12	trade	partners	(USA,	Canada,	Mercosur,	Australia,	New	
Zealand,	Japan,	Vietnam,	Thailand,	Turkey,	Mexico,	Philip-
pines and Indonesia). Details can be found in Boulanger et 
al. (2016a).
The trade scenarios are implemented in MAGNET and CA-
PRI, whereas the IFM-CAP receives the impacts transmit-
ted through price changes from CAPRI.
Various indicators on different spatial scales 
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Data flow 
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FIGURE 5: CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL CHAIN FOR SCENARIO 2 (LIB&PROD).
Source: own presentation.
CAPRI-specific scenario implementation
The Lib&Prod scenario includes full elimination of Pillar 1 
subsidies in line with a reduction in Pillar 2 agri-environ-
mental payments by 50%, and simultaneously with the 
elimination of the LFA budget. These assumptions have 
more direct impacts on simulated results than indirect 
cross	effects,	e.g.	they	directly	reduce	agricultural	income	
through lower direct subsidies. Even though the removed 
Pillar 2 funding is transferred to investment subsidies for 
human and physical capital, which has mostly positive 
productivity	effects,	in	general	this	has	less	of	an	effect	on	
income. These assumptions make the Lib&Prod scenario 
more ‘incentive driven’ than the Inc&Env scenario, which, 
rather, is ‘restrictions driven’.
The scenario setup includes a number of FTAs that the 
EU	is	currently	negotiating,	and	 it	 is	assumed	that	these	
will be concluded and implemented by 2030. For many 
of	 the	 FTAs	 considered,	 the	 negotiation	 offers	 have	 not	
yet been exchanged, which implies that the treatment 
and lists of sensitive products and other reciprocal con-
cessions	granted	under,	for	example,	TRQs	are	largely	un-
known.	 Therefore,	 the	 scenario	 assumes	 simplified	 (and	
ambitious)	 tariff	 reductions:	 full	 tariff	elimination	 for	 the	
majority of traded commodities, except for those declared 
sensitive	and	which	are	subject	to	a	50%	tariff	reduction.	
The	list	of	sensitive	tariff	lines	has	been	constructed	based	
on	the	expert	judgement	of	different	Commission	services,	
complemented	by	a	statistical	analysis	of	historical	tariff	
revenues.	 The	FTAs	 covered	 include	 those	with	 the	USA,	
Mercosur, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Two additional FTAs, with Canada and Vietnam, have been 
implemented with more precise market access assump-
tions	according	to	the	concluded	(but	not	yet	ratified)	legal	
texts.
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The standard CAPRI model includes explicit functions that 
mimic	the	TRQ	mechanism.	However,	in	order	to	(1)	avoid	
making assumptions on quota expansions for FTA mem-
bers and (2) to harmonise the scenario implementation 
with	MAGNET,	the	TRQs	for	sensitive	products	have	been	
replaced	with	an	AVE	tariff	representation.	Although	 it	 is	
a	simplification	 relative	 to	 the	explicit	TRQ-function	 rep-
resentation, and it might lead to overestimated impacts 
on	trade,	this	allowed	us	to	implement	the	50%	tariff	re-
duction for sensitive products directly.
The NoCAP scenario is a variant of the Lib&Prod scenario 
(Figure 6), but, in addition to the elimination of Pillar 1 
payments, all Pillar 2 payments are also eliminated. The 
assumptions regarding trade policy are kept the same as 
in the Lib&Prod scenario.
The IIA describes this option as follows:
‘Option 2 (no policy) while dismantling CAP would not be in 
line with the Treaty, hence not realistic nor desirable, this 
scenario is considered nonetheless useful in demonstrat-
ing	the	EU	value-added	of	CAP	as	well	as	the	economic,	
social	and	environmental	impact	of	the	absence	of	an	EU-
wide policy intervention.’29
4.2.3 Scenario 3: ‘No CAP’
29 http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_agri_001_cap_modernisation_en.pdf.
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FIGURE 6: CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL CHAIN FOR SCENARIO 3, ‘NO CAP’.
Source: own presentation.
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In this chapter, the results of the reference scenario are 
presented,	starting	with	the	EU	in	a	global	context,	focusing	
in particular on the development of the main agricultural 
markets over the next 15 years, presenting the situation 
for	EU	farms	and,	finally,	depicting	the	key	environmental	
indicators.30
Reference scenario results (2016-2030)5
5.1 | The	EU	in	a	global	context
5.1.1 Global macroeconomic context (MAGNET)
The macroeconomic assumptions presented in this chap-
ter	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 employed	 in	 the	 EU	Agricultural	
Outlook as of December 2015 (DG AGRI, 2015).
In this edition of the outlook, a world GDP growth of 2.6% 
was expected for 2015 given the turmoil in the BRICS 
countries31. Based on the assumptions and model out-
come, Table 5 shows the projected sizes of economies in 
2016	 for	 the	 EU	and	 its	 trading	partners.	 The	EU	has	a	
slightly	lower	GDP	than	the	NAFTA	countries	(USA,	Cana-
da, Mexico). Over the time horizon of 15 years until 2030, 
the LDCs, although the smallest in terms of economic size 
in 2016, and China, still the engine of world economic 
growth, are expected to have the highest rates of growth, 
with yearly growth rates of more than 5%. NAFTA is ex-
pected to grow steadily by about 2.4%.
30 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
31 The BRICS countries are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
BASELINE 2016
(EUR	million)
2016-2030
(% change)
Yearly growth
(%)
EU-28 13,343,926 26.7 1.8
EU-15 12,189,162 24.8 1.6
EU-13 1,154,764 47.2 2.8
NAFTA 14,732,908 38.0 2.4
Mercosur 2,212,930 45.4 2.9
China 7,479,412 118.6 5.5
Australia & New Zealand 1,270,883 42.1 2.7
Asian FTA countries 5,876,310 32.7 2.0
LDCs 636,332 95.1 5.0
Rest of the World 12,526,565 68.9 3.7
TABLE 5: GDP AND GDP GROWTH FOR THE EU-28 AND ITS TRADE PARTNERS.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET.
Since	the	economic	crisis	in	2012,	the	EU’s	GDP	has	picked	
up. Between 2016 and 2030, annual GDP growth is an-
ticipated	to	be,	on	average,	1.8%	in	the	EU,	which	is	sig-
nificantly	 below	 that	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 However,	
economic	growth	among	the	EU	MSs	is	quite	diverse:	the	
yearly	GDP	growth	of	the	EU-13	(2.7%	on	average)	is	ex-
pected	to	far	exceed	that	of	the	EU-15,	which	is	expected	
to be, on average, approximately 1.7% per year between 
2016 and 2030.
It	should	be	noted	that	EU	economic	growth	in	2016	and	
2017 is likely to be slightly lower than initially expected at 
the beginning of 2016. Certain factors weighed negatively 
on	the	economic	growth	path	of	the	EU,	such	as	an	ele-
vated level of geopolitical uncertainty, the slowing down 
of world growth and world trade, and some legacies from 
the	recent	economic	and	financial	crisis	(in	terms	of	public	
and private debt, ongoing recovery process in the banking 
sector, etc.).
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Concerning the oil price (Table 6), since the sharp fall in 
oil prices at the end of 2014 and the record low of early 
2016, the Brent crude oil price picked up slightly through-
out 2016, but is still much lower than 2 years ago. Lower 
prices in the last 2 years can be explained by a combi-
nation of lower demand (due to slow economic growth 
and	higher	use	efficiency),	abundant	supply	to	the	market	
from some traditional players such as Libya or Iran, strong 
output	increases	from	the	USA	and	no	downwards	adjust-
ment in production by Russia and countries of the Organ-
ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This led 
to an increase in inventories and low prices. According to 
the	EU	reference	scenario	2016,32 in the longer term, the 
assumption	is	that	the	oil	price	will	rise	to	reach	USD	95	
per barrel (in nominal terms) by 2030 (assuming a price 
of	around	68	USD	per	barrel	in	2016).	There	is	consensus	
among oil price projections that there will be a gradual in-
crease	in	the	oil	price	in	the	coming	10	years.	This	reflects	
continuing demand growth, particularly from emerging 
economies, and higher extraction costs for the non-con-
ventional oil that will be needed to meet the increasing 
world demand.
The energy price (Table 6) is closely linked to the oil price. 
The less pronounced growth expected over the period up 
to 2030 is due to the variable and growing sources of al-
ternative energies (in particular renewables).
 2016 2020 2025 2030
Oil price 100 97.2 110.4 125.3
Energy price 100 96.7 114.7 136.2
TABLE 6: OIL AND PRICE DEVELOPMENT, INDEX 2016-2030.
Source: Own calculation based on EC (2016d).
Oil	price	affects	the	agricultural	outlook	in	several	ways:	it	
impacts production costs (directly or indirectly through the 
cost	of	fertilisers	and	other	 inputs)	and	has	an	effect	on	
the demand for biofuels.
Continued world population growth and economic growth 
drive demand and support prices for agricultural commod-
ities. However, population growth is slowing down in Eu-
rope, North America, Russia and China. In the latter, the av-
erage annual growth rate expected over the 2016-2030 
period is 0.2%, while in the previous decade it amounted 
to 0.5%.
World population growth is concentrated in Africa and Asia 
(Table 7). The annual population increase, which is cur-
rently around 80 million people per year, is expected to 
decelerate. In Europe, the continued population growth in 
the	EU-15	is	partly	offset	by	a	depopulation	trend	in	the	
EU-13.	Moreover,	for	the	years	2015	and	2016,	the	annual	
EU-15	population	growth	was	adjusted	to	be	0.1	percent-
age points higher than in DG AGRI (2015), mostly because 
of the recent increase in the number of asylum seekers 
from the Middle East and North Africa.
32 To be coherent and consistent with the data on GHG emissions included in the MAGNET model, the baseline takes into account the energy prices (coal, oil and gas) from 
the	European	Commission’s	trends	to	2050	EU	Reference	Scenario	2016	(EC,	2016d).
BASELINE 2016
(million)
2016-2030
(% change)
Yearly growth
(%)
EU-28 510,284 –0.23 –0.02
EU-15 388,037 1.0 0.1
EU-13 107,507 –4.7 –0.3
NAFTA 450,198 12.35 0.8
Mercosur 235,713 10.38 0.7
China 1,327,798 2.40 0.2
Australia & New Zealand 25,617 16.31 1.1
Asian FTA 601,588 9.35 0.6
LDCs 412,771 35.46 2.2
Rest of the World 2,340,381 17.20 1.1
TABLE 7: POPULATIONS IN THE EU AND TRADING PARTNER COUNTRIES.
Source: Figures for 2016 from ESTAT.
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The structures of the economies (Table 8) are expected 
to show only small changes over the period analysed. The 
EU-28,	similar	to	the	NAFTA	countries,	Australia	and	New	
Zealand,	and	the	Asian	FTA	countries,	is	expected	to	have	
similar shares of the agriculture (primary production) and 
food processing (food proc.) sectors in 2016 and in 2030, 
amounting to about 5% in both years. Clearly dominating 
are the service and industry sectors in the OECD countries. 
Mercosur, China and the Rest of the World have shares of 
almost 10% in the agri-food sector. The LDCs reach nearly 
a 20% share in the agri-food sector, but show a decreasing 
trend towards 2030.
5.1.2 The agri-food sector in the global economy
EU-28 
(%)
NAFTA 
(%)
Mercosur 
(%)
China 
(%)
AUS&NZZ
(%)
Asian FTA 
(%)
LDCs  
(%)
ROW 
(%)
Agriculture 2016 1.6 1.1 6.3 6.1 2.4 2.9 15.3 6.2
Agriculture 2030 1.6 1.1 5.8 6.1 2.3 2.8 13.2 5.7
Food proc. 2016 3.1 2.0 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.7 4.3 2.9
Food proc. 2030 3.1 2.0 3.1 2.2 2.3 2.7 4.4 2.9
Industry 2016 26.8 24.1 21.7 48.3 24.8 23.9 32.7 36.4
Industry 2030 27.7 24.3 23.7 47.4 24.4 24.2 32.8 36.6
Service 2016 68.5 72.7 69.0 43.4 70.5 70.6 47.7 54.5
Service 2030 67.7 72.5 67.5 44.3 71.0 70.3 49.5 54.7
TABLE 8: DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ SHARES OF SECTORS IN 2016 AND 2030
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET; ROW = Rest of world.
As	suggested	by	the	EU	Agricultural	Outlook	as	of	Decem-
ber	 2015	 (DG	 AGRI,	 2015),	 EU-28	 agri-food	 production	
is expected to grow in real terms by about 8% (Table 9). 
Within the overall growth, sectors such as dairy and bev-
erages and tobacco are expected to grow the most, while 
growth in several sectors such as crops is, in general, ex-
pected to be more limited or even negative (oilseeds and 
meals) (Figure 7).
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FIGURE 7: REAL PRODUCTION IN THE EU-28 BY PRODUCT, % CHANGE 2016-2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
Details on production, imports, exports and domestic use 
are presented in Table 10 and Table 11. The changes in LDC 
aggregates are particularly striking. Indeed imports of both 
agricultural and food products more than double over the 
period in LDCs. On the other hand, exports of agricultural 
products decrease by one third, whereas those of food in-
crease	by	one	fifth.	In	China,	exports	of	agricultural	products	
decrease by half. Interestingly, only Asian FTA countries and 
Mercosur experience major increases in agricultural exports, 
which double and increase by one half, respectively.
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BASELINE 2016
(EUR	million)
2016-2030
(% change)
Yearly growth
(%)
Wheat 31,078 3.1 0.2
Rice 3,669 –4.9 –0.4
Other cereals 28,208 4.7 0.3
Oilseeds 16,570 –0.3 0.0
Oils & meals 42,390 –16.5 –1.3
Raw sugar 3,545 1.7 0.1
Sugar 17,830 9.4 0.7
Fruits & veg. 60,744 3.8 0.3
Other crops 63,704 1.8 0.1
Cattle 32,226 –6.1 –0.5
Beef & sheep meat 52,831 –5.4 –0.4
Pig & poultry 67,214 2.8 0.2
Pig & poultry meat 138,363 3.5 0.2
Raw milk 55,279 10.7 0.7
Dairy 259,276 19.5 1.3
Bev. & tobacco 294,854 12.3 0.8
Other food 441,621 7.3 0.5
Total 1,609,400 7.9 0.6
TABLE 9: REAL PRODUCTION IN THE EU-28 BY PRODUCT.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
Countries
Base 2016 (EUR million) Base 2030 (EUR million) Change in % (2016-2030)
Production Import Export Use Production Import Export Use Production Import Export Use
Mercosur 215,348 4,097 48,146 171,300 266,988 4,512 72,264 199,236 24.0 10.1 50.1 16.3
Asian FTA 237,631 31,366 15,132 253,865 285,178 31,397 30,724 285,851 20.0 0.1 103.0 12.6
Australia & 
New	Zealand
56,523 1,871 17,516 40,877 67,991 2,347 24,526 45,812 20.3 25.4 40.0 12.1
China 737,265 50,274 10,321 777,218 939,133 90,687 5,431 1,024,388 27.4 80.4 -47.4 31.8
LDCs 132,645 8,142 9,617 131,170 184,640 16,428 6,473 194,595 39.2 101.8 -32.7 48.4
NAFTA 364,471 43,361 91,466 316,366 424,978 49,814 121,363 353,430 16.6 14.9 32.7 11.7
Rest of the 
World
1,130,715 108,393 81,402 1,157,705 1,404,698 145,281 98,133 1,451,846 24.2 34.0 20.6 25.4
TABLE 10: PRODUCTION, IMPORT, EXPORT AND USE IN OTHER REGIONS, AGRICULTURE (REAL).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
Countries
Base 2016 (EUR million) Base 2030 (EUR million) Change in % (2016-2030)
Production Import Export Use Production Import Export Use Production Import Export Use
Mercosur 277,149 7,617 51,601 233,165 346,712 9,937 61,548 295,101 25.1 30.5 19.3 26.6
Asian FTA 530,411 65,833 57,269 538,975 636,789 79,142 72,887 643,044 20.1 20.2 27.3 19.3
Australia & 
New	Zealand
91,118 10,716 27,953 73,882 108,829 14,645 29,383 94,091 19.4 36.7 5.1 27.4
China 804,290 26,673 33,896 797,067 1,089,972 39,146 40,825 1,088,294 35.5 46.8 20.4 36.5
LDCs 109,011 23,020 5,589 126,442 195,622 46,679 6,774 235,527 79.5 102.8 21.2 86.3
NAFTA 862,328 94,965 84,199 873,094 1,045,466 116,590 102,427 1,059,629 21.2 22.8 21.6 21.4
Rest of the 
World
1,284,037 201,822 141,115 1,344,745 1,893,486 271,292 221,134 1,943,644 47.5 34.4 56.7 44.5
TABLE 11: PRODUCTION, IMPORT, EXPORT AND USE IN OTHER REGIONS, FOOD (REAL).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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There are no important developments in price apart from 
in the milk and dairy sector, which shows a critical decreas-
ing trend (Table 12). Other food, beverages and tobacco, 
and feed also face minor price decreases. In general, a 
slight increase in other agri-food prices can be observed. 
Oilseeds, raw sugar, cattle and meat increase the most.
 2020 2025 2030
Wheat 96.6 106.9 110.7
Rice 94.2 92.8 92.5
Other cereals 91.3 101.7 105.8
Oilseeds 223.3 282.8 269.1
Oils & meals 94.4 109.6 109.9
Raw sugar 141.0 143.5 137.1
Sugar 110.2 108.7 105.1
Fruits & veg. 100.6 101.6 101.9
Other crops 101.5 101.1 101.1
Cattle 111.1 131.1 150.4
Beef & sheep meat 106.4 113.6 121.2
Pig & poultry 104.5 106.4 103.9
Pig & poultry meat 102.7 104.4 104.1
Raw milk 89.8 73.0 57.9
Dairy 94.9 86.4 76.8
Other food 98.4 96.2 93.5
Bev. & tobacco 98.3 95.8 93.1
Feed 100.1 102.9 98.8
Fertiliser 99.0 101.3 103.9
TABLE 12: PRICE (PRODUCER) DEVELOPMENT IN THE EU-28 BY PRODUCT 
(INDEX 2016 = 100).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
5.1.3	 The	EU’s	trade	position
The	EU’s	net	trade	position	(Table	13)33 is expected to im-
prove	by	about	EUR	17.7	billion	between	2016	and	2030.	
Most notably, the wheat, sugar, dairy, pig and poultry meat, 
and beverages and tobacco sectors are expanding their 
exports compared with imports, while the trade balance is 
worsening for oilseeds and oils and meals; the trade bal-
ance in the beef and sheep meat sector is stable. Dynam-
ics	in	the	EU	sector	appear	to	be	very	positive,	particularly	
in sectors with the highest value-added.
Agri-food net trade with China, NAFTA, the LDCs and the 
Rest of the World is improving. By contrast, imports from 
Mercosur are increasing more substantially than the ex-
ports to this region.
The	analysis	of	trade	flows	sheds	some	light	on	the	out-
standing	 position	 of	 Mercosur	 within	 EU	 markets	 as	 a	
supplier of many commodities, such as oilseeds, oils and 
meals, beef and sheep meat, sugar, and pig and poultry 
meat. For beef and sheep meat, pig and poultry meat, and 
sugar, this prominence is strongly linked to preferential ac-
cess	to	the	EU	market,	granted	under	country-specific	WTO	
TRQs	 under	 the	Uruguay	 Round,	 successive	 EU	 enlarge-
ments	and	TRQs	opened	under	Article	XXVIII	negotiations.
Other	countries	also	have	significant	shares	in	the	EU	mar-
ket, such as the NAFTA countries for oilseeds, and Australia 
and	New	Zealand	for	beef	and	sheep	meat.
33	The	agri-food	trade	balance	in	2016	is	negative	(in	contrast	with	official	figure)	because	it	includes	the	aggregate	other	food	which	includes	processed	fishery	products.	
These products have a negative trade balance. By excluding them, the balance will become positive.
NAFTA Mercosur China AUS&NZZ Asian FTA LDCs ROW Total
2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030
Wheat –650 –1,359 –16 –27 1 3 –48 –87 13 26 562 1,379 3,098 5,075 2,960 5,010
Rice –3 –42 –8 –14 –7 –6 12 0 –390 –416 –127 –82 –12 –309 –535 –869
Other cereals –350 –403 –369 –421 51 222 –17 –18 –17 –14 –30 8 434 1,369 –298 743
Oilseeds –2,060 –2,893 –3,543 –5017 –256 –229 –601 –678 –15 –20 –61 –15 –1,252 –62 –7,788 –8,914
Oils & meals 52 428 –3,816 –5912 47 163 55 196 –1,249 –1,853 119 489 449 –307 –4,343 –6,796
Raw sugar –1 –2 0 0 –1 –3 0 0 0 –1 –4 –4 –29 –74 –35 –84
Sugar 20 280 –1,175 –1384 2 13 –31 –17 –29 38 –209 235 –175 1,786 –1,597 951
Fruits & veg. –1,956 –1,852 –1,049 –1046 –415 –184 –295 –246 –384 –363 –230 –47 –9,175 –7,860 –13,504 –11,598
Other crops –113 –275 –4,653 –6895 –196 172 –225 –218 –1,549 –2,819 –1,629 –852 –4,462 –3,981 –12,827 –14,868
Cattle 37 –498 13 3 6 15 60 44 35 8 –18 –17 1,153 996 1,286 551
Beef & sheep 
meat
–382 –460 –1,627 –1585 248 572 –2,230 –2,193 38 13 16 44 1,209 899 –2,728 –2,710
Pig & poultry –177 –249 –132 –160 155 499 –114 –107 31 5 1 17 470 353 234 358
TABLE 13: NET TRADE BETWEEN THE EU-28 AND OTHER REGIONS PER COMMODITY, 2030 AND 2016 (IN EUR MILLION).
TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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NAFTA Mercosur China AUS&NZZ Asian FTA LDCs ROW Total
2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030 2016 2030
Pig & poultry 
meat
209 147 –668 –1477 104 565 69 138 695 630 401 1,129 2,941 4,811 3,751 5,943
Raw milk 38 163 5 21 6 39 9 24 13 42 4 39 139 956 214 1,284
Dairy 1,830 2,639 114 180 501 625 213 435 1,152 1,665 692 1,488 6,507 9,619 11,009 16,651
Other food 9,287 10,836 267 418 1,697 2,168 –123 –3 2,104 2,387 972 2,158 8,916 13,388 23,120 31,352
Bev. & tobacco 1,224 1,681 –1,174 –1078 –3,211 –3,299 790 1,050 –1,250 –1,093 162 1,100 1,253 180 –2,206 –1,459
Feed –70 –138 –39 –89 65 –71 5 0 20 –80 54 78 315 –429 350 –729
Totals 6,935 8,003 –17,870 –24,483 –1,203 1,264 –2,471 –1,680 –782 –1,845 675 7,147 11,779 26,410 –2,937 14,816
TABLE 13: NET TRADE BETWEEN THE EU-28 AND OTHER REGIONS PER COMMODITY, 2030 AND 2016 (IN EUR MILLION).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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FIGURE 8: COMPOSITION OF EU-28 AGRI-FOOD IMPORTS (2030, BASELINE).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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FIGURE 9: COMPOSITION OF EU-28 AGRI-FOOD EXPORTS (2030, BASELINE)
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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The	baseline	does	not	show	any	large	differences	in	terms	
of	land	use	(Table	14)	within	the	EU	between	2016	and	
2030. The slow but constant increase in productivity, to-
gether with an almost non-existent change in the popu-
lation	 level	within	the	EU	contribute	to	keeping	 land	use	
almost constant over this time.
On the other hand, where population pressures are more 
severe (mainly in Asian and African countries), more land 
has to be exploited to satisfy the food needs of local 
populations.
2016
(km2)
2016-2030
(% change)
Yearly growth 
(%)
EU-13 371,217 –0.1 0.0
EU-15 925,183 –0.6 0.0
EU-28 1,296,400 –0.4 0.0
NAFTA 4,131,224 1.3 0.1
Mercosur 3,361,371 9.6 0.7
China 3,740,554 2.5 0.2
Australia & 
New	Zealand
3,043,113 1.0 0.1
Asian FTA 776,195 8.9 0.6
LDCs 5,986,905 11.0 0.8
TABLE 14: LAND USE AND LAND USE CHANGE UNTIL 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 10: EU IMPORTS BY PRODUCTS AND BY TRADE PARTNERS.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 11: EU EXPORTS BY PRODUCTS AND BY TRADE PARTNERS.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
5.1.4 Global land use change
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2030 2016-2030 Yearly growth
EU-28 92.5 –7.5 –0.6
EU-13 99.7 –0.3 0.0
EU-15 89.6 –10.4 –0.8
NAFTA 149.6 49.6 2.9
Mercosur 145.4 45.4 2.7
China 325.9 225.9 8.8
Australia	&	New	Zealand 201.5 101.4 5.1
Asian FTA 117.4 17.4 1.2
LDCs 331.0 231.0 8.9
Rest of the World 196.7 96.7 5.0
TABLE 15: LAND PRICE FOR THE EU-28 AND OTHER REGIONS (INDEX 2016 
= 100).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
5.1.5 Global greenhouse gas emissions
The reference scenario includes critical increases of GHG 
emissions for all regions. LDCs and China experience 
the	highest	 increases,	 the	EU-28	 the	 lowest	 (Figure	12).	
One has to keep in mind that modelling assumptions 
behind MAGNET and CAPRI can result in potential output 
discrepancies (see section 9.2).
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FIGURE 12: GHG EMISSIONS IN ALL SECTORS AND AGRICULTURE, % CHANGE, 2016-2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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For MAGNET, job number data were obtained from DataM 
bioeconomy data34,	 which	 are	 based	 on	 the	 EU	 Labour	
Force Survey (LFS). We have opted to use data from 
the LFS as it is annually updated, while the last year for 
which data on the agricultural labour force (excluding 
forestry	 and	 fishing)	 in	 the	 National	 Economic	 Accounts	
are available is 2011. The LFS (coded lfsa_egan22d), 
conducted by Eurostat, is a data source usually used to 
compare	 employment	 data	 across	 different	 sectors	 of	
activities. According to this survey, 9.6 million persons 
employed	in	agriculture	(Nace	rev.2	code	A01)	in	the	EU	in	
2014 reported agriculture as their main activity.
The numbers are expressed in full-time equivalents (FTE), 
both paid labour and self-employed. Over the period, 
change of employment in both agricultural and food 
sectors is negative, with a yearly loss of 1.8% and 1.4%, 
respectively.	 The	drop	 is	higher	 in	EU-13	 than	 in	EU-15,	
and slightly greater in the agricultural sector than in the 
food industry. That said, in the year 2030 the former shall 
employ 6.7 million FTE, the latter 0.8 million FTE.
5.2 | Employment in the agri-food sector
34 https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/BIOECONOMICS/index.html.
2016 (FTE) 2030 (FTE) Absolute change (FTE) Change (%) Yearly change (%)
Austria 170,757 141,144 –29,613 –17.3 –1.4
Belgium 48,381 43,349 –5,032 –10.4 –0.8
Bulgaria 172,031 105,603 –66,428 –38.6 –3.4
Croatia 213,224 151,954 –61,271 –28.7 –2.4
Cyprus 13,646 10,677 –2,970 –21.8 –1.7
Czech Republic 92,076 76,128 –15,949 –17.3 –1.3
Denmark 51,933 43,845 –8,088 –15.6 –1.2
Estonia 14,981 11,057 –3,924 –26.2 –2.1
Finland 69,889 54,055 –15,835 –22.7 –1.8
France 612,157 535,821 –76,336 –12.5 –0.9
Germany 513,606 385,590 –128,016 –24.9 –2.0
Greece 437,941 320,118 –117,824 –26.9 –2.2
Hungary 134,414 107,258 –27,155 –20.2 –1.6
Ireland 68,673 60,863 –7,810 –11.4 –0.9
Italy 707,694 603,970 –103,724 –14.7 –1.1
Latvia 44,135 30,111 –14,025 –31.8 –2.7
Lithuania 69,735 51,889 –17,845 –25.6 –2.1
Luxembourg 2,630 2,493 –137 –5.2 –0.4
Malta 1,172 819 –353 –30.1 –2.5
Netherlands 188,084 169,639 –18,445 –9.8 –0.7
Poland 1,579,836 1,232,406 –347,430 –22.0 –1.8
Portugal 405,505 302,075 –103,430 –25.5 –2.1
Romania 1,998,857 1,423,309 –575,548 –28.8 –2.4
Slovakia 39,262 30,082 –9,180 –23.4 –1.9
Slovenia 62,545 46,418 –16,127 –25.8 –2.1
Spain 602,743 484,416 –118,327 –19.6 –1.5
Sweden 53,735 46,425 –7,310 –13.6 –1.0
UK 270,465 231,284 –39,181 –14.5 –1.1
EU-28 8,640,109 6,702,797 –1,937,312 –22.4 –1.8
EU-15 4,204,194 3,425,086 –779,108 –18.5 –1.5
EU-13 4,435,915 3,277,712 –1,158,204 –26.1 –2.1
TABLE 16: EMPLOYMENT – AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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2016 (FTE) 2030 (FTE) Absolute change (FTE) Change (%) Yearly change (%)
Austria 80,036 67,006 –13,029 –16.3 –1.3
Belgium 88,833 84,462 –4,371 –4.9 –0.4
Bulgaria 94,208 74,360 –19,848 –21.1 –1.7
Croatia 68,156 49,671 –18,485 –27.1 –2.2
Cyprus 13,908 11,774 –2,134 –15.3 –1.2
Czech Republic 112,461 94,000 –18,461 –16.4 –1.3
Denmark 64,733 57,081 –7,652 –11.8 –0.9
Estonia 10,825 8,338 –2,488 –23.0 –1.8
Finland 40,063 35,498 –4,565 –11.4 –0.9
France 620,016 539,754 –80,262 –12.9 –1.0
Germany 920,958 685,651 –235,307 –25.6 –2.1
Greece 90,380 71,732 –18,648 –20.6 –1.6
Hungary 103,308 79,106 –24,202 –23.4 –1.9
Ireland 38,203 34,968 –3,235 –8.5 –0.6
Italy 427,316 383,761 –43,556 –10.2 –0.8
Latvia 20,647 13,025 –7,622 –36.9 -3.2
Lithuania 31,124 28,853 –2,271 –7.3 –0.5
Luxembourg 5,266 5,105 –161 –3.1 –0.2
Malta 3,419 2,562 –857 –25.1 –2.0
Netherlands 132,374 126,807 –5,567 –4.2 –0.3
Poland 372,305 288,727 –83,578 –22.4 –1.8
Portugal 109,286 92,073 –17,213 –15.8 –1.2
Romania 191,830 146,706 –45,123 –23.5 –1.9
Spain 360,571 295,011 –65,560 –18.2 –1.4
Slovakia 38,566 30,142 –8,424 –21.8 –1.7
Slovenia 12,886 10,822 –2,064 –16.0 –1.2
Sweden 63,375 59,866 –3,509 –5.5 –0.4
UK 418,086 354,239 –63,847 –15.3 –1.2
EU-28 4,533,139 3,731,101 –802,038 –17.7 –1.4
EU-15 3,459,496 2,893,016 –566,480 –16.4 –1.3
EU-13 1,073,642 838,085 –235,557 –21.9 –1.8
TABLE 17: EMPLOYMENT –FOOD INDUSTRY SECTOR.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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This section gives a brief overview of the major agricultur-
al production and market developments in the reference 
scenario. The results of the reference scenario are gener-
ally in line with the major developments in the agricultural 
market	outlook	of	the	EU	(DG	AGRI,	2015).	However,	the	
following projections are derived using the CAPRI model 
and	may	differ	slightly	from	DG	AGRI’s	2015	EU	Agricultur-
al	Outlook	because	of	differences	 in	the	model	structure	
and input data. Moreover, the results of the 2030 projec-
tions are compared with the historical data which, in some 
cases,	may	also	be	slightly	different	to	the	various	 input	
data of CAPRI.
5.3 | Development	of	main	agricultural	sectors	in	EU
5.3.1 Arable crops
Cereal	production	in	the	EU	is	projected	to	increase	by	6%	
by 2030, compared with the historical data for 2015 (Figure 
13).	This	increase	in	EU	cereal	production	is	mainly	driven	
by	feed	demand	and	favourable	export	prospects.	The	EU-
15	 accounts	 for	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	 total	 EU-28	 cereal	
production, but while production is expected to increase 
only	slightly	in	the	EU-15	by	2030,	most	of	the	increase	
in	cereal	production	is	expected	to	take	place	in	the	EU-
N13 countries (which are projected to increase production 
by	17%).	This	production	 increase	 in	the	EU-N13	can	be	
explained mainly by productivity gains (i.e. yield increases). 
With a share of 21% of total production, France remains 
the	largest	cereal	producer	in	the	EU,	followed	by	Germany	
(15%), Poland (10%), Spain (7%) and Romania (7%).
2005-2030 2030
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
2005 2010 2015 2030 
EU-28 EU-15 EU-N13 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
Au
st
ria
 
Be
lg
iu
m
 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Cy
pr
us
 
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Es
to
ni
a 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 
G
er
m
an
y 
G
re
ec
e 
H
un
ga
ry
 
Ire
la
nd
 
Ita
ly
 
La
tv
ia
 
Li
th
ua
ni
a 
M
al
ta
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
Po
la
nd
 
Po
rt
ug
al
 
Ro
m
an
ia
 
Sl
ov
ak
 R
ep
ub
lic
 
Sl
ov
en
ia
 
Sp
ai
n 
Sw
ed
en
 
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
FIGURE 13: EU CEREAL PRODUCTION DEVELOPMENT (MILLION T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (Reference=REF).
For	 oilseeds,	 EU	 production	 is	 projected	 to	 increase	 by	
about 2% overall, compared with historical data for 2015 
(Figure 14). Approximately 60% of oilseed production 
takes	 place	 in	 the	 EU-15,	 but	 most	 of	 the	 projected	
increase	by	2030	 is	 expected	 to	 take	place	 in	 the	 EU-
N13	 (+4.5%).	 France	 (responsible	 for	 20%	 of	 total	 EU	
oilseed production) and Germany (responsible for 17%) 
are	the	largest	oilseed	producers	in	the	EU.	While	France	
produces	 considerable	 amounts	 of	 rapeseed,	 sunflower	
and soyaseed, rapeseed accounts for most oilseed 
production in Germany. Considerable increases in oilseed 
production are also projected for Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary	 (each	 accounting	 for	 8%	 of	 total	 EU	 oilseed	
production),	 which	 are	 mainly	 related	 to	 sunflower	
production (and, in the case of Hungary and Romania, 
also soybean production). The cultivation of rapeseed 
accounts for most of Poland’s oilseed production (7% of 
EU	oilseed	production).
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FIGURE 14: EU OILSEED PRODUCTION DEVELOPMENT (MILLION T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
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FIGURE 15: EU NET TRADE BALANCE FOR CEREALS AND OILSEEDS (MILLION T).
Note: net trade = exports – imports.
Regarding	the	EU	trade	balance,	the	EU	is	projected	to	re-
main a net exporter of cereals, especially with respect to 
wheat and barley exports, whereas it is projected to be 
a	net	 importer	of	grain	maize	and	other	cereals.	The	EU	
net trade balance for oilseeds is negative, which is mostly 
accounted for by net imports of soya (Figure 15).
5.3.2 Milk and dairy
Milk	 is	 produced	 in	 every	 EU	 MS	 and	 milk	 production	
represents	 an	 important	 proportion	 of	 EU	 agricultural	
output value. With no production quota in place, the main 
drivers	for	increasing	EU	supply	are	market	fundamentals,	
which	 show	 a	 favourable	 market	 environment	 for	 EU	
dairy	 exports.	 Accordingly,	 EU	milk	 and	 dairy	 production	
is projected to further increase in the reference scenario, 
mainly	 driven	 by	 increases	 in	 world	 demand.	 EU	 milk	
production is projected to increase by about 9% between 
2015	and	2030,	with	 the	EU-15	accounting	for	most	of	
this increase, as production is expected to increase by 
11%	in	the	EU-15	but	by	only	around	2%	in	the	EU-N13	
(Figure 16). Germany will keep its position as largest milk 
producer	in	the	EU	in	2030,	producing	about	20%	of	total	
EU	milk,	followed	by	France	(16%),	the	UK	(10%),	Poland	
(8%) and the Netherlands (8%).
73Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
0,0 
0,5 
1,0 
1,5 
2,0 
2,5 
3,0 
3,5 
4,0 
4,5 
5,0 
Dairy products Butter Skimmed milk powder Cheese Whole milk powder Whey powder 
M
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
 
FIGURE 17: EU NET TRADE BALANCE (MILLION T).
Note: net trade = exports – imports.
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FIGURE 16:	EU	COW	MILK	PRODUCTION	DEVELOPMENT	(MILLION	T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
5.3.3 Meat
The	EU	is	expected	to	remain	a	considerable	net	exporter	
of dairy products (Figure 17), further increasing its exports 
over the projection period and becoming the leading sup-
plier of dairy products on the world market. Despite the 
increase	in	exports,	the	EU	domestic	market	remains	the	
main	outlet	for	EU	dairy	products,	especially	with	respect	
to fresh dairy products, cheese and butter.
World population and economic growth are expected to 
drive higher global meat demands and contribute to higher 
EU	meat	exports.	As	a	result	of	the	recent	economic	recov-
ery and slightly lower meat prices, overall meat consump-
tion	per	capita	in	the	EU	recovered	by	2015.	The	increase	
in	EU	meat	consumption	is	expected	to	continue,	albeit	at	
a slower pace than that observed in most recent years. By 
the end of the projection period (2030), per capita con-
sumption is expected to be stable, with the market share 
for poultry taking small amounts of the market shares of 
other meats.
Considering	 that	 approximately	 two	 thirds	 of	 EU	 beef	
comes	from	the	dairy	herd,	EU	beef	production	is	mainly	
driven by dairy herd developments. Furthermore, the 
beef	 sector	 is	 influenced	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 VCS	
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in many MSs, mainly in the form of payments linked to 
suckler cows. However, it also has to be mentioned that 
some MSs with large suckler cow herds did not opt for 
VCS	in	the	beef	sector,	for	example	Germany	and	the	UK	
(excluding	 Scotland).	 Moreover,	 specific	 ceilings	 (i.e.	 the	
maximum number of cattle that can be granted VCS) and 
specific	implementation	in	the	MSs	limit	the	impact	of	VCS	
on	cattle	herd	developments	 in	 the	EU.	VCS	 is	assumed	
to remain implemented over the projection period in the 
reference	scenario.	The	projections	indicate	that	EU	beef	
meat production will slightly decrease, by less than 1%, 
compared with the 2015 level. This small decrease can be 
accounted	for	by	the	EU-15,	whereas	beef	meat	production	
is	expected	to	remain	stable	in	the	EU-N13	(Figure	18).
The	EU	 is	 the	second	 largest	producer	of	pig	meat	 in	 the	
world	 (after	China),	and	the	 largest	exporter.	EU	pig	meat	
production is projected to further increase by about 4% 
by 2030, compared with the already high levels of 2015, 
with	most	of	this	increase	taking	place	in	the	EU-15	(Figure	
19). As increases in domestic pig meat consumption are 
limited,	EU	pig	meat	exports	are	projected	to	grow	steadily,	
particularly supported by sustained world demand and 
relatively low feed prices. Germany and Spain are the 
largest pig meat producers, with a share of 23% and 18%, 
respectively,	of	total	EU	pig	meat	production.	With	shares	
of	between	9%	and	7%	 in	 total	EU	production,	Denmark,	
France, Poland, the Netherlands and Italy are also among 
the	most	important	pig	meat	producers	in	the	EU.
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FIGURE 18: EU BEEF MEAT PRODUCTION (1,000 T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
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FIGURE 19: EU PIG MEAT PRODUCTION (1,000 T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
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FIGURE 20: EU POULTRY MEAT PRODUCTION (1,000 T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
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FIGURE 21: EU SHEEP AND GOAT MEAT PRODUCTION (1,000 T).
Note: 2005-2015: historical data; 2030: CAPRI projection (REF).
The	EU	is	one	of	the	world’s	largest	producers	of	poultry	
meat	and	a	net	exporter	of	poultry	products.	EU	poultry	
meat production projections suggest an increase of 9% by 
2030 compared with 2015 levels (Figure 20). The increase 
is driven by consumption increases both inside and outside 
the	EU.	The	promising	growth	in	global	demand	will	lead	
to	 increasing	EU	poultry	meat	exports,	especially	due	 to	
the	expected	valorisation	of	different	cuts	of	poultry	meat.	
The leading MSs in poultry meat production are Poland (17 
%), Germany (14%) and France (13 %), closely followed by 
Italy	(11%),	the	UK	(10	%)	and	Spain	(9%).
The	EU	 is	 not	 self-sufficient	 in	 the	 sheep	and	goat	meat	
sector, and imports considerable quantities of these meats, 
mainly	from	New	Zealand	and	Australia.	After	several	years	
of	decrease,	the	EU	production	of	sheep	and	goat	meat	is	
projected to stabilise and further increase over the projection 
period,	especially	in	the	EU-15	(Figure	21). The production 
increase	 is	 due	 to	 profitability	 increases	 and	 increased	
demand, but also because the majority of sheep-producing 
MSs decided to implement VCS for sheep farming, which is 
assumed to remain over the projection period.
The	EU	net	trade	balance	for	meat	is	expected	to	remain	
positive until 2030 as a result of pig and poultry meat 
exports (Figure 22).
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FIGURE 22: EU NET TRADE BALANCE FOR MEAT (MILLION T).
Note: net trade = exports – imports.
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Table 18 and Table 19 show the structure of the farm 
population and land use by farm specialisation and economic 
farm	size	in	the	baseline	for	the	EU-27.	The	farm	population	
is	split	 into	14	different	production	specialisations.	Out	of	
4.8 million farms represented in the IFM-CAP model for the 
EU-27,	in	terms	of	numbers,	the	most	abundant	farm	types	
are those specialised in mixed crops (14% of all farms), 
followed by specialist milk (12%) and specialist COP35 (11%) 
farms. These three farm specialisations use around 50% 
of	the	total	agricultural	area	of	the	EU-27.	The	remaining	
11 farm specialisations represent individually between 3% 
and	 8%	of	 total	 farms	 in	 the	 EU-27.	 As	 expected,	 small	
farms	dominate	 the	EU	agricultural	sector.	Farms	with	an	
economic	 size	 of	 less	 than	 EUR	 25,000	 standard	 output	
(SO)36	represent	65%	of	all	farms	in	the	EU-27.	Farms	of	
medium	 economic	 size	 (between	 EUR	 25,000	 and	 EUR	
100,000 SO) account for 22% of the total farm population, 
while remaining farms (13%) are of large economic size 
(more	than	EUR	100,000	SO).
The average farm utilises 34 ha of agricultural land in the 
EU-27.	The	largest	farms	are	specialised	in	COP	products,	
with an average area of 74 ha, followed by specialist 
cattle farms (51 ha/farm) and specialist sheep and goat 
farms (40 ha/farm). Farms specialised in horticulture and 
orchards	and	fruits	are	the	smallest	in	the	EU-27,	cultivating	
on average less than 10 ha per farm. As expected, farms 
specialised	 in	 field	 crops	 (e.g.	 specialist	 COP,	 specialist	
other	field	crops)	have	a	larger	areas	of	arable	land	as	a	
proportion	of	total	UAA	than	farms	specialised	in	livestock	
production (e.g. specialist sheep and goat farms, specialist 
cattle farms). In contrast, farms specialised in animal 
production (e.g. specialist sheep and goat, specialist cattle 
and specialist milk farms) have large areas of grassland 
as a proportion of total agricultural area (Table 18).
Farms	of	small	economic	size	(smaller	than	EUR	25,000	
SO) operate, on average, with less than 17 ha per 
farm, while farms of large economic size (more than 
EUR	100,000	SO)	use	more	 than	100	ha	per	 farm.	 The	
medium-sized	 farms	 (between	 EUR	 25,000	 and	 EUR	
100,000 SO) manage, on average, 45 ha per farm. Large 
farms	use	around	50%	of	the	agricultural	land	in	the	EU-
27, while medium-sized and small farms use 30% and 
20%, respectively. Large farms tend to have larger areas 
of arable land as a proportion of total used area, whereas, 
for small and medium-sized farms, a higher proportion of 
their total land tends to be grassland (Table 19).
Table 20 and Table 21 describe the structure of livestock 
numbers by farm specialisation and economic farm size 
in	the	EU-27.	The	average	farm	in	the	EU-27	has	8	cows,	
16 pigs, 26 sheep and goats, and 200 poultry animals. 
As expected, the vast majority of livestock animals are 
on farms specialised in livestock production (specialist 
milk, specialist sheep and goat, specialist cattle, specialist 
granivore farms) followed by mixed farms (mixed livestock, 
mixed crops and livestock farms). With the exception of 
sheep and goats, most livestock production is carried out 
by	medium-sized	 farms	 (between	 EUR	25,000	 and	 EUR	
100,000	SO)	 and	 large	 farms	 (more	 than	 EUR	100,000	
SO). These farm size classes account for more than 85% 
of	 total	 livestock	 numbers.	 Small	 farms	 (between	 EUR	
2,000	and	EUR	25,000	SO)	account	for	a	relatively	large	
(37%) proportion of total animal numbers for only sheep 
and goats.
5.4 | The	EU	farm	sector
5.4.1 Farm structures and land use
35 COP crops: cereals, oilseed and protein crops.
36 The SO is the average monetary value of the agricultural output at farm-gate price calculated by MSs per hectare or per head of livestock, by using data for a reference 
period of 5 successive years. The SO of the farm is calculated as the sum of the SO of each agricultural product present in the farm multiplied by the number of hectares 
or heads of livestock of the farm (FADN 2017).
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Farm population UAA Arable land Grassland
No. farms
% of all 
farms
Average per 
farm	(UAA/
farm)
% of 
UAA
Average per 
farm (arable 
area/farm)
% of total 
arable 
area
Average per 
farm  
(grassland/farm)
% of total 
grassland
Specialist COP 530,964 11.1 74.2 24.7 70.8 32.5 3.4 4.1
Specialist	other	field	crops 396,350 8.3 39.6 9.8 36.7 12.6 2.9 2.6
Specialist horticulture 171,106 3.6 6.3 0.7 5.5 0.8 0.8 0.3
Specialist wine 278,836 5.9 13.1 2.3 12.7 3.1 0.4 0.2
Specialist orchards – fruits 308,322 6.5 9.8 1.9 9.3 2.5 0.6 0.4
Specialist olives 248,741 5.2 11.1 1.7 10.8 2.3 0.4 0.2
Permanent crops combined 131,269 2.8 11.1 0.9 10.7 1.2 0.4 0.1
Specialist milk 588,310 12.3 37.2 13.7 21.0 10.7 16.3 21.7
Specialist sheep and goats 397,736 8.3 40.4 10.1 10.0 3.5 30.4 27.4
Specialist cattle 373,861 7.8 51.4 12.0 17.9 5.8 33.5 28.3
Specialist granivores 147,734 3.1 37.1 3.4 33.7 4.3 3.4 1.1
Mixed crops 191,239 4.0 22.5 2.7 21.0 3.5 1.5 0.7
Mixed livestock 350,960 7.4 14.4 3.2 9.9 3.0 4.5 3.6
Mixed crops and livestock 649,073 13.6 31.8 12.9 25.4 14.3 6.4 9.4
EU-27 4,764,501 100.0 33.5 100.0 24.3 100.0 9.3 100.0
TABLE 18: FARM STRUCTURE AND AGRICULTURAL AREA BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
 
Farm population UAA Arable land Grassland
No. farms
% of all 
farms
Average per 
farm	(UAA/
ha)
% of 
UAA
Average per 
farm (arable 
area/ha)
% of total 
arable 
area
Average per 
farm (grassland/
ha)
% of total 
grassland
EUR	2,000	to	<	8,000 1,664,756 34.9 5.6 5.9 4.2 6.1 1.4 5.3
EUR	8,000	to	<	25,000 1,454,196 30.5 16.2 14.8 11.7 14.8 4.5 14.8
EUR	25,000	to	<	100,000 1,045,201 21.9 45.5 29.8 28.7 26.0 16.8 39.6
EUR	100,000	to	<	500,000 535,065 11.2 106.9 35.8 78.6 36.4 28.3 34.2
≥	EUR	500,000 65,282 1.4 337.9 13.8 296.5 16.7 41.4 6.1
EU-27 4,764,501 100 33.5 100.0 24.3 100.0 9.3 100.0
TABLE 19: FARM STRUCTURE AND AGRICULTURAL AREA BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
 
 
Cows Pigs Sheep and goats Poultry
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
cows
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
pigs
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
sheep and 
goats
Average per 
farm (1000 
heads/farm)
% of all 
poultry
Specialist COP 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 2.8 1.2 0.0 1.6
Specialist	other	field	crops 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.0 2.6 0.8 0.0 0.4
Specialist horticulture 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1
Specialist wine 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Specialist orchards – fruits 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
Specialist olives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.4 0.0 0.0
Permanent crops combined 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Specialist milk 35.9 55.7 1.3 0.9 3.0 1.4 0.0 0.7
Specialist sheep and goats 3.1 3.3 0.5 0.3 237.9 75.6 0.0 0.3
Specialist cattle 21.5 21.2 0.9 0.4 17.8 5.3 0.0 0.4
Specialist granivores 2.1 0.8 378.8 71.2 2.4 0.3 5.4 80.6
Mixed crops 0.6 0.3 1.0 0.3 2.8 0.4 0.1 1.1
Mixed livestock 6.3 5.8 25.8 11.5 15.9 4.5 0.2 7.4
Mixed crops and livestock 6.3 10.8 16.3 13.5 18.6 9.7 0.1 7.4
EU-27 8.0 100.0 16.5 100.0 26.3 100.0 0.2 100.0
TABLE 20: THE STRUCTURE OF LIVESTOCK NUMBERS BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
79Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
Table 22 and Table 23 show the per hectare farm income37 
and farm subsidies as a proportion of total farm income by 
farm specialisation and economic size class, respectively, 
for	the	reference	scenario	in	the	EU-27.
As shown in Tables 22 and 23, the farm income varies 
substantially	 among	 the	 different	 farm	 types	 in	 the	 EU.	
The	 average	 farm	 income	 is	 around	 EUR	 2,115/ha	 in	
the	 EU-27.	 The	 highest	 income	 per	 ha	 (more	 than	 EUR	
4,000/ha) is observed on farms specialised in horticulture, 
wine, orchards, fruits and mixed crops. These farm types 
usually produce high-value products and tend to be labour 
intensive.	The	 lowest	per	hectare	 income	(less	 than	EUR	
1,000/ha) is found on land-intensive farms such as farms 
specialised in COP crops and cattle. Farms with other types 
of	 specialisation	 have	 incomes	 ranging	 between	 EUR	
1,200/ha	and	EUR	3,600/ha.
Regarding farm size, larger farms tend to have higher per 
hectare incomes than smaller farms (Table 23). Farms 
specialised in activities with high per hectare production 
value	(e.g.	horticulture	and	some	animal	activities)	often	
have high production volumes and thus are included in the 
large	economic	size	class	which	explains	 the	differences	
in the per hectare income between small and large farms.
Figure 23 shows that most farms (52%) have incomes 
of	between	EUR	50/ha	and	EUR	2,000/ha.	Only	a	 small	
proportion of farms (2.7%) have a negative income in the 
reference scenario (Figure 24). This concerns farms whose 
revenue obtained from the sale of agricultural products 
and subsidies does not fully cover the costs of variables 
such as fertilisers, pesticides, seeds, feed, etc. These 
farms represent the most vulnerable group because they 
are not able to cover basic production-related expenses. 
These farms also have limited potential to guarantee 
the renovation of capital and machinery or farm growth 
or to pay labour costs, and thus many of the farmers in 
question might be under pressure to exit farming. This 
means that more farms would attain negative income 
when labour and capital costs are included in the income 
calculation. This also implies that the farms with negative 
incomes reported in Figure 24 are the most vulnerable 
farms from the economic viability point of view, and thus 
they represent a lower bound of the number of farms that 
are at risk of exiting farming. Figure 24 shows that the 
UAA	of	these	negative-income	farms	represents	3.1%	of	
total	UAA	in	the	EU-27.
The most subsidy-dependent farm types are those 
specialised in cattle, COP and olives, with their subsidies 
representing 32%, 26% and 23% of their total incomes, 
respectively.	These	farms	are	expected	to	be	most	affected	
by the CAP reforms, which aim to reduce agricultural 
support. The farms that are least dependent on subsidies 
(with subsidies accounting for less than 10% of their 
total incomes) are those specialised in horticulture, wine, 
mixed crops, and granivores (Table 22). Small farms are 
more dependent on subsidies than large farms. Subsidies 
represent between 15% and 20% of total farm income in 
small	 and	medium-sized	 farms	 (less	 than	EUR	100,000	
SO).	In	large	farms	(larger	than	EUR	100,000	SO),	subsidies	
5.4.2 Farm income
 
 
Cows Pigs Sheep and goats Poultry
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
cows
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
pigs
Average per 
farm (heads/
farm)
% of all 
sheep and 
goats
Average per 
farm (1000 
heads/farm)
% of all 
poultry
EUR	2,000	to	<	8,000 1 5.9 1.4 2.9 14.3 19.0 0.0 7.8
EUR	8,000	to	<	25,000 2 8.4 2.5 4.7 15.5 18.0 0.0 1.2
EUR	25,000	to	<	EUR	100,000 10 27.5 6.4 8.5 43.5 36.3 0.0 3.9
EUR	100,000	to	<	500,000 32 45.6 53.9 36.7 59.8 25.5 0.6 31.0
≥	EUR	500,000 73 12.6 568.4 47.2 22.7 1.2 8.6 56.1
EU-27 0 100 16.5 100.0 26.3 100.0 0.2 100.0
TABLE 21: THE STRUCTURE OF LIVESTOCK NUMBERS BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
37	Note	that	 the	farm	 income	 is	calculated	as	 the	difference	between	farm	revenues,	 including	coupled	and	decoupled	subsidies,	and	variable	 input	costs	 (fertilisers,	
pesticides,	feed,	seeds	and	other	specific	costs).	We	do	not	explicitly	model	labour	and	capital	in	IFM-CAP,	but	they	are	captured	by	the	quadratic	terms	of	the	behavioural	
activity function. Hence, wage costs are not included in the income calculation as well as other variable costs expenditures (e.g. rental costs) (for more details see Louhichi 
et al., 2017a, b).
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account for between 9% and 10% of farm income (Table 
23). At individual level, for many farms subsidies account 
for a substantial proportion of total income: around 37% 
of farms receive subsidies that account for more than 
20% of their total incomes (Figure 25).
 Farm income (EUR/ha)
Subsidy  
(% of farm 
income)
Specialist COP 817 26.3
Specialist	other	field	crops 2,237 12.6
Specialist horticulture 27,418 1.2
Specialist wine 4,515 4.9
Specialist orchards – fruits 4,401 8.0
Specialist olives 1,787 23.1
Permanent crops combined 2,705 10.1
Specialist milk 3,664 8.9
Specialist sheep and goats 1,284 17.0
Specialist cattle 975 31.8
Specialist granivores 3,316 8.0
Mixed crops 4,301 5.8
Mixed livestock 2,442 10.6
Mixed crops and livestock 1,637 15.7
EU-27 2,115 12.5
TABLE 22: FARM INCOME AND SUBSIDIES BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE 
EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
 Farm income (EUR/ha)
Subsidy  
(% of farm 
income)
2,000	to	<	8,000	EUR 1,594 15.6
8,000	to	<	25,000	EUR 1,346 19.5
25,000	to	<	100,000	EUR 1,692 16.0
100,000	to	<	500,000	EUR 2,542 10.5
≥	500,000	EUR 2,963 8.7
EU-27 2,115 12.5
TABLE 23: FARM INCOME AND SUBSIDIES BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE 
EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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FIGURE 23: THE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM INCOME (EUR/HA) ACROSS THE FARM POPULATION IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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FIGURE 24: FARMS WITH NEGATIVE INCOME IN THE EU-27 IN THE REFERENCE SCENARIO (% OF ALL FARMS/UAA).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model.
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The N-surplus is the balance between inputs and outputs 
of nitrogen to and from the farm. It increases with mineral 
fertiliser application and also with manure brought from 
outside. High levels of N-surplus indicate higher losses of 
nitrogen to the atmosphere (through ammonia and N2O 
emissions) and the water (through nitrates and eutrophi-
cation). The average N-surplus in the reference scenario is 
indicated	at	about	62.9	kg	N/ha	UAA	by	2030.	This	implies	
a slight decrease in average N-surplus compared with 
2015, which is mostly related to some regional decreases 
in animal herd sizes. Figure 26 shows some regions with 
particularly high levels of N-surplus: north-western Ger-
many, Belgium and the Netherlands, Brittany, Catalonia, 
Lombardy, Ireland and Northern Ireland.
5.5.2 Greenhouse gas emissions
Non-CO2	GHG	emissions	of	the	EU	agricultural	sector	are	
projected to amount to 433 million tonnes CO2e by 2030 
(Figure 27).	Reflecting	the	absolute	size	of	the	agricultural	
sector,	France	 (17%),	Germany	(15%)	and	the	UK	(11%)	
account for almost 45% of agricultural GHG emissions in 
the	EU.	Further	considerable	emissions	are	also	projected	
for	Spain	(9%	of	EU	agriculture	emissions),	Poland	(7%),	
Italy and Ireland (6% each), and the Netherlands (5%).
5.5 | Environmental indicators
5.5.1 Nitrogen surplus
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FIGURE 27: AGRICULTURAL NON-CO2 EMISSIONS PROJECTED FOR 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
FIGURE 26: N-SURPLUS PROJECTED FOR 2030 (KG N/HA OF UAA).

6 SCENARIOS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT
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The description of the CAP budget and welfare impacts 
follow the methodology published by Boulanger & 
Philippidis (2014 and 2015). Table 24 presents the 
revenues and costs corresponding to the CAP budget in the 
reference	scenario	for	the	year	2016.	The	first	row	shows	
total	CAP	receipts	of	EUR	53,371	million	accruing	to	the	EU-
28	MSs	(EUR	38,947	million	to	the	EU-15	and	EUR	14,424	
million	to	the	EU-13).	This	total	is	split	between	the	first	
and	second	pillars	(Pillar	2	figures	exclude	nationally	co-
financed	support)	amounting	 to	EUR	41,355	million	and	
EUR	12,016	million,	respectively.	Of	the	former,	decoupled	
payments	 total	 EUR	 26,801	million,	 greening	 payments	
amount	 to	 EUR	 11,322	 million	 and	 remaining	 coupled	
payments	sum	to	EUR	3,232	million.	Contributions	to	the	
CAP	budget	are	financed	by	tariff	revenues	and	a	uniform	
EU-wide	percentage	of	each	MS’s	GDP.	The	rebate	row	in	
Table 19	 accounts	 for	 the	net	 impacts	on	EU	MSs	 from	
both	UK	rebate	and	additional	corrective	payments.
The	‘net	position’	row	shows	that	the	‘old’	EU-15	(except	
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) are net contributors to 
the CAP budget, while the newer MSs (as expected) are net 
beneficiaries.	This	observation	underlies	the	redistributive	
nature of the CAP. A closer look reveals that France is the 
largest	 recipient	 of	 CAP	 funding,	 but	 makes	 significant	
payments	 to	 the	 CAP	 budget	 and	 the	 UK	 rebate,	 while	
receiving no special dispensation.
On the basis of these estimates, a CAP budget cut would 
benefit	net	contributors	(or	be	of	detriment	to	net	beneficiaries)	
in the form of a taxpayer savings (or losses). In the model, 
income changes feedback to each economy as an increase 
(or	 decrease)	 in	 expenditure	 and	 savings.	 This	 effect	 is	
demonstrated in the lower part of Table 24 (parts C and D). As 
an initial observation, the results are consistent for all scenarios 
in terms of the comparative magnitudes across regions and 
whether or not the estimates are positive or negative.
For the Lib&Prod scenario, in comparison with the baseline, 
the following observations can be made with regard 
to the estimates for 2030. First, CAP budget cuts are 
expected to lead to strong reductions in the CAP receipts 
in all countries. Second, most of the net contributors are 
expected to be in a positive net position, i.e. the removal 
of the calculated CAP contribution is higher than the loss 
of CAP receipts. This is the case in particular for Belgium, 
Germany,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Sweden	and	the	UK.	Third,	
among	the	largest	losers	(losses	of	>	EUR	400	million)	are	
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, 
Romania and Spain.
The Inc&Env scenario predicts much smaller impacts on 
the CAP budget. Compared with the size of the payments, 
only Croatia would have a tangible reduction from its 
initial net position.
Scenarios: economic effects in a global context6
6.1 | The CAP budget
A. CAP budget  
estimates in 2016 EU-28 EU-13 EU-15 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL
1. CAP receipts 53,371 14,424 38,947 1,204 565 1,091 786 72 1,120 899 218 806 8,426 5,771 2,285
 Pillar 1: decoupled 26,801 6,862 19,939 420 292 526 510 34 556 560 78 319 4,396 3,277 1,122
 Pillar 1: coupled 3,232 394 2,838 79 87 43 8 3 34 13 1 50 969 18 257
 Pillar 1: greening 11,322 2,777 8,545 180 125 226 55 15 238 240 33 137 1,884 1,405 481
 Pillar 1: total 41,355 10,033 31,322 678 504 795 573 51 829 814 112 506 7,249 4,700 1,860
 Pillar 2: ANC/LFA 2,238 822 1,416 135 3 30 72 4 67 0 4 115 437 146 90
 Pillar 2: agri-environmental 3,794 1,208 2,586 264 19 100 31 9 138 30 40 118 254 408 62
 Pillar 2: physical capital 3,207 1,206 2,001 42 23 82 66 4 45 40 39 22 235 263 172
 Pillar 2: human capital 1,763 767 996 37 10 41 24 3 23 10 15 32 178 103 87
 Pillar 2: wider development 1,013 387 626 46 5 43 19 1 19 6 8 13 74 151 15
 Pillar 2: total 12,016 4,391 7,625 525 61 295 212 21 292 85 106 300 1,177 1,071 426
2. CAP contribution 53,371 4,624 48,748 1,182 1,901 166 227 81 666 1,006 84 703 8,152 11,168 749
3. Rebates 0 –507 507 –45 –172 –18 –20 –8 –73 39 –8 –82 –916 –403 –85
4. Net position 0 9,294 –9,294 –23 –1,508 906 539 –16 381 –68 126 22 –643 –5,801 1,452
TABLE 24: CAP BUDGET (EUR MILLIONS, 2016 PRICES).
TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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B. CAP budget  
estimates in 2030 EU-28 EU-13 EU-15 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL
1. CAP receipts 45,475 12,076 33,399 1,008 482 924 911 55 962 792 231 693 7,335 5,051 2,053
2. CAP contribution 45,475 4,407 41,068 997 1,535 166 213 84 609 868 83 602 6,745 9,344 661
3. Rebates 0 –517 517 –38 –152 –20 –22 –9 –71 14 –9 –75 –802 –335 –80
4. Net position 0 7,152 –7,151 –27 –1,206 739 676 –37 282 –61 140 17 –212 –4,627 1,312
C. Lib&Prod vs.  
baseline in 2030 EU-28 EU-13 EU-15 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL
1. CAP receipts 11,156 4,067 7,090 335 91 306 256 13 200 132 115 177 1,068 1,048 534
2. CAP contribution 11,156 1,123 10,034 216 449 40 71 28 155 228 26 131 1,631 2,313 151
3. Rebates 0 –233 233 –26 –69 –9 –10 –4 –32 70 –4 –34 –362 –230 –36
4. Net position 0 2,711 –2,711 93 –427 257 175 –19 13 –27 84 13 –926 –1,495 347
D. Inc&Env vs.  
baseline in 2030 EU-28 EU-13 EU-15 AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL
1. CAP receipts 44,042 11,461 32,581 1,138 419 948 595 65 996 706 242 755 6,709 4,897 2,085
2. CAP contribution 44,041 4,267 39,774 964 1,495 161 206 82 590 840 81 582 6,527 9,053 639
3. Rebates 0 –475 475 –36 –140 –18 –20 –8 –65 23 –8 –68 –736 –319 –73
4. Net position 1 6,719 –6,718 137 –1,215 769 369 –25 340 –111 153 104 –554 –4,475 1,373
TABLE 24: CAP BUDGET (EUR MILLIONS, 2016 PRICES).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
A. CAP budget  
estimates in 2016 HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
1. CAP receipts 1,769 1,485 5,017 331 613 43 14 810 4,672 1,178 2,885 603 250 5,819 912 3,727
 Pillar 1: decoupled 893 818 2,474 137 297 22 4 487 2,254 281 1,198 288 88 2,894 467 2,109
 Pillar 1: coupled 67 21 283 5 13 0 0 23 102 249 90 16 13 761 3 25
 Pillar 1: greening 383 351 1,060 59 127 10 2 209 966 120 513 124 38 1,240 200 904
 Pillar 1: total 1,342 1,190 3,817 200 437 32 5 719 3,321 650 1,801 428 138 4,896 670 3,038
 Pillar 2: ANC/LFA 11 93 109 30 29 4 1 2 235 111 244 60 34 77 44 52
 Pillar 2: agri–environmental 146 129 355 28 33 4 1 34 306 89 307 38 32 262 116 443
 Pillar 2: physical capital 174 20 457 53 58 2 4 39 360 215 261 38 23 353 21 94
 Pillar 2: human capital 65 21 175 12 33 1 2 10 321 73 193 17 17 172 33 56
 Pillar 2: wider development 30 33 103 8 23 0 0 7 128 41 79 24 5 59 28 45
 Pillar 2: total 427 295 1,200 130 176 11 9 91 1,350 529 1,084 175 112 923 242 689
2. CAP contribution 410 747 5,875 97 159 175 58 2,478 1,636 649 571 308 160 4,261 1,632 8,071
3. Rebates –47 –84 –674 –10 –16 –21 –4 648 –185 –75 –67 –34 –16 –482 156 2,703
4. Net position 1,312 654 –1,533 223 438 –153 –47 –1,020 2,850 454 2,247 261 73 1,076 –564 –1,640
B. CAP budget  
estimates in 2030 HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
1. CAP receipts 1,418 1,230 4,147 361 585 38 15 675 3,417 954 2,508 485 203 4,816 758 3,368
2. CAP contribution 381 640 4,423 98 139 158 55 2,029 1,572 545 563 291 153 3,764 1,363 7,393
3. Rebates –46 –77 –534 –11 –15 –20 –4 495 –189 –67 –71 –34 –17 –451 117 2,521
4. Net position 990 512 –810 252 431 –140 –44 –859 1,656 342 1,874 160 34 601 –488 –1,505
C. Lib&Prod vs.  
baseline in 2030 HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
1. CAP receipts 466 150 1,358 124 198 9 16 111 1,111 439 1,014 165 82 1,018 160 460
2. CAP contribution 89 139 1,083 27 39 31 29 469 375 119 120 77 45 907 306 1,861
3. Rebates –21 –35 –242 –5 –7 –9 –2 519 –85 –30 –32 –15 –8 –204 133 789
4. Net position 356 –24 33 92 152 –30 –15 161 651 289 862 73 30 –93 –13 –612
D. Inc&Env vs.  
baseline in 2030 HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
1. CAP receipts 1,365 1,247 3,823 348 532 37 10 616 3,147 933 2,537 456 223 4,907 773 3,536
2. CAP contribution 369 620 4,280 95 135 153 54 1,967 1,521 526 545 282 148 3,643 1,318 7,167
3. Rebates –42 –71 –490 –10 –14 –18 –3 499 –174 –62 –65 –31 –15 –414 119 2,261
4. Net position 953 557 –947 243 384 –135 –48 –852 1,453 345 1,927 143 59 850 –426 –1,371
TABLE 25: CONT.: CAP BUDGET (EUR MILLIONS, 2016 PRICES).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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Effects	on	GDP	are	predicted	to	be	very	small	(slightly	neg-
ative) in the Inc&Env scenario, but more sizeable in both 
the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios. By showing changes 
predicted for 2025 and 2030, Figure 28 takes advantage 
of the dynamic feature of MAGNET and predicts a better 
situation for almost all countries in 2030 than in 2025. 
Consistent with the CAP budget analysis and the redistrib-
utive nature of the policy, a consistent outcome is expect-
ed	to	be	a	negative	impact	on	‘new’	EU-13	MSs	(and	CAP	
budget	net	beneficiaries).	The	NoCAP	scenario	predicts	a	
more	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 EU-13	 than	 the	 Lib&Prod	
scenario does. This latter scenario predicts an increase of 
EU-28	GDP	by	about	0.2%	by	2030.	As	shown	 in	Figure	
29, countries such as Germany and Italy would have GDP 
increases of 0.3% and 0.5% compared with the baseline. 
The	 most-affected	 countries	 would	 be	 Greece	 (–0.7%)	
and,	 within	 the	 EU-13,	 Bulgaria	 and	 Lithuania,	 which	
would face 0.4% and 0.5% reductions in GDP, respectively. 
The	NoCAP	scenario	predicts	damages	to	EU-13	GDP	but	
gains	for	the	EU-15	MSs	implies	a	positive	change	overall	
for	the	EU-28.	GDP	falls	are	elevated	for	Greece	(–1.5%)	
and Cyprus (–1.7%).
6.2 | Growth and welfare
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FIGURE 28: GDP, CHANGE FROM BASELINE (%), 2025 AND 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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The description of the CAP budget is the exact accountancy 
of payments and receipts by MSs according to the current 
policies and the assumed changes in the scenarios. The 
welfare impacts instead take into account the impacts 
of the scenarios on the economy, presented as the real 
income or equivalent variation (EV) changes.
Figure 30	shows	the	change	in	welfare	by	EU	aggregates	
and presents its decomposition to better understand 
where the impacts or changes come from.
The	 EV	 results	 in	 the	 Lib&Prod	 scenario,	 with	 a	 EUR	
19.2 billion welfare gain, show losses accruing to the 
‘new’	EU-13	states	vis-à-vis	EV	gains	of	the	‘old’	EU-15	
states. This result is driven by the CAP budget, but also 
changes	in	‘allocative	efficiency’	(i.e.	efficiency	gains	that	
arise from changing resources or product usage in the 
presence	of	market	distortions),	and	‘technology	effects’	
(i.e. money metric equivalent from improvements in 
output or input augmenting technical change). Moreover, 
the	 ‘terms	 of	 trade’	 effect	 (i.e.	 the	 unit	 price	 ratio	 of	
exchange	between	exports	and	imports)	in	the	EU	regions	
is the net result of (1) a change in agri-food prices 
resulting from adjustments in agricultural support, and 
(2) changes in the real exchange rate (i.e. factor prices). 
The Inc&Env scenario suggests a slightly negative EV of 
EUR	2.3	billion,	with	higher	losses	for	the	EU-15	than	the	
Lib&Prod scenario. Remarkably, a NoCAP scenario would 
have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 EU-28	 welfare,	 of	 EUR	 2.3	
billion,	corresponding	to	a	gain	of	EUR	15.9	billion	for	the	
‘old’	EU-15	states	and	a	loss	of	EUR	13.6	billion	for	the	
‘new’	EU-13	states.
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FIGURE 30: EV DECOMPOSITION BY EU AGGREGATES, 2030 (EUR MILLIONS, SCENARIOS VS. REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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Agri-food production will fall by about 1% under the 
Lib&Prod scenario while it remains stable under the 
Inc&Env scenario. The fall under the NoCAP scenario is 
even more pronounced, reaching almost 6% (Figure 31).38
From	sectorial	point	of	view,	the	most	notable	difference	
appears in the dairy sector which, under the Lib&Prod 
scenario, thanks to the increased market access in many 
third countries, increases production by about 1%, while, 
under the Inc&Env scenario, production decreases by more 
than 1% (Table 26 and Table 27).
Main	 differences	 between	 scenarios	 emerge	 when	
analysing	the	causes	of	the	changes	in	production.	Under	
the Lib&Prod scenario, the increase in imports (15% of 
agri-food imports) is one of the key factors accounting for 
the	decrease	 in	domestic	production.	Under	 the	 Inc&Env	
scenario, domestic policy changes are the main trigger for 
the	change	in	production,	while	trade	flows	remain	almost	
unchanged, with a limited decrease in exports and only a 
reduced increase in imports.
The policy measure with the highest impact on 
agriculture	production	 is	 the	 removal	 of	 the	first	pillar.	
Based on analysis of the shock decomposition, the 
removal of decoupled payments will have a negative 
effect	on	agricultural	production,	decreasing	production	
by about 4% compared with the baseline (the decrease 
would only be about 2% under the Inc&Env scenario). 
Under	 the	NoCAP	scenario,	 the	 removal	of	Pillar	2	has	
an	effect	 (–4%)	similar	 to	 the	effect	of	 removing	Pillar	
1 (Figure 31).
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FIGURE 31: DECOMPOSITION OF POLICY MEASURES ON AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH BASELINE, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
6.3 | Market impacts (in terms of value)
38 The reader is reminded that results for a similar indicator can vary from one model to the other. The authors decided to provide a complete picture with a comprehensive 
result description.
Production Import Export Use
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Wheat 27,898 30,126 30,821 3,639 3,145 2,983 6,762 7,915 8,336 24,775 25,357 25,468
Rice 3,321 3,342 3,477 1,231 1,215 1,079 44 46 37 4,508 4,511 4,519
Other cereals 27,669 28,761 28,953 2,282 2,142 2,002 2,628 2,777 2,797 27,322 28,126 28,158
Oilseeds 14,306 15,531 15,731 9,773 9,557 9,450 2,068 2,139 1,924 22,011 22,949 23,257
Oils & meals 33,722 34,625 34,943 19,569 19,226 18,551 5,692 6,043 5,879 47,599 47,809 47,615
Raw sugar 3,508 3,601 3,589 98 91 82 0 0 0 3,606 3,691 3,670
Sugar 19,258 19,573 19,482 5,942 5,869 5,402 3,996 4,094 3,608 21,204 21,348 21,277
Fruits & veg. 58,477 61,287 61,740 14,871 13,007 12,592 1,177 1,428 1,382 72,171 72,866 72,950
TABLE 26: PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND DOMESTIC USE, 2030, EUR MILLION, 2011 PRICES, EU-28.
TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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Compared with 2016, the index of agricultural production 
for 2030 is slightly higher in the Inc&Env scenario, almost 
equal	 in	 the	Lib&Prod	scenario	and	significantly	 lower	 in	
the NoCAP scenario. The index of food industry production 
increases in all scenarios, although to a slightly lesser ex-
tent than in the baseline, with the lowest growth being in 
the NoCAP situation (Figure 32).
Production Import Export Use
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Other crops 59,047 62,446 63,487 18,682 16,647 15,832 2,227 2,778 2,730 75,502 76,315 76,590
Cattle 28,714 29,329 29,966 1,224 1,176 1,089 1,359 1,369 951 28,578 29,135 30,103
Beef & sheep meat 46,519 47,356 49,702 9,648 9,253 5,508 2,856 3,092 1,818 53,310 53,516 53,392
Pig & poultry 63,981 66,948 67,947 1,657 1,514 1,505 1,836 2,109 2,084 63,802 66,353 67,367
Pig & poultry meat 134,778 139,520 141,395 9,318 8,097 4,930 9,643 11,394 9,789 134,453 136,222 136,536
Raw milk 57,647 60,524 59,492 0 0 0 1,650 2,639 2,609 55,998 57,886 56,884
Dairy 305,852 313,299 306,300 465 409 136 27,308 29,894 24,578 279,009 283,814 281,858
Bev. & tobacco 330,659 331,324 330,976 7,798 7,775 7,420 41,168 41,304 40,488 297,289 297,795 297,908
Other food 467,904 470,675 472,712 43,263 42,855 38,447 36,321 36,870 34,407 474,847 476,661 476,752
TABLE 26: PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND DOMESTIC USE, 2030, EUR MILLION, 2011 PRICES, EU-28.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
Production Import Export Use
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Wheat –12.90 –5.94 –3.77 31.86 13.98 8.10 –25.18 –12.42 –7.76 –3.79 –1.53 –1.10
Rice –4.86 –4.25 –0.39 15.09 13.53 0.87 18.85 22.60 –1.80 –0.34 –0.26 –0.08
Other cereals –6.34 –2.64 –1.99 18.45 11.15 3.90 –10.09 –5.01 –4.34 –4.28 –1.47 –1.35
Oilseeds –13.44 –6.03 –4.82 4.98 2.66 1.51 0.88 4.35 –6.14 –7.47 –3.52 –2.23
Oils & meals –4.78 –2.23 –1.33 6.79 4.92 1.24 –6.30 –0.52 –3.22 –0.14 0.30 –0.10
Raw sugar –2.69 –0.11 –0.45 20.45 11.01 –0.02 –33.62 –13.64 –6.11 –2.17 0.14 –0.44
Sugar –1.28 0.33 –0.13 10.16 8.82 0.15 11.25 13.99 0.45 –0.50 0.18 –0.16
Fruits & veg. –7.24 –2.78 –2.06 26.06 10.26 6.74 –22.11 –5.54 –8.56 –1.57 –0.63 –0.51
Other crops –8.96 –3.71 –2.11 23.53 10.08 4.69 –25.93 –7.62 –9.20 –1.91 –0.85 –0.50
Cattle –5.15 –3.12 –1.01 14.93 10.41 2.22 39.96 40.93 –2.09 –5.89 –4.05 –0.87
Beef & sheep meat –6.94 –5.26 –0.57 79.53 72.19 2.50 54.14 66.89 –1.89 –0.37 0.02 –0.21
Pig & poultry –7.42 –3.12 –1.68 14.96 5.05 4.44 –17.24 –4.89 –6.02 –6.62 –2.89 –1.41
Pig & poultry meat –5.86 –2.55 –1.24 101.58 75.15 6.65 –8.03 8.68 –6.64 –2.08 –0.79 –0.56
Raw milk –5.80 –1.09 –2.78 341.73 72.72 73.70 –50.54 –20.89 –21.78 –3.22 0.05 –1.69
Dairy –1.32 1.08 –1.18 267.16 223.46 7.21 5.72 15.73 –4.85 –1.84 –0.15 –0.84
Bev. & tobacco –0.17 0.03 –0.08 5.24 4.94 0.13 1.54 1.87 –0.14 –0.27 –0.10 –0.06
Other food –1.25 –0.66 –0.23 13.04 11.97 0.45 4.88 6.47 –0.64 –0.55 –0.17 –0.15
TABLE 27: PRODUCTION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND DOMESTIC USE, 2030, EU-28, CHANGE (%) FOR SCENARIOS VS. BASELINE.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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The market prices of agricultural products are slightly 
higher according to Lib&Prod scenario while NoCAP pre-
dicts a slight decrease of the price and Inc&Env a more 
pronounced fall. Food industry product prices show a de-
clining	trend,	without	notable	differences	between	the	sce-
narios and the baseline (Figure 33).
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FIGURE 35: LAND PRICE DECOMPOSITION, 2011-2030, EU-28, DIFFERENCE (%) FROM BASELINE (DECOMPOSITION) AND TOTAL.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 33: AGRICULTURE (LEFT) AND FOOD INDUSTRY (RIGHT) PRICES, 2016-2030, IN THE EU-28 (2011 = 100).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
The	 aggregated	 land	 price	 in	 the	 EU-28	 is	 expected	 to	
show a clear pattern of change between 2011 and 2030 
(Figure 34). In the baseline, the price is almost stable, 
while	the	changes	to	the	CAP	under	the	different	scenarios	
are	expected	to	have	opposite	effects	on	land	price.	Under	
the Lib&Prod scenario, both Pillar 1 and 2 shocks are caus-
ing a decrease in land price, whereas under the Inc&Env 
scenario, the reverse is true (Figure 35).
In the case of the Lib&Prod scenario, the decrease is due 
to the removal of Pillar 1 payments, which are (partially) 
capitalised into land.
In the case of the Inc&Env scenario, the redirection of pay-
ments into greening and agro-environmental payments, 
which are entirely capitalised into land, is the main force 
behind	the	land	price	increase	in	the	EU.
Looking at individual MSs, the pattern is similar (i.e. a de-
cease under the Lib&Prod and an increase under the In-
c&Enc scenarios) with very few exceptions (e.g. Malta and 
Luxembourg). Nevertheless, the magnitude of the shocks 
varies according to the MS, mainly depending on the initial 
level of capitalisation of Pillar 1 payments into land.
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FIGURE 34: LAND PRICE (2011 = 100), BASELINE AND SCENARIOS.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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All	three	scenarios	are	detrimental	in	terms	of	the	EU	agri-
food	 trade	 balance,	which	worsens	 by	 between	 EUR	 30	
billion	under	the	Inc&Env	scenario	and	EUR	53	billion	under	
the NoCAP scenario. The combination of CAP removal or 
reduction and trade liberalisation policies causes a higher 
increase in imports than in exports (Table 28).
Again,	 sectoral	 differences	 highlight	 how	 the	 EU	 is	 highly	
competitive in high value-added food industry sectors, such 
as the dairy and beverages and tobacco sectors, where, 
under all three scenarios, the trade balance improves to 
very similar extents (Figure 36, Figure 37 and Figure 38).
As already underlined in Boulanger et al. (2016a), the 
region where trade competitiveness erodes the most is 
Mercosur, where trade policies have the strongest impacts, 
in particular on the beef meat sector. On the other hand, 
the Asian FTA region, which includes Japan, is the region 
where	EU	exports	are	gaining	most	momentum,	under	all	
scenarios (Table 28).
6.4 | Trade
6.4.1 Trade balance
NAFTA Mercosur China Australia & New Zealand
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Wheat –1,762 –1,510 –1,469 –34 –28 –29 2 3 4 –122 –101 –95
Rice –67 –66 –47 –19 –19 –15 –7 –6 –7 0 0 0
Other cereals –492 –458 –427 –537 –510 –446 201 215 228 –35 –32 –18
Oilseeds –2,704 –2,654 –2,601 –4,552 –4,459 –4,453 –191 –183 –179 –582 –576 –578
Oils & meals –216 –164 –85 –6,722 –6,646 –6,808 32 45 47 –2 6 117
Raw sugar –10 –9 –2 –1 –1 0 –3 –2 –3 0 0 0
Sugar 298 324 159 –2,155 –2,149 –1,495 8 9 8 –71 –68 –30
Fruits & veg. –2,315 –2,003 –1,853 –1,496 –1,316 –1,083 –144 –122 –124 –295 –257 –224
Other crops –414 –266 –180 –8,112 –7,227 –6,636 122 202 208 –208 –177 –171
Cattle –681 –640 –589 –6 –5 –4 9 9 9 14 18 19
Beef & sheep meat –601 –559 –537 –4,704 –4,554 –1,718 392 408 427 –3,306 –3,153 –2,388
Pig & poultry –312 –271 –268 –207 –187 –165 521 648 638 –111 –100 –99
Pig & poultry meat –327 –128 63 –4,107 –3,593 –1,688 383 498 510 –448 –326 111
Raw milk 182 336 332 25 43 40 39 69 75 39 48 49
Dairy 6,513 7,164 4,109 583 636 272 815 926 960 608 706 686
Bev. & tobacco 11,449 11,501 11,576 614 611 453 2,251 2,260 2,272 –58 –54 13
Other food 414 584 1,789 –2,434 –2,434 –1,129 –3,902 –3,829 –3,918 1,100 1,127 1,121
Feed –170 –166 –165 –103 –102 –103 –171 –162 –156 –2 –2 –1
Total 8,786 11,014 9,808 –33,968 –31,942 –25,006 357 987 999 –3,477 –2,941 –1,488
Asian FTA LDCs Rest of the World Total
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Wheat –1,762 –1,510 –1,469 –34 –28 –29 2 3 4 –3,709 –3,171 –3,083
Rice –67 –66 –47 –19 –19 –15 –7 –6 –7 –186 –183 –138
Other cereals –492 –458 –427 –537 –510 –446 201 215 228 –1,693 –1,538 –1,308
Oilseeds –2,704 –2,654 –2,601 –4,552 –4,459 –4,453 –191 –183 –179 –15,475 –15,168 –15,044
Oils & meals –216 –164 –85 –6,722 –6,646 –6,808 32 45 47 –13,815 –13,524 –13,574
Raw sugar –10 –9 –2 –1 –1 0 –3 –2 –3 –27 –25 –11
Sugar 298 324 159 –2,155 –2,149 –1,495 8 9 8 –3,769 –3,701 –2,687
Fruits & veg. –2,315 –2,003 –1,853 –1,496 –1,316 –1,083 –144 –122 –124 –8,205 –7,140 –6,343
Other crops –414 –266 –180 –8,112 –7,227 –6,636 122 202 208 –17,016 –14,760 –13,385
Cattle –681 –640 –589 –6 –5 –4 9 9 9 –1,341 –1,253 –1,147
Beef & sheep meat –601 –559 –537 –4,704 –4,554 –1,718 392 408 427 –13,132 –12,563 –6,042
TABLE 28: TRADE BALANCE, DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (REAL VALUES).
TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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Asian FTA LDCs Rest of the World Total
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Pig & poultry –312 –271 –268 –207 –187 –165 521 648 638 –107 278 313
Pig & poultry meat –327 –128 63 –4,107 –3,593 –1,688 383 498 510 –8,550 –6,773 –2,118
Raw milk 182 336 332 25 43 40 39 69 75 534 943 945
Dairy 6,513 7,164 4,109 583 636 272 815 926 960 16,429 18,158 11,367
Bev. & tobacco 11,449 11,501 11,576 614 611 453 2,251 2,260 2,272 28,570 28,689 28,614
Other food 414 584 1,789 –2,434 –2,434 –1,129 –3,902 –3,829 –3,918 –10,743 –10,232 –5,394
Feed –170 –166 –165 –103 –102 –103 –171 –162 –156 –891 –861 –851
Total 8,786 11,014 9,808 –33,968 –31,942 –25,006 357 987 999 –53,127 –42,823 –29,887
TABLE 28: CONT: TRADE BALANCE, DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (REAL VALUES).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 37: CHANGES IN IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE IN DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (REAL VALUES), LIB&PROD SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 36: CHANGES IN IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE IN DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (REAL VALUES), INC&ENV SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 38: CHANGES IN IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE IN DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (REAL VALUES), NOCAP SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 39: EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF PRODUCTION – SELECTED COMMODITIES.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
An analysis of exports (and imports) as a share of 
production	 illustrates	 the	 state	 of	 self-sufficiency	 in	 the	
EU-28.	For	wheat,	oils	and	meals,	the	ratio	of	exports	to	
production is highest in the Inc&Env scenario. The ratios 
of exports to production are similar in both the NoCAP and 
Lib&Prod scenarios; under these scenarios, oilseeds, sugar, 
meat and dairy are the products that demonstrate the 
highest ratio of exports to production (Figure 39).
With regard to imports as a share of production, under the 
Inc&Env	 scenario,	 an	 improvement	 in	 self-sufficiency	 for	
all products is predicted, by contrast with both the NoCAP 
and Lib&Prod scenarios (Figure 40). As expected, the 
NoCAP scenario is associated with the lowest degree of 
self-sufficiency.
6.4.2	 Self-sufficiency
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FIGURE 40: IMPORTS AS A SHARE OF PRODUCTION – SELECTED COMMODITIES.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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To	determine	 the	 impact	on	 the	 job	market,	a	simplified	
approach was followed, i.e. the number of jobs (see 
also section 5.2) was assumed to change by the same 
percentage as that of changes in production in the individual 
sectors. This is a common approach in modelling; however, 
it does not incorporate the development of economies of 
scale, particularly for relatively high-skilled jobs.
The MAGNET model behaves according to the methodological 
assumptions;	that	is,	depending	on	the	specific	impact	of	a	
policy/subsidy, job numbers are reduced or increased. There 
is no modelling for farms entering or leaving the sector (e.g. 
for small-farm, part-time farmers, which, anyway, would 
result in only a small overall change), but only aggregate 
results.
Agri-food	 sectors	 have	 different	 job	 multipliers;	 in	
general, they are higher in animal production. Within the 
EU,	 there	 is	 high	 diversity	 among	 the	MSs	with	 regard	
to value share between crop, animal and other food 
industry	sectors	(e.g.	for	the	EU-13,	the	value	shares	for	
these sectors are 51%, 23% and 26%, respectively; for 
the	 EU-15,	 the	 value	 shares	 are	 35%,	 14%	 and	 51%,	
respectively; see Figure 41).
The levels of subsidies/payments per ha and category, 
as	well	 their	 share	 in	gross	margin	per	ha,	 influence	 the	
resilience of farm activities and thus the number of jobs. 
In addition, the impact of subsidies on land and labour 
productivity	 is	 differently	 articulated.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	
NoCAP scenario, the main change (if compared with the 
Lib&Prod scenario) is the change in the Pillar 2 payments.
The	 different	 CAP	 payments	 influence	 productivity	 (see	
section 3.3.4) and employment in various ways: Pillar 
1 payments increase land price/value and therefore 
make production more attractive (decoupled payments 
have a kind of coupling factor); Pillar 2 investments in 
human capital increase labour productivity (more output 
with less input, improvement of competitiveness). 
Pillar 2 investments in machinery increase capital, thus 
increase (capital) productivity, making production more 
competitive.
In short, improving productivity reduces, ceteris paribus, 
the number of jobs, but makes each job more productive 
and therefore competitive.
In addition to the 25% loss in the number of agricultural 
jobs	in	the	EU	in	the	next	15	years	in	the	baseline,	all	three	
scenarios show further decreases in job numbers (Table 29 
and Table 30).	Under	the	Inc&Env	scenario,	employment	in	
the	agricultural	sector	decreases	by	1.8	%	at	 the	EU-28	
level.
The Lib&Prod scenario depicts a further job decrease of 
4.7%,	with	jobs	in	downstream	sectors	being	less	affected	
(–0.3%) than agricultural jobs (–4.3%).
The NoCAP scenario shows a higher total job decrease 
(–5.6%), because of the higher impacts on the food 
industry (–1.3%) than in the other scenarios.
6.5 | Labour market
EU13
Crop
Animal
Food industry
Crop
Animal
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EU15
FIGURE 41: VALUE SHARE BETWEEN CROP, ANIMAL AND OTHER FOOD/FOOD INDUSTRY IN THE EU-13 AND EU-15.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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Level Absolute change Change (%)
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Austria 126,558 132,415 137,491 –14,586 –8,729 –3,653 –10.3 –6.2 –2.6
Belgium 42,580 41,811 43,136 –769 –1,537 –213 –1.8 –3.5 –0.5
Bulgaria 95,837 90,591 101,977 –9,766 –15,012 –3,626 –9.2 –14.2 –3.4
Cyprus 9,447 10,528 10,713 –1,230 –149 36 –11.5 –1.4 0.3
Czech Republic 74,904 72,026 75,087 –1,224 –4,102 –1,040 –1.6 –5.4 –1.4
Denmark 42,247 42,007 42,785 –1,598 –1,837 –1,060 –3.6 –4.2 –2.4
Estonia 9,276 9,959 10,596 –1,782 –1,098 –461 –16.1 –9.9 –4.2
Finland 51,636 52,423 53,160 –2,418 –1,632 –895 –4.5 –3.0 –1.7
France 502,641 498,156 522,242 –33,180 –37,664 –13,579 –6.2 –7.0 –2.5
Germany 355,926 362,340 380,525 –29,665 –23,250 –5,065 –7.7 –6.0 –1.3
Greece 293,330 302,047 306,510 –26,787 –18,070 –13,607 –8.4 –5.6 –4.3
Hungary 105,999 104,872 104,197 –1,259 –2,386 –3,061 –1.2 –2.2 –2.9
Ireland 53,361 54,410 59,028 –7,502 –6,454 –1,835 –12.3 –10.6 –3.0
Italy 571,243 584,285 591,096 –32,727 –19,685 –12,873 –5.4 –3.3 –2.1
Latvia 21,195 26,122 26,756 –8,916 –3,989 –3,355 –29.6 –13.2 –11.1
Lithuania 50,447 49,898 50,589 –1,443 –1,992 –1,300 –2.8 –3.8 –2.5
Luxembourg 2,322 2,352 2,419 –171 –141 –74 –6.9 –5.7 –3.0
Malta 841 838 818 22 19 –1 2.7 2.3 –0.1
Netherlands 176,830 168,762 171,262 7,191 –877 1,624 4.2 –0.5 1.0
Poland 1,165,425 1,169,407 1,206,844 –66,981 –63,000 –25,562 –5.4 –5.1 –2.1
Portugal 284,124 297,900 295,897 –17,951 –4,175 –6,178 –5.9 –1.4 –2.0
Romania 1,428,228 1,395,642 1,416,180 4,919 –27,667 –7,129 0.3 –1.9 –0.5
Slovakia 28,909 28,956 32,185 –1,174 –1,126 2,102 –3.9 –3.7 7.0
Slovenia 43,700 44,706 45,155 –2,718 –1,712 –1,263 –5.9 –3.7 –2.7
Spain 464,713 463,037 476,048 –19,703 –21,379 –8,368 –4.1 –4.4 –1.7
Sweden 40,806 43,968 44,996 –5,619 –2,456 –1,429 –12.1 –5.3 –3.1
UK 215,752 211,894 226,306 –15,532 –19,390 –4,978 –6.7 –8.4 –2.2
Total 6,258,277 6,261,352 6,433,998 –292,569 –289,490 –116,843 –4.5 –4.4 –1.8
TABLE 29: AGRICULTURAL JOBS, HEADS AND CHANGE (%) FROM BASELINE, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
Level Absolute change Change (%)
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Austria 64,682 66,823 66,472 –2,324 –183 –535 –3.5 –0.3 –0.8
Belgium 83,736 83,726 84,411 –726 –736 –51 –0.9 –0.9 –0.1
Bulgaria 75,453 73,796 74,690 1,093 –564 330 1.5 –0.8 0.4
Cyprus 8,737 11,790 11,792 –3,037 16 18 –25.8 0.1 0.2
Czech Republic 93,936 94,222 93,995 –64 222 –5 –0.1 0.2 0
Denmark 55,876 57,042 56,360 –1,205 –39 –722 –2.1 –0.1 –1.3
Estonia 8,217 8,264 8,342 –121 –74 4 –1.4 –0.9 0.1
Finland 34,399 35,074 35,482 –1,099 –424 –16 –3.1 –1.2 0
France 536,146 539,010 537,757 –3,608 –744 –1,997 –0.7 –0.1 –0.4
Germany 664,778 675,039 682,362 –20,873 –10,611 –3,289 –3 –1.5 –0.5
Greece 69,982 71,725 70,854 –1,750 –7 –877 –2.4 0 –1.2
Hungary 77,602 78,413 78,557 –1,504 –693 –549 –1.9 –0.9 –0.7
Ireland 32,764 33,580 34,500 –2,204 –1,389 –468 –6.3 –4 –1.3
Italy 380,188 385,338 382,253 –3,573 1,577 –1,508 –0.9 0.4 –0.4
Latvia 13,141 13,071 13,066 116 46 41 0.9 0.4 0.3
Lithuania 29,009 28,638 29,079 156 –215 226 0.5 –0.7 0.8
Luxembourg 5,166 5,113 5,127 61 7 21 1.2 0.1 0.4
Malta 2,567 2,613 2,559 5 51 –2 0.2 2 –0.1
TABLE 30: FOOD INDUSTRY JOBS, HEADS AND CHANGE (%) FROM BASELINE, 2030.
TABLE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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Figure 42 distinguishes impacts in MSs according to the 
magnitude of agricultural job losses in the Lib&Prod 
scenario. Main results on agricultural job numbers 
according to the Lib&Prod scenario:
● more than a 10% decrease in job numbers in Bulgaria, 
Ireland, and Latvia;
● more than a 5% decrease in job numbers in Austria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Lux-
embourg,	Poland,	Sweden	and	United	Kingdom;
Level Absolute change Change (%)
NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env NoCAP Lib&Prod Inc&Env
Netherlands 127,595 127,233 127,001 788 426 194 0.6 0.3 0.2
Poland 285,547 290,176 288,537 –3,180 1,449 –189 –1.1 0.5 –0.1
Portugal 90,440 92,339 91,441 –1,633 265 –632 –1.8 0.3 –0.7
Romania 146,066 146,571 146,944 –640 –135 237 –0.4 –0.1 0.2
Slovakia 30,049 30,188 30,198 –93 46 57 –0.3 0.2 0.2
Slovenia 11,046 10,891 10,885 224 69 63 2.1 0.6 0.6
Spain 290,766 293,128 293,484 –4,246 –1,884 –1,527 –1.4 –0.6 –0.5
Sweden 59,048 59,596 59,755 –818 –270 –111 –1.4 –0.5 –0.2
UK 349,262 350,530 353,200 –4,977 –3,710 –1,040 –1.4 –1 –0.3
Total 3,626,197 3,663,928 3,669,103 –55,233 –17,502 –12,326 –1.5 –0.5 –0.3
TABLE 30: FOOD INDUSTRY JOBS, HEADS AND CHANGE (%) FROM BASELINE, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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FIGURE 42: LIB&PROD SCENARIO AND JOBS IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
BY MS, CHANGE (%) FROM BASELINE, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
● less than a 0% change in job numbers in Belgium, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain;
● a slight increase in job numbers in Malta.
Figure 43, decomposing agri-food employment, shows the 
adverse impact of the reduction in the Pillar 1 payment for 
employment, while the impacts of Pillar 2 policy changes 
are mixed. Changes in trade policy have a small, negative 
impact on jobs. The impact of polices on job creation is 
negative under all three scenarios.
The	 final	 number	 of	 job	 losses	 is	 the	 net	 result	 of	 a	
combination	 of	 different	 drivers/policies	 that	 decrease	
or increase the number of jobs. The removal of Pillar 1 
is expected to have a direct negative impact on jobs in 
almost all countries (Latvia, –22%; Bulgaria, –14.7%; 
Estonia, –13%; other countries, between –5 and –10%). 
The removal of investment in capital/machinery would 
bring about an increased loss of employment in agriculture 
of about 2% (i.e. job numbers will be reduced by 25%). 
The removal of investment in human capital lowers 
productivity, thus causing an increase in labour demand to 
compensate,	equal	to	4%	in	agriculture	in	the	EU-28.	This	
explains the smaller number of job losses in the NoCAP 
scenario than in the Lib&Prod scenario.
The importance of the external drivers (general economic 
environment and the low opportunity costs in farming) also 
has to be stressed. As outlined in DG AGRI’s agricultural 
market outlook (DG AGRI, 2015), for instance, if the pre-
crisis trend had continued, the value in 2026 would be 6.1 
million	 AWU	 (annual	 work	 units)	 rather	 than	 7.9	million	
AWU	under	the	current	trend.
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FIGURE 43: AGRI-FOOD EMPLOYMENT, 2016-2030, % DIFFERENCE FROM BASELINE (DECOMPOSITION) AND TOTAL FOR AGRICULTURE (TOP) AND FOOD 
INDUSTRY (BOTTOM).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
Why are job numbers slightly increasing in the case of Romania in the NoCAP scenario?
Under	the	reference	scenario,	the	absolute	numbers	indicate	that	Romania	loses,	between	2016	and	2030,	almost	
600,000	agricultural	jobs	(considering	all	persons	active),	which	is	a	loss	of	29%.	Under	the	NoCAP	scenario,	Ro-
mania does not lose any more jobs than under the reference scenario, and, in fact, job numbers increase slightly, 
by	0.4%.	At	first	sight,	this	is	counterintuitive	as	the	removal	of	all	CAP	payments	should	have	a	negative	impact	
on job numbers.
The explanation is complex, as is linked to economic development as a whole and other factors.
First of all, under the NoCAP scenario, the whole Romanian economy grows less than in the reference scenario, with 
agricultural production shrinking. Given the overall reduction in economic growth, the market prices of production 
factors (wages, capital and land) decrease, including wages and salaries of skilled and unskilled workers in agri-
culture.	Assuming	a	constant	unemployment	rate,	workers	have	to	be	reallocated	somewhere	after	market	shocks.	
Typically, when an economy is shrinking, workers tend to remain in agriculture.
Second, the lack of Pillar 2 support (RDPs) slows down farm consolidation and labour productivity gains. This is 
illustrated	by	the	subtotal	analysis,	showing	the	impacts	of	the	different	policy	shocks	on	agricultural	employment	
in Romania.
Consequently, the agricultural sector, in the NoCAP scenario, in Romania jobs decrease less than in the reference 
scenario, but these workers are less skilled.
Therefore,	 when	 looking	 at	 jobs,	 a	 differentiated	 view	
on	 the	 impacts	 of	 different	 policies	 has	 to	 be	 taken,	
acknowledging	the	trade-off	between	multiple	objectives	
per	 single	 policy	 measure	 (e.g.	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 increase	
productivity and keep jobs in the same sector with one 
measure).
7 SCENARIOS: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND SECTOR  
INCOME AT MS AND  
REGIONAL LEVEL
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This chapter presents the most important scenario results 
with respect to agricultural production, land use, and 
sectoral	income	in	the	EU,	focusing	on	the	MS	and	regional	
levels.39
Scenarios: agricultural production and sector 
income at MS and regional level
7
7.1 | Agricultural production
In the Inc&Env scenario, the increase in area payments 
maintains	 the	 profitability	 of	 agricultural	 activities,	
despite	 some	 negative	 productivity	 effects,	 while	 the	
combined nitrogen input and livestock density limitations 
effectively	 limit	 the	 output	 of	 intensive	 production	
systems. The assumption that the market would not be 
further	liberalised	prevents	EU	agriculture	from	increasing	
international competitiveness, and therefore agricultural 
producer prices are projected to increase on average by 
1.3% and income is projected to increase by 4.2% on 
average	at	the	aggregated	EU-28	level.
The Lib&Prod scenario results show decreases in both 
cereal and meat production. These decreases are mainly 
driven by (1) the elimination of most area payments and 
coupled subsidies; and (2) by a negative price response of 
the domestic markets, induced by opening up the markets 
for international trade. The combination of these two 
drivers results in a considerable income loss for farmers 
(on	average	–20%	at	EU-28	 level).	Although	equilibrium	
producer prices ceteris paribus should increase in parallel 
with decreasing supply, trade liberalisation opens up 
EU	 markets	 and	 generates	 decreasing	 overall	 domestic	
prices	 (on	 average	 –0.7%	 in	 the	 EU-28)	 for	 agricultural	
commodities.
The	results	of	the	NoCAP	scenario	show	similar	effects	to	
the Lib&Prod scenario; however, the negative impact on 
EU	 production	 levels	 is	 more	 pronounced	 in	 the	 NoCAP	
scenario. The elimination of all direct payments, rural area 
development measures and price management tools, in 
combination with the further opening up of agricultural and 
food	markets	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	 lead	to	significant	
decreases in cereal and meat production, and also result 
in	a	negative	effect	on	EU	dairy	production	levels.	The	drop	
in	 the	EU’s	agricultural	production	 cannot	be	 completely	
compensated for by the increasing imports, and, as a 
consequence,	EU	producer	prices	increase	for	agricultural	
commodities by, on average, 5.3%. Nonetheless, the price 
effect	does	not	compensate	for	the	production	effect,	and	
total agricultural income decreases by 17.4% per ha of 
UAA	at	the	aggregated	EU-28	level.
 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
Ha or 
heads
Yield Supply
Prod. 
price
Ha or 
heads
Yield Supply
Prod. 
price
Ha or 
heads
Yield Supply
Prod. 
price
UAA 0.3% na na na –7.3% na na na –6.9% na na na
Cereals 0.6% –1.4% –0.9% 1.1% –8.0% 0.1% –7.9% –3.8% –8.4% –2.9% –11.0% –0.4%
Oilseeds –0.1% –1.5% –1.6% 1.5% –2.9% 2.5% –0.4% 0.9% –1.8% –3.5% –5.2% 7.9%
Other arable crops –3.3% 0.6% –2.8% 2.7% –10.5% 9.9% –1.7% 2.0% –12.2% 10.0% –3.4% 3.7%
Vegs & Permanent crops 0.1% –0.8% –0.7% 1.2% –0.5% 0.9% 0.4% –1.9% –0.2% –2.5% –2.8% 3.4%
Pasture 0.1% na na na –8.6% na na na –8.1% na na na
Set-aside and fallow land 7.8% na na na –15.6% na na na –16.9% na na na
Dairy cows 0.3% –0.5% –0.3% 1.5% –0.7% 0.6% –0.1% –0.4% 0.7% –2.8% –2.1% 11.9%
Beef meat activities –1.7% –0.3% –2.0% 3.3% –8.0% 5.0% –3.4% –9.6% –11.8% 0.3% –11.5% –1.2%
Pig fattening 0.1% –0.6% –0.5% 1.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% –2.3% 0.2% –3.4% –3.2% 6.6%
Sheep & goat fattening 5.3% –0.9% 4.3% –2.9% –6.3% 0.3% –5.9% –7.3% –12.1% –1.7% –13.6% –1.8%
Poultry fattening –0.2% –0.6% –0.8% 1.0% –3.0% 1.1% –2.0% –5.9% –4.0% –2.7% –6.6% –1.5%
TABLE 31: OVERVIEW OF CHANGES IN AREA, HERD SIZE AND SUPPLY FOR THE EU-28 ACTIVITY AGGREGATES (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Note: Prod. price = producer price; na = not applicable.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
39 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
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With the increase of area payments and the nitrogen input 
limitations in the Inc&Env scenario, the intensity of cereal 
production decreases compared with the reference scenar-
io. The average yield decreases in almost all MSs (–1.4% 
on	average	for	 the	EU)	and	even	 though	 this	 is	partially	
compensated for by an increase in area of 0.6% (314,000 
ha),	 total	EU	cereal	supply	of	about	1%	 (–1.9	million	 t).	
The most important increases in cereal area in absolute 
terms are indicated for Spain (+170,000 ha), followed 
by Finland (+86,000 ha), whereas Germany and France 
show the largest decreases in cereal area (–58,000 ha 
and –30,000 ha, respectively). Taking productivity (yield) 
changes into account, cereal supply increases are highest 
in Spain (+208,000 t), Latvia (+144,000 t), Lithuania and 
Estonia (both by about 130,000 t), while the largest drops 
are indicated for France (–750,000 t), Poland (–600,000 
t), Germany (–495,000 t) and Bulgaria (–470,000 t).
Under	the	Lib&Prod	scenario,	the	combined	effect	of	elim-
inating area payments and pressure from increased com-
petition from the world market lead to strong decreases in 
EU	cereal	production	compared	with	the	reference	scenar-
io.	Average	EU	cereal	productivity	per	hectare	is	not	really	
affected,	but	cereal	area	(–4.5	million	ha)	and	supply	(–26	
million t) both decrease by about 8%. In absolute terms, 
the production decreases are strongest for Germany (–6.7 
million t; –825,000 ha), France (–3.3 million t, –360,000 
ha), Poland (–3 million t; –650,000 ha), Spain (–2.3 million 
t; –450,000 ha), Italy (1.8 million t; almost –430,000 ha), 
Finland (–1.5 million t; –388,000 ha) and Hungary (–1.5 
million t; –194,000 ha).
The	strong	decreases	in	EU	cereal	area	(–8.4%;	–4.7	mil-
lion ha) and supply (–11%; –36 million t) in the NoCAP 
scenario compared with the reference scenario, are mainly 
due	to	the	removal	of	direct	payments	that	affect	the	in-
come	of	EU	crop	producers	and	to	a	decrease	in	EU	feed	
demand, but also to an increase in market competition 
due	to	further	liberalisation	of	the	EU	market.	The	effects	
on production levels would, in almost all MSs, be more 
pronounced under the NoCAP scenario than under the 
Lib&Prod scenario, especially with respect to supply levels.
7.1.1 Cereals
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FIGURE 44: CHANGES IN CEREAL AREA AND SUPPLY IN THE THREE POLICY SCENARIOS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
FIGURE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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FIGURE 44: CHANGES IN CEREAL AREA AND SUPPLY IN THE THREE POLICY SCENARIOS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Figure 44 gives an overview of the percentage changes 
of	 cereal	 production	 in	 each	 EU	MS	 and	 each	 scenario,	
and Figure 45 presents the production changes per region. 
Regions where the production of cereals is already low in 
the baseline and where mixed livestock and crop producers 
are located tend to have stronger decreases in cereal 
area in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios. Moreover, in 
both scenarios cereal production is also reduced in more 
productive regions, such as Picardie and Ile de France, due 
to the large decrease in income.
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 45: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF CEREALS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
7.1.2 Oilseeds
Figure 46 presents an overview of the percentage changes 
of	cereal	production	in	each	EU	MS	and	each	scenario,	and	
Figure 47 shows the production changes per region. Similar 
to the developments in the cereals sector, the nitrogen 
input restriction in the Inc&Env scenario lead to an average 
oilseed	 yield	 decline	 of	 1.5%	 at	 EU-28	 level	 compared	
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with the reference scenario. As oilseed area changes only 
slightly (–0.1%), the decrease in production intensity leads 
to	an	EU	oilseed	supply	reduction	of	1.6%.	The	percentage	
changes in oilseed area and supply are shown in Figure 
46. In absolute terms, the production decreases are most 
important	 in	 Bulgaria	 (–169,000	 t,	 mostly	 sunflower),	
France (–102,000 t, mainly rapeseed, but also soya, 
whereas	 sunflower	 increases),	 Spain	 (–84,000	 t,	 mainly	
sunflower)	and	Hungary	(–61,000	t,	mainly	rapeseed,	but	
also	sunflower	and	soya),	whereas	the	largest	production	
increases are projected for the Czech Republic (+29, 000 t, 
mainly rapeseed) and Poland (+24,000 t, rapeseed).
In the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, oilseed production 
is	 less	 affected	 than	 EU	 cereal	 production,	 and	 some	
switches	between	the	production	of	 rapeseed,	sunflower	
and	 soybeans	 are	 projected.	 Even	 though	 EU	 oilseed	
area decreases by almost 3% in the Lib&Prod scenario, 
production intensity and hence yields increase by 
2.5%,	 resulting	 in	 a	 moderate	 EU	 supply	 decrease	 of	
0.4% compared with the reference scenario. A closer 
examination	of	the	results	shows	that	the	aggregated	EU	
oilseed result can be explained by decreases in rapeseed 
and	soybean	production,	whereas	sunflower	supply	in	fact	
increases, by almost 2%. The most important absolute 
increases	in	sunflower	production	are	reported	for	Romania	
(+122,000 t) and France (+71,000 t). France also shows 
the most important absolute increase in rapeseed supply 
(+220,000 t), followed by Poland (+102,000 t), whereas 
the supply drop is by far the largest in Germany (–264,000 
t).	The	developments	in	soya	supply	are	quite	different	in	
the MSs, ranging from decreases of 98,000 t in France to 
increases of 34,000 t in Italy.
Negative oilseed production developments are more 
pronounced in the NoCAP scenario than in the Lib&Prod 
scenario.	Although	total	EU	area	for	oilseeds	decreases	
by only 2%, supply declines by more than 5% compared 
with the reference scenario, as yields per hectare 
decrease by 3.5%. The production decline is greatest for 
rapeseed, followed by soya, and the decline is lowest 
(but	 still	 negative)	 for	 sunflower	 production.	 Rapeseed	
supply	 is	 the	 most	 negatively	 affected	 oilseed	 supply,	
in absolute terms, in Germany (–570,000 t), France 
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(–174,000	 t)	 and	 the	 UK	 (	 151,000),	 whereas	 several	
EU-N13	MSs	 show	 some	 increase	 in	 supply	 (largest	 in	
Poland, +76,000 t). Considerable decreases in soybean 
production are projected for Romania (–176,000 t) and 
France	 (–146,000	 t),	 and	 sunflower	 supply	 declines	
most in Bulgaria (–225,000 t), Spain (–184,000 t) and, 
especially, Romania (+197,000 t, switching from soya); 
France also shows increases in production (+43,000 t).
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FIGURE 46: CHANGES IN OILSEED AREA AND SUPPLY IN THE THREE POLICY SCENARIOS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 47: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF OILSEEDS (%-CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Trade balance for cereals and oilseeds
With	decreases	in	EU	production,	the	EU	trade	balance	also	
worsens compared with the reference scenario (Figure 48). 
The	EU,	one	of	the	largest	cereal	producers	in	the	world	in	
the REF scenario, loses its position as an important cereal 
net exporter in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios. In the 
case of wheat, this is not because of decreasing exports 
(which in fact increase), but because of substantially 
increased imports, especially in the NoCAP scenario. For 
grain maize, substantial increases in imports are projected 
in	 the	 Lib&Prod	 and	 NoCAP	 scenarios,	 whereas	 the	 EU	
106 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
slightly increases its barley net exports in both scenarios. 
For	oilseeds,	the	EU	position	as	a	net	importer	is	not	much	
affected,	and	is,	as	in	the	reference	scenario,	dominated	by	
soybean imports.
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FIGURE 48: EU TRADE BALANCE FOR CEREALS AND OILSEEDS.
Note: trade balance = exports – imports;
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 49: CHANGES IN DAIRY COW NUMBERS AND MILK SUPPLY IN THE THREE POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
FIGURE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
Changes in milk production in the three policy scenarios 
are presented in Figure 49 and Figure 50. The total 
impact	on	EU	milk	production	is	rather	low	in	the	Inc&Env	
scenario. Compared with the reference scenario, the 
number of dairy cows slightly increases in most MSs, but 
because	of	decreases	in	average	milk	yields,	total	EU	milk	
supply	drops	slightly,	by	0.3%.	In	the	EU-N13	both	animal	
numbers (–0.4%) and supply (–0.6%) decrease, whereas 
the	animal	herd	increases	in	the	EU-15	(+0.4%);	however,	
average yields decrease and supply is reduced by –0.2%. 
At	MS	level,	the	effect	on	cow	milk	supply	varies	between	
–2.2% in Bulgaria and +2.5% in Austria.
The elimination of coupled subsidies and the further 
opening up of the market for international trade do not 
have	a	large	impact	on	total	EU	cow	milk	production	in	the	
Lib&Prod scenario. The decrease in the number of dairy 
cows	(–0.7%)	is	compensated	for	by	a	slight	intensification	
of milk production, with increases in average milk yields, 
resulting	in	almost	no	change	in	EU	milk	supply	(–0.1%).	
Cow	milk	 production	 is	 more	 negatively	 affected	 in	 the	
EU-N13,	with	a	decrease	of	–1%,	whereas	 in	the	EU-15	
milk supply increases by a mere +0.1%. At MS level, milk 
supply changes vary between –2% in Latvia and +1.7% 
in Greece.
Compared	 with	 the	 reference	 scenario,	 the	 EU	 dairy	
sector	 is	 most	 negatively	 affected	 under	 the	 NoCAP	
scenario, especially because of the elimination of price 
management	 tools.	 EU	 cow	 milk	 supply	 decreases	 by	
–2.1% under this scenario, mainly because of a decrease 
in average milk yield (–2.8%), as cow numbers increase by 
7.1.3 Milk and dairy
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FIGURE 49: CHANGES IN DAIRY COW NUMBERS AND MILK SUPPLY IN THE THREE POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 50: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF COW MILK (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
108 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
0.7%.	While	the	cow	herd	increases	by	1.1%	in	the	EU-15,	
it	decreases	in	the	EU-N13.	Milk	supply	is	most	negatively	
affected	in	Bulgaria	(–6.5%)	and	Austria	(–5.4%),	whereas	
milk production increases the most (in relative terms) in 
Greece (+1%) because of an increase in the number of 
dairy cows.
The	decrease	in	EU	milk	production	leads	to	reductions	in	
the	EU	supply	of	dairy	products	in	all	three	policy	scenarios	
compared with the reference scenario (Figure 51). 
Following	the	decreases	in	EU	milk	and	dairy	production,	
the	 EU	 trade	 balance	 for	 dairy	 products	 decreases	 in	
all	 policy	 scenarios,	 and	 is	 most	 affected	 in	 the	 NoCAP	
scenario.	Nonetheless,	the	EU	would	remain	a	substantial	
net exporter in dairy products in all scenarios (Figure 52).
Figure 53	gives	an	overview	of	the	relative	changes	in	EU	
meat supply in the scenarios compared with the reference 
scenario.	 EU	meat	production	 in	 the	 Inc&Env	scenario	 is	
affected	 mainly	 by	 stocking	 density	 restrictions,	 leading	
to	a	decrease	in	total	EU	meat	supply,	most	pronounced	
for beef meat (–2%), but sheep and goat meat increase 
by 4% (although from a rather low level). In the Lib&Prod 
scenario, the removal of almost all direct payments in 
combination with trade liberalisation leads to production 
decreases	for	all	meats	except	pork,	which	benefits	slightly	
(+0.6%) from the trade liberalisation. The elimination of 
all CAP support in combination with trade liberalisation 
leads	to	significant	production	decreases	for	all	meats	in	
the NoCAP scenario. This further decrease, compared with 
the Lib&Prod scenario, is mainly due to the removal of 
all remaining CAP premiums, as, even though not directly 
related to meat production, they have a positive impact 
on income, and their removal further decreases the small 
income	margins	of	EU	meat	production.
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FIGURE 52: EU TRADE BALANCE FOR SELECTED DAIRY PRODUCTS.
Note: trade balance = exports – imports.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 51: EU SUPPLY OF DAIRY PRODUCTS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 53: EU MEAT SUPPLY VARIATION (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Figure 54 and Figure 55 present the changes in beef meat 
production at MS and regional level, respectively. In the 
Inc&Env	scenario,	beef	meat	supply	 is	affected	more	than	
any of the other meat categories, mainly because of the 
restrictions	 on	 stocking	 densities.	 Supply	 in	 the	 EU-15	 is	
generally	more	affected	(–2.1%)	than	in	the	EU-N13	(–1.5),	
leading	to	a	total	decrease	of	2%	in	the	EU-28	compared	
with the reference scenario. In general, the decrease in beef 
meat cattle numbers is only partially compensated for by an 
increase in production intensity. The number of beef cattle 
decreases most in France (–152,600 heads), whereas an 
increase is indicated for Germany (+19,300 heads). Beef 
meat supply decreases in almost all MSs, i.e. also in Germany 
(–5.6%), with the largest supply decrease in absolute terms 
being reported for France (–36,100 t; –2.1%).
The	beef	herd	decreases	 in	almost	all	 EU	MSs	under	 the	
Lib&Prod	 scenario	 (EU-28:	 –8%;	 –1.5	million	 cattle),	 and	
even though production intensity and hence yields increase 
(+5%),	total	EU	beef	supply	declines	by	–3.4%	(266,000	t).	
In absolute terms, the number of beef cattle decreases most 
in France (–545,000 cattle), followed by Spain (–280,000 
cattle), whereas Ireland and Cyprus are the only countries 
where increases, although very small, in cattle numbers are 
noted (+0.2% and +0.6%, respectively). In terms of beef 
supply, the decreases are largest (in absolute terms) in 
France (–85,000 t), followed by Germany (–30,000 t), Spain 
and	the	UK	(–22,000	t	each).
In the NoCAP scenario, the beef cattle herd decreases 
substantially, by almost 12% (–2.2 million cattle), and, 
as beef yields only slightly increase (+0.3%), the net 
effect	 is	 a	 decline	 in	 EU	 beef	 meat	 supply	 of	 –11.5%	
(–0.9 million t) compared with the reference scenario. The 
decrease	in	cattle	numbers	is	more	pronounced	in	the	EU-
N13	(–15.1%)	than	in	the	EU-15	(–11.3%),	but	as	yields	
increase	in	the	former	(+3.6%),	the	net	effect	is	a	decrease	
in	 EU-N13	beef	 supply	of	–12%.	 In	absolute	 terms,	 the	
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FIGURE 54: CHANGES IN BEEF CATTLE NUMBERS AND SUPPLY IN ALL POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
FIGURE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
110 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
-30% 
-25% 
-20% 
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
EU
-2
8 
EU
-1
5 
EU
-N
13
 
Au
str
ia 
Be
lgi
um
 
Bu
lga
ria
 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Cy
pru
s 
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
 
De
nm
ar
k 
Es
ton
ia 
Fin
lan
d 
Fra
nc
e 
Ge
rm
an
y 
Gr
ee
ce
 
Hu
ng
ar
y 
Ire
lan
d 
Ita
ly 
La
tvi
a 
Lit
hu
an
ia 
Ma
lta
 
Ne
th
erl
an
ds
 
Po
lan
d 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Ro
ma
nia
 
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
 
Slo
ve
nia
 
Sp
ain
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m 
Inc&Env 
Heads Supply 
-30% 
-25% 
-20% 
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
EU
-2
8 
EU
-1
5 
EU
-N
13
 
Au
str
ia 
Be
lgi
um
 
Bu
lga
ria
 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Cy
pru
s 
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
 
De
nm
ar
k 
Es
ton
ia 
Fin
lan
d 
Fra
nc
e 
Ge
rm
an
y 
Gr
ee
ce
 
Hu
ng
ar
y 
Ire
lan
d 
Ita
ly 
La
tvi
a 
Lit
hu
an
ia 
Ma
lta
 
Ne
th
erl
an
ds
 
Po
lan
d 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Ro
ma
nia
 
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
 
Slo
ve
nia
 
Sp
ain
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m 
Lib&Prod 
Heads Supply 
-30% 
-25% 
-20% 
-15% 
-10% 
-5% 
0% 
5% 
10% 
EU
-2
8 
EU
-1
5 
EU
-N
13
 
Au
str
ia 
Be
lgi
um
 
Bu
lga
ria
 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Cy
pru
s 
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
 
De
nm
ar
k 
Es
ton
ia 
Fin
lan
d 
Fra
nc
e 
Ge
rm
an
y 
Gr
ee
ce
 
Hu
ng
ar
y 
Ire
lan
d 
Ita
ly 
La
tvi
a 
Lit
hu
an
ia 
Ma
lta
 
Ne
th
erl
an
ds
 
Po
lan
d 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Ro
ma
nia
 
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
 
Slo
ve
nia
 
Sp
ain
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m 
NoCAP 
Heads Supply 
FIGURE 54: CHANGES IN BEEF CATTLE NUMBERS AND SUPPLY IN ALL POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 55: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF BEEF MEAT (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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decrease in the cattle herd is largest in France (–650,000 
cattle),	 Spain	 (–248,000	 cattle)	 and	 the	 UK	 (–181,000	
cattle), and the supply decrease is highest in France 
(–166,000 t) and Germany (–119,000 t).
Total	EU	pig	meat	production	decreases	slightly	by	0.5%	
in the Env&Prod scenario compared with the reference 
scenario. Due to the restrictions on stocking densities, the 
production	decreases	occur	mostly	 in	EU-15	regions	and	
are most pronounced in Belgium (–90,000 t supply), the 
Netherlands (–57,000 t), and Spain and Denmark (around 
–34,000 t each). Conversely, some regions in Germany 
(+69,000 t) and Poland (+34,000 t) show the largest 
absolute increases in pig meat production. In the Lib&Prod 
scenario, pig meat production increases slightly, by 0.6%, 
at	aggregated	EU-28	level.	While	production	declines	most	
in Germany (–179,000 t) and Poland (–14,000 t), several 
other regions experience production opportunities, leading 
to supply increases. The largest increases occur in Spain 
(+151,000 t), Italy (+69,000 t) and Denmark (+45,000 t). 
The removal of all CAP measures in the NoCAP scenario 
provokes an aggregated pig meat production decrease 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 57: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF PIG MEAT (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 56: CHANGES IN PIG MEAT SUPPLY IN THE POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
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of	 3.2%	 in	 the	 EU.	 This	 affects	 almost	 all	MSs,	 but	 the	
absolute production decline is by far the largest in Germany 
(–454,000 t), followed by Poland (–134,000 t), Denmark 
(–97,000 t) and Austria (–84,000 t). In contrast, increases 
in pig meat production are highest in the Netherlands 
(+84,000 t) and Belgium (+21,000 t). The changes in pig 
meat production are shown at MS level in Figure 56 and at 
regional level in Figure 57.
EU	poultry	meat	production	declines	 in	all	policy	scenarios	
(Figure 58).	 EU	 poultry	 supply	 decreases	 moderately,	 by	
0.8%, in the Inc&Env scenario, which is mainly due to stocking 
density restrictions, and is most pronounced, in absolute 
terms, in Italy (–26,000 t), Spain (–23,000 t) and Portugal 
(–21,000	 t).	 In	 contrast,	 Germany,	 the	 second	 largest	 EU	
poultry meat-producing country, slightly increases poultry 
meat supply (+18,000 t). In the Lib&Prod scenario, total 
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FIGURE 58: CHANGES IN POULTRY SUPPLY IN THE POLICY SCENARIOS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 59: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF POULTRY MEAT (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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EU	 poultry	 supply	 declines	 by	 2%,	 with	 somewhat	 larger	
decreases	in	the	EU-N13	(–3.1%)	than	in	the	EU-15	(–1.6%).	
The absolute production decreases are highest in the two 
largest poultry meat-producing MSs: Poland (–94,000 t) 
and Germany (–85,000 t). In the NoCAP scenario, poultry 
production	is	projected	to	decline	most,	by	–6.6%	in	the	EU-
28, again with the largest decreases in Poland (–234,000 t) 
and	Germany	(–219,000	t),	but	other	important	EU	poultry	
meat	producers	are	also	negatively	affected,	especially	the	
UK	(–96,000	t),	France	(89,000	t)	and	Spain	(–85,000	t).	The	
regional scenario results are shown in Figure 59.
EU	 sheep	 and	 goat	 meat	 production	 benefits	 from	 the	
Inc&Env scenario (Figure 60). In particular, because of the 
decreases	 in	 EU	 beef	meat	 production	 related	 to	 density	
restrictions,	EU	sheep	and	goat	meat	production	increases	
by 4.3% (43,000 t) compared with the reference scenario. 
Almost	half	of	this	increase	takes	place	in	the	UK	(+21,000	t),	 
which further improves its position as the largest sheep and 
goat	meat	producer	in	the	EU-28.	Apart	from	the	UK,	only	
Spain,	 the	second	 largest	EU	producer	of	sheep	and	goat	
meat, (+7,400 t), Greece (+3,800 t) and France (+3,400 t) 
show somewhat considerable production increases.
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FIGURE 61: EU TRADE BALANCE FOR MEAT.
Note: trade balance = exports – imports.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 60: REGIONAL SUPPLY OF SHEEP AND GOAT MEAT (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
114 Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
As	a	result	of	production	decreases,	the	EU-28	trade	bal-
ance	for	meat	worsens	in	all	scenarios,	and	while	the	EU	
remains a net meat exporter in the Inc&Env and Lib&Prod 
scenarios (particularly because of the net exports in pig 
meat),	the	EU	becomes	a	net	importer	of	meat	in	the	No-
CAP scenario (Figure 61).
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Under	the	Inc&Env	scenario,	UAA	increases	by	0.3%	(+0.6	
million ha) compared with the reference scenario, whereas 
UAA	substantially	declines,	by	7.3%	(–13.1	million	ha),	in	
the Lib&Prod scenario and by about 6.9% (–12.4 million 
ha) in the NoCAP scenario (Figure 62).	The	decreases	in	UAA	
in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios are directly linked 
to (1) the removal of direct payments, which immediately 
affects	 the	 profitability	 of	 all	 crop	 production	 activities,	
and	(2)	the	decreases	 in	EU	production	levels,	especially	
to the declines in cereal production and pasture, i.e. part of 
the land is taken out as economic returns decrease.
7.2 | Land use
7.2.1	 Utilised	agricultural	area
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FIGURE 62: CHANGE IN UAA PER MS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
FIGURE 63: REGIONAL CHANGES IN UAA (CHANGE RELATIVE TO BASELINE).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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The	regional	changes	in	UAA	compared	with	the	reference	
scenario are shown inFigure 53.	This	figure	shows	that	land	
abandonment in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios also 
takes place in areas with relatively good land quality (e.g. 
in France). In this context, it has to be mentioned that land 
quality in the CAPRI modelling approach is only captured 
through the inputs and outputs of the activities. Crop 
activities	in	regions	with	good	land	quality	have	a	profitability	
that	is	above	average	(i.e.	above	the	country	or	EU	average),	
but	the	removal	of	direct	payments	immediately	affects	the	
profitability	of	crop	production,	 leading	to	an	 income	drop	
for all crop activities (as all crop activities receive direct 
payments in the REF scenario), and related reductions in 
total area. However, the income decline is generally smaller 
for regions where soil quality (and therefore potentially 
profitability	of	the	crop	activities)	is	high.
In the Inc&Env scenario, there is almost no change in 
grassland	area	at	aggregate	EU-28	level	compared	with	
the reference scenario, but impacts in the individual MSs 
vary slightly, from the decreases of –3.5% in Cyprus (very 
low in absolute terms) and –0.5% in Spain to the increase 
of 2% in Austria. Both the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios 
show	a	substantial	decrease	in	EU-28	grassland	area,	with	
decreases of 8.6% (5.2 million ha) and 8.1% (4.9 million 
ha), respectively. In absolute terms, the decline in grassland 
is largest in France (around –1 million ha in both scenarios) 
and Spain (–0.9 million ha in Lib&Pro; –0.7 million ha in 
NoCAP). These substantial decreases in grassland area are 
driven mainly by the removal of direct payments and the 
absence of a CAP measure targeting the maintenance of 
permanent grassland. Grassland receives subsidies from 
both	pillars	 that	are	a	significant	share	of	 the	grassland	
income, and without direct payments the grassland income 
becomes negative in most MSs. Moreover, the decrease of 
ruminant production and the related drop in feed demand 
amplify	the	negative	effect	on	grassland	area	(Figure	64).
7.2.2 Grassland
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FIGURE 64: CHANGE IN GRASSLAND AREA PER MS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 65: REGIONAL CHANGE IN GRASSLAND AREA (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO BASELINE).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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The market developments in the Inc&Env scenario, 
together with the direct payments and other agricultural 
support, lead to an increase of 4.2% in gross farm income 
for	all	agricultural	activities	 in	the	EU-28	compared	with	
the reference scenario. The income increase is similar in 
the	EU-15	and	EU-N13	(4.1%	and	4.5%,	respectively).	In	
contrast, in the Lib&Prod scenario, income decreases by 
20%	in	the	EU-28,	with	a	decrease	of	about	18%	in	the	
EU-15	and	a	decrease	of	32%	in	the	EU-N13.	The	income	
decrease is a combination of the elimination of most 
support payments and a decrease in most producer prices 
due	to	increased	international	competition	and	related	EU	
production	decline.	As	the	negative	EU	production	effects	
are less pronounced in the NoCAP scenario than in the 
Lib&Prod, scenario, producer prices actually decrease less 
in	the	NoCAP	scenario	(as	the	EU	production	decrease	is	
not compensated for by increased imports). Accordingly, 
income decreases less in the NoCAP scenario than in the 
Lib&Prod	 scenario.	Nonetheless,	 total	 EU-28	agricultural	
income	decreases	by	more	than	17%	in	the	EU-28	under	
the NoCAP scenario, with decreases of almost 16% in the 
EU-15	and	29%	in	the	EU-N13.	Relative	income	changes	
are	bigger	 in	EU-N13	 in	all	 three	 scenarios	because	 the	
relative proportion of support payments to total income is 
generally	higher	in	the	EU-N13	than	in	the	EU-15.
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FIGURE 66: GROSS FARM INCOME, ALL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
7.3 | Sectoral income per region
Figure 67 shows that in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, 
the	impacts	on	income	per	UAA	are	lower	in	regions	with	
a high proportion of sectors not receiving payments, 
e.g. Andalusia, other southern MSs and the Netherlands, 
where horticulture accounts for a very high proportion 
of value-added. Conversely, the reduction in income per 
UAA	is	above	30%	in	regions	where	cattle,	dairy	and	crop	
production is very high (e.g. cattle and dairy farms in 
Asturias, Scotland, Tyrol and Slovenia).
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FIGURE 67: GROSS FARM INCOME PER UAA AT REGIONAL LEVEL (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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Table 32 and Table 33 show the impact of the simulated 
policy scenarios on crop area and animal numbers for key 
activity groups by farm specialisation and economic farm 
size	in	the	EU-27.40 The simulation results show that the 
impacts are of a greater magnitude in the Lib&Prod and 
NoCAP scenarios than in the Inc&Env scenario. In general, 
in all three scenarios, supported activities (e.g. cattle, 
cereals)	are	more	negatively	affected	than	less	supported	
activities (e.g. oilseeds, vegetables and permanent crops) 
across	 different	 farm	 specialisations	 and	 economic	 size	
classes.41
Under	 the	 Inc&Env	 scenario,	 cereal	 area	 decreases	
between 0.5% and 7% across farm specialisations and 
between 1.4% and 3% across farm size classes compared 
with the reference scenario because of the elimination of 
coupled crop subsidies. Cereals tend to be more supported 
than other crop activities in the reference scenario, while 
crop payments are eliminated in the Inc&Env scenario. 
The cereal area is relocated to, among others, oilseed and 
fodder production. Oilseed area increases because of a 
lower level of coupled support in the reference scenario 
and a better relative price for oilseeds than cereals in the 
Inc&Env scenario. Cattle activities increase by up to 5% 
across most farm specialisations in the Inc&Env scenario, 
compared with the reference scenario, because of price 
rises,	while	they	are	also	less	adversely	affected	by	coupled	
payment reduction. However, livestock farms (specialist 
milk; specialist cattle) experience a small reduction in cattle 
numbers, in contrast to the increases indicated for other 
farm	 specialisations.	 This	 effect	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 limits	
on stocking density per hectare imposed as an eligibility 
condition for receiving coupled livestock payments in the 
Inc&Env scenario. This limit constrains livestock farms 
more than farms specialised in other activities because of 
the greater livestock intensity on livestock farm than on 
other farms. Livestock farms account for the main bulk 
of cattle numbers; hence, they drive the overall results 
causing a small reduction in cattle numbers across most 
economic size classes (Table 32 and Table 33).
The reduction of support in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP 
scenarios leads to a substantial restructuring of farming 
activities	 across	 farm	 types	 and	 sectors	 in	 the	 EU-
27 (Table 32). The resulting impacts under these two 
scenarios are much greater than under the Inc&Env 
scenario. The direction of the simulated activity changes 
for cereals, oilseeds and vegetables, and permanent 
crops are the same for the Inc&Env and the Lib&Prod and 
NoCAP scenarios, but the magnitudes of these changes 
are	 significantly	 larger	 under	 the	 Lib&Prod	 and	 NoCAP	
scenarios across most farm specialisations and farm size 
classes. The exception is cattle numbers, which decrease 
in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios compared with the 
reference scenario for all farm specialisations and size 
classes,	 but	 show	 rather	 mixed	 effects	 in	 the	 Inc&Env	
scenario. The main cause for the reduction in cattle 
activities in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios is the 
elimination of coupled payments, as these farms receive 
the main bulk of this type of subsidy in the reference 
scenario.	 For	 other	 animal	 activities,	 the	 effects	 are	
mixed across farm specialisations and size classes in the 
Lib&Prod	and	NoCAP	scenarios,	as	 they	 include	different	
livestock	 types	 which	 are	 affected	 heterogeneously	 by	
the	subsidy	changes	and	price	effects	applied	under	 the	
simulated	scenarios.	Overall,	the	magnitudes	of	the	effects	
for other animal activities are similar for the Lib&Prod and 
NoCAP scenarios and the Inc&Env scenario.
The results reveal that there is substantial heterogeneity 
in the changes in crop area and animal numbers between 
different	 farm	 specialisations	 in	 the	 three	 simulated	
scenarios. In general, farms experience greater changes 
in minor activities in which they are not specialised (e.g. 
cereal and animal activities for permanent crop farms; 
vegetables	and	permanent	crops	for	field	cropping	farms	
and livestock farms; oilseeds for livestock farms) than in 
their	core	activities.	This	effect	is	largely	due	to	relatively	
low levels of minor activities in the reference scenario. It 
could be also explained by lower adjustment costs and 
lower opportunity costs for minor activities than for core 
Scenarios: impacts at farm level8
8.1 | Farm structure change
40	The	EU-27	includes	all	EU	Member	States	except	for	Croatia.	Croatia	is	not	considered	because,	in	2012,	it	was	not	part	of	the	EU	(FADN	data	for	the	base	year	are	not	
available).
41 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
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activities. This indirectly implies that when subsidies are 
reduced (particularly coupled ones) farms adjust minor 
activities to a larger extent than core activities, which 
remain	less	affected	(Table	32).
The	 simulated	 effects	 are	 less	 heterogeneous	 between	
economic sizes classes than they are across farm 
specialisations (Table 32 and Table 33). However, there is a 
relatively consistent pattern indicating an inverse relationship 
between the magnitude of the simulated impacts and 
economic farm size in all three simulated scenarios. The 
exceptions to this are vegetables and permanent crops 
in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, where the reverse 
pattern is observed. The main explanation for this inverse 
relationship is the greater subsidy dependence of small 
farms,	which	are,	therefore,	affected	more	than	large	farms	
when subsidies are reduced. In addition, as explained above, 
because, by construction, small farms have fewer farm 
activities in the reference scenario than large farms, there 
are larger changes in relative magnitudes.
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Specialist COP –1.96 –4.15 –3.63 3.89 19.20 21.24 9.44 –6.21 27.37 1.50 –9.79 –5.09 –2.05 –1.80 2.42
Specialist	other	field	crops –4.00 –7.48 –5.99 3.44 34.38 33.09 3.40 7.54 17.00 0.48 –9.13 –5.40 –0.72 –0.13 2.22
Specialist horticulture –1.90 –9.67 –13.26 2.70 25.38 10.54 –1.14 4.37 8.76 2.91 –15.03 –9.34 –0.26 –0.30 1.30
Specialist olives –7.48 –10.51 –13.01 17.48 46.85 –5.56 0.73 0.87 3.04 2.30 –12.86 –7.34 0.42 0.70 1.55
Specialist wine –3.41 –8.74 –6.05 –5.13 36.11 18.38 0.43 –1.44 –0.39 0.27 –6.79 –3.86 –2.19 –2.11 –1.21
Specialist orchards – fruits –6.41 –8.94 –6.12 –0.14 40.15 38.30 0.04 –2.06 –2.09 4.84 –20.01 –8.80 –1.03 –1.45 –0.79
Permanent crops combined –5.85 –6.34 –6.69 –2.62 30.97 13.74 0.74 –1.09 0.52 –0.61 –6.50 –3.56 0.40 1.69 2.95
Specialist milk –1.39 –4.99 –0.98 4.76 40.16 42.16 8.01 3.07 37.36 –0.24 –3.54 –0.52 –0.45 –1.57 0.25
Specialist sheep and goats –5.85 8.03 11.03 13.65 192.30 220.30 1.08 –4.26 2.53 1.63 –7.76 –3.47 –0.50 –0.49 –0.08
Specialist cattle –2.55 1.22 4.79 –3.06 29.15 30.48 1.11 –1.34 6.61 –0.76 –7.39 –4.10 –0.50 –0.72 –0.87
Specialist granivores –0.68 –3.46 –2.72 0.12 16.03 14.30 6.85 3.52 27.47 1.13 –6.49 –2.08 –0.05 0.02 0.04
Mixed crops –3.53 –5.83 –6.12 1.70 34.38 32.62 0.75 –0.86 3.25 0.83 –9.81 –5.57 –0.74 –0.97 0.56
Mixed livestock –0.51 –1.86 –1.69 8.13 74.06 97.80 0.89 11.94 16.39 0.33 –7.89 –4.45 –0.45 –1.86 –1.12
Mixed crops and livestock –0.81 –1.77 –1.17 1.64 23.24 27.24 1.55 1.81 11.15 0.18 –7.49 –3.96 –1.22 –1.45 0.30
TABLE 32: THE STRUCTURE OF CROP AREA AND ANIMAL NUMBERS FOR KEY ACTIVITY GROUPS BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE EU-27 (% CHANGE RELATIVE 
TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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2,000	to	<	8,000	EUR –2.94 –7.09 –7.48 27.71 162.22 199.46 1.55 –1.32 0.89 –0.05 –15.97 –11.02 –0.33 –3.12 –5.19
8,000	to	<	25,000	EUR –2.83 –1.86 –0.24 8.77 61.21 55.66 1.30 –1.21 2.30 –1.07 –13.04 –8.66 –0.77 –0.59 0.95
25,000	to	<	100,000	EUR –2.44 –3.53 –1.90 3.46 30.31 29.59 1.49 –0.61 4.79 –0.24 –7.17 –3.14 –0.92 –0.37 0.98
100,000	to	<	500,000	EUR –1.68 –4.83 –3.90 0.99 14.47 16.12 0.67 3.42 7.91 –0.05 –3.67 –0.67 –0.26 –0.03 0.48
≥	500,000	EUR –1.46 –1.85 –1.42 0.40 8.14 8.94 0.07 2.82 7.10 0.03 –1.27 0.06 –0.08 –0.03 0.55
TABLE 33: THE STRUCTURE OF CROP AREA AND ANIMAL NUMBERS FOR KEY ACTIVITY GROUPS BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE EU-27 (% CHANGE RELATIVE 
TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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Table 34 and Table 35 show the percentage income 
change, relative to the reference scenario, for the three 
simulated scenarios (Inc&Env, Lib&Prod and NoCAP) by 
farm	specialisation	and	economic	farm	size	in	the	EU-27,	
respectively.
Across farm specialisations, income changes vary from 
–12% to +2% in the Inc&Env scenario; from –37% to +2% 
in the Lib&Prod scenario; and from –32% to +4% in the 
NoCAP scenario. The income change variation is much 
smaller	across	 the	different	economic	 size	 classes:	 from	
–1% to +2% for the Inc&Env scenario; from –16% to –6% 
for the Lib&Prod scenario; and from –15% to –2% for the 
NoCAP	scenario.	This	is	because	sector-specific	effects	are	
diluted	among	different	farm	specialisations	belonging	to	
the same economic size class.
These income changes are largely driven by changes 
to subsidies, particularly for the Lib&Prod and NoCAP 
scenarios. The correlation ratio between the subsidy as 
a proportion of total income in the reference scenario 
and the income change in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP 
scenarios for both farm specialisations and economic 
size classes is greater than 90%. Subsidy-dependent 
farms	 experience	 a	 significant	 reduction	 in	 income	 in	
these two scenarios, such as specialist cattle, specialist 
COP and specialist olive farms, with income reductions 
of	20%	or	more.	 In	addition	 significantly	affected	 farms	
under the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios are specialist 
sheep and goat, mixed crop and livestock and mixed 
livestock farms. In the Inc&Env scenario, only specialist 
olive	farms	are	significantly	affected	(–12%)	because	of	
the direct payment reduction caused by the introduction 
of	flat-rate	decoupled	payments.	Most	of	the	other	farm	
specialisations experience an income change of between 
–2% and +2% in the Inc&Env scenario.
Small economic size farms seem to gain (in relative terms) 
in the Inc&Env scenario. Small farms experience greater 
income losses than large farms under the Lib&Prod and 
NoCAP scenarios because of the subsidy cuts. However, 
under the Inc&Env scenario, small farms seem to be less 
affected	by	the	restrictive	greening	measures	and	benefit	
from the redistribution of payments (homogenisation of 
direct payments, higher share of the greening envelope 
and	 HNV	 payments).	 Under	 the	 Lib&Prod	 and	 NoCAP	
scenarios,	 small	 farms	 are	 adversely	 affected	 by	 the	
removal of direct payments because of their higher 
subsidy dependency in the reference scenario.
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
Specialist COP 1.2 –23.5 –22.6
Specialist	other	field	crops 0.4 –2.1 –0.2
Specialist horticulture –0.9 1.9 0.8
Specialist wine 0.4 –7.1 –7.6
Specialist orchards – fruits –2.7 –4.0 –6.2
Specialist olives –11.6 –20.6 –19.9
Permanent crops combined –1.5 –7.7 –9.2
Specialist milk –0.1 –8.7 2.6
Specialist sheep and goats –0.5 –12.1 –11.9
Specialist cattle –2.3 –36.7 –31.8
Specialist granivores 1.0 –3.7 3.6
Mixed crops –0.3 –2.8 –3.6
Mixed livestock 1.8 –12.0 –3.0
Mixed crops and livestock 0.2 –14.8 –9.7
TABLE 34: INCOME VARIATION BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE EU-27 (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
 Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
EUR	2,000	to	<	8,000	 1.9 –14.5 –10.2
EUR	8,000	to	<	25,000	 –0.5 –16.3 –14.6
EUR	25,000	to	<	100,000	 –0.7 –13.8 –10.2
EUR	100,000	to	<	500,000	 –0.2 –8.5 –3.3
≥	EUR	500,000	 –0.2 –6.1 –2.2
TABLE 35: INCOME VARIATION BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE EU-27 (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
Figure 68	 reveals	 that	 there	 are	 heterogeneous	 effects	
with regard to income in all three simulated scenarios. 
However, the proportion of farmers with negative income 
change	is	significantly	 larger	 in	the	Lib&Prod	and	NoCAP	
scenarios than in the Inc&Env scenario. In the Lib&Prod 
and NoCAP scenarios, most farms (around 88% and 78% 
of all farms, respectively) lose relative to the reference 
situation, whereas in the Inc&Env scenario the reverse 
holds true, with most (around 54%) farms gaining relative 
to the reference.
In the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, farmers lose 
mainly because of the abolishment of direct payments. 
Most farms (83% and 73% of all farms, respectively) 
lose	 between	 EUR	 10/ha	 and	 EUR	 1,000/ha	 in	 these	
two scenarios. In the Inc&Env scenario, most farms that 
8.2 | Farm income
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gain income (45% of all farms) increase their income by 
between	EUR	10/ha	and	EUR	500/ha	 (Figure	68). These 
farms gain income mainly because of an increase in 
output	prices.	Some	specific	farms	are	positively	affected	
by the increase in direct payments with the introduction 
of	MS	flat-rate	decoupled	payments	(i.e.	those	that	have	
lower per hectare payments in the reference scenario) and/
or because they are located in Natura 2000 areas. Most 
income-losing farms (37% of all farms) in the Inc&Env 
scenario	experience	an	income	reduction	of	between	EUR	
10/ha	and	EUR	500/ha	(Figure	68).
Figure 69 shows that the proportion of farms with a 
negative income is 2.7% of the total number of farms 
in the reference scenario but 4.2% and 4.4% of farms in 
the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, respectively. In the 
Inc&Env scenario, the proportion of farms with a negative 
income is the same as in the reference scenario. In terms 
of	the	UAA,	the	proportion	of	UAA	of	farms	with	a	negative	
income	is	3.1%	of	total	UAA	in	the	reference	scenario	but	
5.8% and 6.2%, respectively, in the Lib&Prod and NoCAP 
scenarios.
At	the	EU-27	level,	as	represented	by	the	Gini	coefficient,	
the Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios increase farm income 
inequality among farms to 0.75 and 0.76, respectively, 
from 0.71 in the reference scenario. This implies that CAP 
subsidies play an income equalisation role among farms in 
the	EU.	Farm	income	inequality	is	the	same	in	the	Inc&Env	
and	 reference	 scenarios;	 that	 is,	 the	 Gini	 coefficient	 is	
around 0.71 in both of these scenarios (Figure 70).
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FIGURE 68: THE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM INCOME RELATIVE TO THE REFERENCE SCENARIO ACROSS THE FARM POPULATION IN THE EU-27 (EUR/HA).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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FIGURE 69: FARMS WITH NEGATIVE INCOME IN THE EU-27 (% OF ALL FARMS/UAA).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
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FIGURE 70: GINI COEFFICIENT FOR FARM INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE EU-27.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model. 
9 SCENARIOS:  ENVIRONMENTAL  
ASPECTS IN THE EU
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The limitation in animal stocking density and the restriction 
on nitrogen use lead to a decrease in the N-surplus of 0.8 
kg	N/ha	UAA	under	the	Inc&Env	scenario.	A	considerable	
reduction is reported in particular in Member States and 
regions with a high N-surplus in the reference scenario, 
such as Belgium and the Netherlands, mostly related to 
reductions in stocking densities. In contrast, under the 
Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios, the N-surplus increases 
by	 2	 and	 0.5	 kg	 N/ha	 UAA,	 respectively	 (Figure	71 and 
Figure 72). The increase in N-surplus is, on the one hand, 
driven	 by	 the	 decrease	 in	 UAA	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
the	 intensification	 of	 livestock	 and	 crop	 production	 on	
the	 remaining	UAA.	The	 rise	 in	N-surplus	per	ha	 is	more	
pronounced in the Lib&Prod than in the NoCAP scenario 
because the overall decline in intensity and production 
levels is greater in the NoCAP scenario, while the decrease 
in	 total	UAA	 is	greater	 in	 the	Lib&Prod	scenario.	 In	both	
scenarios, more substantial increases in N-surplus are 
indicated for regions that already have the highest 
N-surplus in the reference scenario, as these are among 
the most competitive regions (Figure 73).41
Scenarios: environmental aspects9
9.1 | Nitrogen surplus
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FIGURE 71: N-SURPLUS, EU-28 (KG N/HA UAA).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 72: CHANGE IN N-SURPLUS PER MS (ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN KG N/HA UAA RELATIVE TO REF).
Note: Malta has been removed from the graph to improve the readability. The values for Malta are: Inc&Env -14%, Lib&Prod +17%, NoCAP +12%”.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
41 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
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FIGURE 67: GROSS FARM INCOME PER UAA AT REGIONAL LEVEL (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. More details http://europa.eu/!DH83Ur.
FIGURE 73: N-SURPLUS IN 2030 IN REF AND EACH SCENARIO, AND CHANGE IN N-SURPLUS UNDER EACH SCENARIO RELATIVE TO REF (KG N/HA UAA).
FIGURE CONTINUES ON NEXT PAGE → 
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FIGURE 73: N-SURPLUS IN 2030 IN REF AND EACH SCENARIO, AND CHANGE IN N-SURPLUS UNDER EACH SCENARIO RELATIVE TO REF (KG N/HA UAA).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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Changes in agricultural non-CO2 GHG emissions follow 
directly from production developments. Therefore, 
changes are rather limited in the Inc&Env scenario, 
with	 a	 decrease	 of	 0.5%	 in	 EU-28	 emissions;	 however,	
considerably larger decreases are indicated under the 
Lib&Prod scenario (–4.2%) and NoCAP scenario (–5.8%) 
(Figure 74). It should be mentioned that the consideration 
of the impact of technological GHG mitigation options is 
very limited in the scenario setting (i.e. the technologies 
are not widely applied), which is why the predicted GHG 
9.2 | Agricultural greenhouse gas emissions
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FIGURE 74: CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL NON-CO2 GHG EMISSIONS (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
Au
str
ia 
Be
lgi
um
 
Bu
lga
ria
 
Cr
oa
tia
 
Cy
pru
s 
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic
 
De
nm
ar
k 
Es
ton
ia 
Fin
lan
d 
Fra
nc
e 
Ge
rm
an
y 
Gr
ee
ce
 
Hu
ng
ar
y 
Ire
lan
d 
Ita
ly 
La
tvi
a 
Lit
hu
an
ia 
Ma
lta
 
Ne
th
erl
an
ds
 
Po
lan
d 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
Ro
ma
nia
 
Slo
va
k R
ep
ub
lic
 
Slo
ve
nia
 
Sp
ain
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m 
M
io
 t
on
ne
s 
CO
2 
eq
 REF Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP 
FIGURE 75: AGRICULTURAL NON-CO2 GHG EMISSIONS IN THE EU MSs.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 76: GHG EMISSIONS IN AGRICULTURE, EU-28 AND OTHER COUNTRIES, 2030 (% DIFFERENCE FROM BASE).
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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changes mirror production changes so closely. At the MS 
level, the changes in agricultural non-CO2 GHG emissions 
also	 reflect	 the	corresponding	production	changes	 in	 the	
scenarios (Figure 75).
Taking a worldwide perspective, the increase of GHG 
emissions in agriculture for Mercosur or Australia-New-
Zealand	 in	 the	 NoCAP	 scenario	 illustrates	 the	 leakage	
effect,	mainly	 due	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	 support	 and	 to	 a	
lesser extent to market opening (Figure 76).
10 CONSOLIDATED ANALYSIS  AND OUTLOOK
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The CAP is evolving into a multifunctional policy that can 
respond to the constantly changing needs of society. The CAP 
must	meet	market-efficiency	and	competitiveness	criteria;	
be a motor of job creation and ‘smart’ growth; continue to 
aid	the	fight	against	climate	change	as	an	environmentally	
accountable policy measure; act (in tandem with other 
policies) as a custodian of responsible and sustainable 
biologically renewable resource management; and still 
respect	its	initial	aim	of	ensuring	sufficient	amounts	of	food	
for	all	citizens	at	affordable	prices.
Given the above, the design of post-2020 farm policy is 
once again under consultation and a wide range of policy 
options are being considered, from retaining the status 
quo to radical reform.
The present report, in the tradition of the ‘Scenar 2020’ 
studies, contributes to the analysis of selected scenarios 
and provides a framework for further exploration of the 
process of designing the future CAP.42 It complements 
recent, more qualitative, forward-looking studies with 
a well-elaborated baseline and multiple perspectives 
through	the	use	of	different	models.
This analysis of the social, economic and environmental 
impacts of several options for the next CAP employs 
models of the iMAP platform hosted by the JRC. This 
suite of economic models ranges from one that models 
macroeconomic aspects (a CGE model, i.e. MAGNET43) to 
those that model more sectoral economic aspects (a PE 
model, i.e. CAPRI44) and microeconomic aspects related to 
the impact on individual farms (IFM-CAP45).
MAGNET, CAPRI and IFM-CAP are run in an integrated 
manner	on	different	spatial	scales	(global,	EU,	MS,	NUTS	
2,	individual	farm),	having	as	a	common	reference	the	EU	
Agricultural Outlook published at the end of 2015 (DG 
AGRI, 2015), generated with the AGLINK-COSIMO46 PE 
model.
The reader is reminded that the general caveats 
that	 apply	 to	 all	modelling	 exercises	 (i.e.	 a	 simplified	
representation of reality, no forecasting models, 
high uncertainty, etc.) apply here. Furthermore, using 
three	 different	 models	 and	 their	 (soft)	 linkages	 adds	
complexity and a certain degree of inconsistency (e.g. 
different	commodity	categories).
Consolidated analysis and outlook10
10.1 | The Scenar 2030 approach
42 See http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2017_agri_001_cap_modernisation_en.pdf.
43 Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET).
44 Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact (CAPRI) model; http://www.capri-model.org/docs/capri_documentation.pdf.
45 Individual Farm Model for Common Agricultural Policy Analysis (IFM-CAP).
46 AGLINK-COSIMO; http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC92618/jrc92618%20online.pdf.
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FIGURE 77: MODEL CHAIN.
Source: own presentation.
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Scenar 2030 looks at three scenarios, designed beginning 
of 2016, that take polar paths, against a reference scenario 
(the	baseline),	to	characterise	different	visions	for	the	CAP.
The baseline, or reference scenario (or the business-as-
usual scenario), was generated on the basis of the latest 
available reference at the time of the study, i.e. the 2015 
EU	Agricultural	Outlook47, with a perspective up to 2025. 
The baseline was extended up to 2030 in order to cover 
the timeline of the Scenar 2030 study.
The	 first	 scenario	 (Inc&Env)	 assumes	 a	more	 restrictive	
compliance with agri-environmental objectives needed for 
direct	payment	eligibility	while	maintaining	the	EU’s	CAP	
budget at its current nominal level.
The second scenario (Lib&Prod) assumes a strong reduction 
in subsidies (the removal of Pillar 1 direct payments, which 
are	 returned	 to	 tax	 payers),	with	 a	 shift	 to	 productivity-
increasing measures and further trade liberalisation.
The third scenario (NoCAP) is a variant of the Lib&Prod 
scenario, but it also eliminates Pillar 2 payments, and is 
basically	intended	to	represent	a	step	away	from	the	EU	
CAP.
The policy scenarios are assessed with regard to their 
impact on markets (production, demand, trade and prices), 
land use, environment and farmer income from the global 
to the farm level. In the following section, the key results 
are presented in relation to their economic, social and 
environmental dimensions.
10.2 | The scenarios
47 EU Agricultural Outlook: Prospects for EU agricultural markets and income 2015-2025. Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission.
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Source: own presentation.
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The	 reference	 scenario	 in	 Scenar	 2030	 is	 based	 on	 ‘EU	
Agricultural	Outlook:	Prospects	for	EU	agricultural	markets	
and income 2015-2025’, published in December 2015 (DG 
AGRI, 2015). It assumes the implementation of the 2013 
CAP	reforms,	as	well	as	the	ratified	FTAs.	By	extending	the	
horizon to 2030 and complementing it with the outcome 
of the three models used, a plausible/potential pathway of 
the	EU	in	the	global	agri-food	system	can	be	described	as	
follows:48
● Annual GDP growth between 2016 and 2030 is an-
ticipated	to	be	1.8%	on	average	in	the	EU,	significantly	
below that in the rest of the world. However, economic 
growth	 among	 the	 EU	MSs	 is	 quite	 diverse;	 the	 EU-
N13	(2.7%	on	average)	far	exceeds	that	in	the	EU-15,	
where it is expected to be 1.7%.
● EU production and consumption is growing slower 
than	in	rest	of	the	world.	The	EU	will	increase	the	pro-
duction of all products apart from rice and beef. A sub-
stantial increase of about 20% over the 15-year horizon 
is observed in the dairy sector, following the expansion 
of world dairy demand. The increase in the production 
and use of the main cereals is mainly driven by feed use.
● The trade surplus	with	the	non-EU	countries	rises	to	
about	 EUR	40	billion	by	2030.	 The	 trade	balance	of	
the	EU	improves	for	all	products	but	rice,	oilseeds	and	
meals, ‘other products’ and feed. The evolution of the 
beverages and dairy sectors appears to be particularly 
positive. The main improvements in the trade balance 
are in relation to NAFTA, China, the LDCs and Rest of 
the World, but there is a negative trend with regard to 
Mercosur	and	Australia	and	New	Zealand.
● Land use change	is	slightly	negative	in	the	EU	over	
the 15-year horizon, whereas increases reaching al-
most 10% are apparent for Mercosur, Asian FTA and 
the LDCs over the same period. Land prices show a 
negative	trend	in	the	EU,	but	rise	substantially	in	China	
and the LDCs.
● GHG emissions	 from	agriculture	 in	 the	EU	 increase	
by 7.9% over the time horizon, which is in line with the 
increase in production. However, the GHG emissions in-
crease is much lower than in the other countries and 
regions considered. The N-surplus is expected to be 
larger where livestock density is already high, reaching, 
on	average,	63	kg/ha	UAA.
● Employment in the agricultural sector decreases by 
1.9% yearly, reaching 7.3 million in 2030. Employment 
in the food industry is decreasing at a slower pace, by 
1.3% yearly.
● The farm structure of today is extrapolated to 
2030. Out of the 4.7 million farms, the 13% largest 
farms	(economic	size	>	EUR	100,000)	cultivate	50%	
of	the	UAA.
● The	net	positions	of	the	EU	MSs	remain	similar	to	those	
of today’s budget, with the CAP budget showing an 
important	economic	contribution	to	many	of	the	EU-13	
and Mediterranean countries.
● The most subsidy-dependent farm types are 
those specialised in cattle, COP and olives, with sub-
sidies representing 32%, 26% and 23% of their to-
tal incomes, respectively. Subsidies as a proportion 
represent between 15% and 20% of total income in 
small	and	medium-sized	farms	(>	EUR	100,000	SO).	
In	large	farms	(>	EUR	100,000	SO),	subsidies	account	
for between 9% and 10% of farm income. The Gini 
coefficient	for	income	distribution	is	estimated	at	0.7%	
(ESTAT	 calculates	a	Gini	 coefficient	 of	 equalised	dis-
posable income of 0.3%).
This perspective of the agri-food sector in a broadly un-
changed socioeconomic and political environment must 
also	be	placed	 in	 the	context	of	public	opinion.	EU	citi-
zens	 identified,	 in	 the	 ‘Modernising	and	Simplifying	 the	
Common Agricultural Policy’ public consultation (2017), 
the	 following	 as	 the	most	 important	 challenges	 for	 EU	
agriculture and rural areas: (1) pressures on the environ-
ment and on natural resources; (2) climate change (mit-
igation and adaptation); and (3) a fair standard of living 
for farmers.49
10.3 | EU	agri-food	sector	towards	2030	(reference	scenario)
48 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
49 https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/consultations/cap-modernising/highlights-public-consul_en.pdf.
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In the following section, the key results of the three sce-
narios are described according to the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions. The results are presented in 
terms of changes with respect to the results given by the 
baseline (reference or business as usual scenario).50
10.4 | The	EU	agri-food	system	between	markets	and	societal	 
challenges (scenarios)
10.4.1 Economic dimension
The results show a small negative impact on agricultural 
production under the Inc&Env scenario, whereas under the 
Lib&Prod and NoCAP scenarios production decreases by 
4%	and	6%,	respectively.	The	differences	between	EU-15	
and	EU-13	are	negligible,	and	the	variability	between	EU	
MSs is greatest under the NoCAP scenario.
Agricultural	production	is	declining,	but	not	disappearing,	in	most	extreme	
scenarios
Producer prices increase if the CAP is eliminated
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FIGURE 79: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, EU-28, TOTAL QUANTITY CHANGES COMPARED WITH REFERENCE (%).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 80: PRODUCER PRICE, EU-28, CHANGES COMPARED WITH REFERENCE (%).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Following the small decreases in agricultural production 
under	 the	 Inc&Env	 scenario,	 aggregated	 EU	 producer	
prices increase by about 1%. In the Lib&Prod scenario, 
EU	producer	 prices	drop	by	almost	1%,	as	 EU	production	
decreases are compensated by cheaper imports. With the 
elimination	of	all	CAP	payments,	the	stronger	EU	production	
declines cannot be fully compensated by imports, leading 
to	increased	aggregated	EU	producer	prices	of	about	5%	in	
the NoCAP scenario.
50 More details can be found under this link: https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/SCENAR2030.
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More imports than exports
Income of farms decreases strongly when the CAP is abolished
Imports increase in all scenarios, leading to a decrease in 
the	 EU	 trade	 balance.	 Although	 exports	 in	 the	 Lib&Prod	
scenario grow substantially, also thanks to the ambitious 
trade	agenda	pursued	by	the	EU,	they	cannot	compensate	
for the higher level of imports. In the NoCAP scenario, 
the	 trade	 balance	 is	 reduced	 by	 about	 EUR	 25	 billion,	
billion trade surplus in 2030 under the reference scenario, 
bringing	back	the	EU	to	net	importer	status.
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FIGURE 81: EU IMPORTS, EXPORTS AND TRADE BALANCE CHANGES (EUR 
MILLION) COMPARED WITH REFERENCE, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
Under	the	Inc&Env	scenario,	gross	farm	income	increases	
by around 4.5%, mainly through higher prices, with the 
CAP	budget	remaining	stable.	The	negative	effects	in	the	
Lib&Prod scenario (–20%) mean that there is a slightly 
larger income decrease than under the NoCAP scenario, 
following	 the	 larger	 decreases	 in	 EU	 production.	 Again,	
the	EU-13	farming	sector	experiences	a	stronger	negative	
impact	on	 income	than	the	EU-15,	 reflecting	a	generally	
higher importance of CAP payments in total income..
The	 simulated	 effects	 are	 less	 heterogeneous	 between	
economic sizes classes than they are across farm 
specialisations. However, there is a relatively consistent 
pattern indicating an inverse relationship between the 
magnitude of the simulated impacts and economic farm 
size in all three simulated scenarios. Among the most 
affected	farm	specialisations,	mainly	in	the	Lib&Prod	and	
NoCAP scenarios, are the specialists cattle, COP (cereals, 
oilseeds and protein), and olives.
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FIGURE 82: GROSS FARM INCOME (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Inc&Env Lib&Prod NoCAP
Specialist COP 1.2 –23.5 –22.6
Specialist	other	field	crops 0.4 –2.1 –0.2
Specialist horticulture –0.9 1.9 0.8
Specialist wine 0.4 –7.1 –7.6
Specialist orchards – fruits –2.7 –4.0 –6.2
Specialist olives –11.6 –20.6 –19.9
Permanent crops combined –1.5 –7.7 –9.2
Specialist milk –0.1 –8.7 2.6
Specialist sheep and goats –0.5 –12.1 –11.9
Specialist cattle –2.3 –36.7 –31.8
Specialist granivores 1.0 –3.7 3.6
Mixed crops –0.3 –2.8 –3.6
Mixed livestock 1.8 –12.0 –3.0
Mixed crops and livestock 0.2 –14.8 –9.7
TABLE 36: INCOME VARIATION BY FARM SPECIALISATION IN THE EU-27 (% 
CHANGE RELATIVE TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar2030, IFM-CAP.
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Small	increase	of	prosperity,	but	only	for	richer	EU-15	countries
Overall,	economic	growth	effects	are	small,	but	are	substantial	for	some	
Member States 
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FIGURE 83: GDP, CHANGE FROM REFERENCE (%), 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
The CAP has an important role to play in territorial cohesion. 
The	effect	of	the	scenarios	on	GDP	is	very	small	(maximum	
–0.3%	 in	 the	 NoCAP	 scenario	 for	 the	 EU-13);	 however,	
under all scenarios, changes in GDP are negative for the 
EU-13.	In	general,	the	gains	observed	in	the	scenarios	with	
a	large	or	complete	reduction	in	CAP	payments	for	the	EU-
15	countries	drive	the	EU-28	GDP	to	a	small	but	positive	
value. 
When looking at the individual MS results, sizeable 
impacts are observed for Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia 
and Lithuania, who lose up to 1.7% of their GDP compared 
with the reference scenario.
One	can	observe	that	most	of	the	EU-13	and	some	EU-15	
countries not only experience a high absolute per capita 
welfare loss, but even more in relative terms (here in % 
change of household expenditure).
Using	 so-called	 Equivalent	 variation	 (EV)	 as	 a	 welfare	
measure, i.e. the real income change, we observe a similar 
pattern as that observed for GDP, namely that the scenarios 
have only small impacts on welfare. Compared with the 
reference scenario in 2030, the Inc&Env scenario for the 
EU-28	results	in	a	slightly	negative	EV	of	EUR	2.6	billion	
(–0.08%),	the	Lib&Prod	scenario	shows	a	EUR	18.4	billion	
welfare	 gain	 (+0.15%)	 and,	 finally,	 the	 NoCAP	 scenario	
shows	a	EUR	0.1	billion	welfare	gain	(+0.01%).	
The welfare decomposition highlights the reasons behind 
these developments. The EV results in, for instance, the 
Lib&Prod	scenario	show	 losses	 for	 the	 ‘new’	EU-13	MSs	
vis-à-vis	EV	gains	for	the	‘old’	EU-15	MSs.	For	the	EU-13	
MSs this result is mainly driven by changes to the CAP 
budget,	 whereas	 efficiency	 gains	 and	 improving	 terms	
of	 trade	occur	 in	 the	EU-15	MSs	and	 lead	 to	an	overall	
positive	welfare	effect	in	the	Lib&Prod	scenario.
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FIGURE 84: WELFARE (EV) DECOMPOSITION IN THE EU-28, EU-15 AND EU-13, 2030, EUR MILLIONS, SCENARIOS VS. REFERENCE.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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The time dimension of scenario shocks matters for welfare 
The dynamics of the scenarios’ impacts on welfare (and 
other indicators) have to be closely observed, on the one 
hand to anticipate temporary hardships and the necessary 
accompanying measures, on the other hand to monitor the 
recovering	of	an	economy	after	a	(structural)	adjustment.
In the Lib&Prod scenario, and even more so in the NoCAP 
scenario,	EU-13	welfare	growth	shows	a	substantial	de-
cline	in	2025	after	the	policy	change	in	2020,	but	recovers	
in the period from 2025 to 2030 due to the market evolu-
tion and structural adjustment of the economy.
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FIGURE 85: WELFARE GROWTH, CHANGES (%) FROM BASELINE FROM ONE PERIOD TO THE NEXT WITHIN A SCENARIO, IN EUR BILLION.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
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10.4.2 Social dimension
Small farms lose a higher proportion of their incomes than larger farms
In this subsection, the income distribution among farms 
and the impacts on jobs are analysed.
With the exception of the smallest farms in the Inc&Env 
scenario, all farm sizes lose income under all scenarios. 
The	 smaller	 farms	are	 generally	more	 affected	 because	
the share of subsidies in their total income is usually 
higher than for larger farms. It should be noted that the 
income	calculation	on	 the	 farm	 level	 is	 slightly	different	
from the gross farm income calculation. 
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FIGURE 86: INCOME VARIATION BY ECONOMIC FARM SIZE IN THE EU-28 (% CHANGE RELATIVE TO REFERENCE).
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP model.
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FIGURE 87: GINI COEFFICIENT FOR INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE EU-27.
Source: Scenar 2030, IFM-CAP.
CAP subsidies play an income equalisation role among 
farms	in	the	EU.	Decreasing	or	cutting	payments	increases	
inequality,	where	a	higher	Gini	coefficient	indicates	higher	
inequality.
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Under	all	three	scenarios,	in	addition	to	the	job	decline	of	
about 25% in the reference scenario, there is a negative 
effect	 on	 jobs	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector.	 The	 decrease	
in agricultural jobs is more pronounced in the Lib&Prod 
and NoCAP scenarios (–5%) than in the Inc&Env scenario 
(–1.8%). Decreases in employment in the food industry are 
less noticeable.
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FIGURE 88: IMPACT OF SCENARIOS ON EMPLOYMENT NUMBERS, 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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FIGURE 89: IMPACT OF LIB&PROD SCENARIO ON EMPLOYMENT NUMBERS 
(IN % CHANGE), 2030.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model.
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With regard to the environmental dimension, the results 
are considered in the context of land use, nitrogen surplus 
and GHG emissions. 
The	slight	increase	in	UAA	in	the	Inc&Env	scenario	of	0.3%	
(+0.6 million ha) contrasts with the substantial decreases 
of 7.3% (–13.1 million ha) in the Lib&Prod scenario and 
about 6.9% (–12.4 million ha) in the NoCAP scenario. The 
decreases	in	UAA	in	the	Lib&Prod	and	NoCAP	scenarios	are	
directly linked to the removal of direct payments, which 
immediately	affect	the	profitability	of	all	crop	production	
activities,	and	the	decreases	 in	EU	production	 levels,	es-
pecially the decline in cereal production and pasture, i.e. 
part of the land is taken out as economic returns decrease.
Under	the	Inc&Env	scenario,	UAA	increases	by	0.3%	(+0.6	
million ha) compared with the reference scenario, whereas 
UAA	substantially	declines,	by	7.3%	(–13.1	million	ha),	in	
the Lib&Prod scenario and by about 6.9% (–12.4 million 
ha) in the NoCAP scenario. 
More land is abandoned with diverse impacts
10.4.3 Environmental dimension
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FIGURE 90: UAA, % CHANGE.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 91: CHANGE IN UAA PER MS (CHANGE RELATIVE TO REF).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model.
A similar decrease in grassland area (–8.8%) can be 
observed, driven by the removal of direct payments 
and by the absence of any CAP measure targeting the 
maintenance of (permanent) grassland. This is relevant 
from a public goods point of view (e.g. landscape, tourism).
143Scenar 2030 - Pathways for the European agriculture and food sector beyond 2020
High concentrations of nitrates in the soil and water 
constitute a widespread problem caused by nitrogen 
surplus. Nitrogen surplus per ha decreases under only 
the Inc&Env scenario, by 1%. The increase of 3% in the 
Lib&Prod scenario illustrates the challenge of sustainable 
intensification.	
The limitation in animal stocking density and the restriction 
on nitrogen use lead to a decrease in the N-surplus of 
0.8	 kg	 N/ha	 UAA.	 A	 considerable	 reduction	 is	 reported	
in particular in Member States and regions with a high 
N-surplus in the reference scenario, such as Belgium and 
the Netherlands, mostly related to reductions in stocking 
densities. In contrast, under the Lib&Prod and NoCAP 
scenarios, the N-surplus increases by 2 and 0.5 kg N/ha 
UAA,	respectively.	The	increase	in	N-surplus	is,	on	the	one	
hand,	 driven	 by	 the	 decrease	 in	 UAA	 and,	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	the	intensification	of	 livestock	and	crop	production	
on	the	remaining	UAA.	In	both	scenarios,	more	substantial	
increases in N-surplus are indicated for regions that already 
have the highest N-surplus in the reference scenario, as 
these are among the most competitive regions.
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FIGURE 92: NITROGEN SURPLUS PER HA.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
Nitrogen - a particular challenge
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FIGURE 93: CHANGE IN N-SURPLUS PER MS (ABSOLUTE CHANGE IN KG N/HA UAA RELATIVE TO REF).
Note: Malta has been removed from the graph to improve the readability. The values for Malta are: Inc&Env -14%, Lib&Prod +17%, NoCAP +12%”.
Source: Scenar2030, CAPRI.
Looking at the regional distribution of the N-surplus the 
increase is concentrated in productive areas that already 
have high N-surplus in the reference scenario.
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The	GHG	emissions	of	EU	agriculture	follow	directly	the	
production developments. Therefore, changes are rather 
limited in the Inc&Env scenario, with a decrease of 0.5% in 
EU-28	emissions;	however,	considerably	larger	decreases	
are indicated under the Lib&Prod scenario (–4.2%) and 
NoCAP scenario (–5.8%). The impact of technological 
GHG mitigation options is very limited in the scenarios 
(i.e. the technologies are not widely applied), which is why 
the predicted GHG changes mirror production changes so 
closely. Moreover, the GHG emission analysis does not 
take	into	account	that	the	land	taken	out	of	EU	production	
could	be	used	for	afforestation	and	therefore	as	a	carbon	
sink. At the MS level, the changes in agricultural non CO2 
GHG	emissions	also	reflect	the	corresponding	production	
changes in the scenarios.
FIGURE 94: NITROGEN SURPLUS PER HA, % CHANGES IN THE LIB&PROD 
SCENARIO.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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FIGURE 95: CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL NON-CO2 GHG EMISSIONS (%).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model.
GHG emissions – a question of leakage?
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FIGURE 96: AGRICULTURAL NON-CO2 GHG EMISSIONS IN THE EU MSs (IN MIO TONNES CO2 EQ).
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI model. 
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The main caveat in relation to the scenarios’ consideration 
of GHG emissions is that only a rough estimation of GHG 
emissions is possible. However, the main message is the 
importance of GHG emission leakage through increased 
EU	imports.
From a worldwide perspective, the emission reductions 
in	the	EU	are	widely	compensated	by	emission	increases	
in	non-EU	countries,	mainly	due	to	increased	production	
and	exports	of	agricultural	commodities	to	the	EU.	This	
emission	 leakage	 effect	 is	 for	 example	 illustrated	 by	
the increase of agricultural GHG emissions in Mercosur 
or	 Australia	 &	 New	 Zealand.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 emission	
leakage,	 the	 net	 benefit	 of	 EU	 emission	 reductions	 on	
global agricultural GHG emissions is minimal.
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FIGURE 97: GHG EMISSIONS IN AGRICULTURE, DIFFERENT REGIONS, 2030, DIFFERENCE (%) FROM REFERENCE.
Note: Asian FTA means bilateral trade agreements between the EU and Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia respectively.
Source: Scenar 2030, MAGNET model. 
10.4.4 Synthesis of scenario results
Figure 98 summarises the indicators presented at a glance.
The Inc&Env scenario shows only marginal changes for 
production, land use and emissions. The more pronounced 
focus on the environment, implemented through 
extended greening measures and a limit on nitrogen 
use, is associated with a small, economy-wide cost, but 
contributes to the improving trend of the agricultural 
nitrogen balance. However, the reduction of about 1% 
nitrogen in the scenario compared with the reference is 
not	sufficient	to	address	the	nitrogen	balance	problem	in	
areas	already	in	surplus.	Under	this	scenario,	farm	income	
distribution	 in	 the	EU,	as	measured	by	a	Gini	 coefficient,	
does not improve. Thus, the key challenges related to the 
environment and a fair standard of living for farmers are 
only partly addressed.
The Lib&Prod scenario and its even extremer variant, the 
NoCAP scenario, have, by default, a much stronger impact 
on farm income, land use, production and emissions. The 
decrease in agricultural production, leading to price increases 
in the NoCAP scenario, is within the limit of interannual 
variation, but is associated with a pronounced reduction in 
land	use.	 This	affects	 the	 territorial	 balance,	with	marginal	
areas being further marginalised, with fewer jobs, and 
intensive agricultural areas being further concentrated. Less 
production, in principle, reduces the overall use of resources 
and	thus	the	environmental	impacts.	At	least	in	the	EU,	GHG	
emissions would also be reduced; however, these reductions 
could	be	levelled	out	through	a	leakage	effect.	Releasing	land	
from agricultural uses could also provide an opportunity for 
the creation of CO2 sinks, such as forests and other ecological 
areas,	with	important	benefits	for	biodiversity.
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FIGURE 98: OVERVIEW OF KEY IMPACTS.
Source: Scenar 2030, CAPRI and MAGNET model. 
The mixed picture with regard to production and the 
environment for these scenarios is opposed by a strongly 
negative impact on the social dimension. Most of the 
burden, at least in percentage terms, is on the small 
farms	in	the	net	beneficiary	countries,	and	would	increase	
farm income inequality even more and put the resilience 
of many farms at risk. The scenarios show, also as a 
consequence of further liberalisation, an increase in the 
vulnerability of, in particular, crop and cattle/beef farmers. 
The trade balance is very negative under these scenarios, 
giving rise to questions about a general leakage of positive 
and negative externalities. In this context, the widely 
demanded inclusion of the consumer side (see obesity and 
other problems related to unhealthy food consumption) in 
a food systems approach could provide further insights.
A further element to consider is the increase in aggregated 
welfare through the released budget being used in more 
(economically) productive sectors.
The presented and discussed scenarios do not represent 
real policy options. However, they underline the potential 
for changes to the current agri-food policies to address 
societal challenges and demands.
The vulnerability of small farms, in particular in the 
southern	and	eastern	parts	of	 the	EU,	where	agriculture	
(and its subsidies) have a far more important economic 
weight has to be emphasised. The trade liberalisation 
scenarios reveal opportunities for some but risks for 
even more agri-food sectors. Special attention must 
be paid to the complex relations, incentives and trade-
offs	 of	 the	 different	 instruments,	 in	 particular	 regarding	
the environmental dimension. For direct payments to 
be	 effective	 in	 achieving	 their	 objectives	 and	 improving	
existing the inequality, the target population needs to be 
well	defined.
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The	present	study	offers	a	well-established,	model-based	
agro-economic analysis enriched with new features, pro-
viding a framework for future policy analysis. In particular, 
an attempt has been made to deliver a fully transparent 
study report, linked to an interactive visualisation of the 
results. 
The scenarios chosen are instructive and show the exist-
ence	of	trade-offs.	
In	particular,	the	combination	of	different	types	of	models	
allows the analysis of the scenarios from all three sus-
tainability	perspectives	and	on	different	spatial	scales,	i.e.	
from the global market to the individual farm level. 
During the course of this study, experiences have revealed 
repeatedly that the linkage of models is a challenge. Fur-
thermore, the assumptions on the impact of policies on 
productivity are of particular importance, pointing to the 
need for more research. 
At	 the	 time	 of	 finalising	 this	 report,	 many	 uncertainties	
about the future of the agricultural sector remain. They 
include the early stage of discussions on the Multiannu-
al Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the Brexit, the 
ongoing free trade negotiations, the implementation of 
COP21 and SDGs, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the 
evolving bioeconomy among others. 
10.5 | Scenar 2030 and the long road ahead: achievements and 
remaining challenges
• DECOMPOSITION METHOD
• PILLAR 2
• MAIN ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE IFM-CAP MODEL
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As an additional tool of analysis, this study draws on the 
use of a decomposition method known as ‘subtotals’ 
based on the pioneering work of Harrison et al. (2000). 
More	 specifically,	 on	 running	 a	 complex	 scenario	 with	
an	 array	 of	 shocks	 (i.e.	 endowments,	 tariffs,	 technology	
changes, etc.), it is possible to calculate the part-worth 
of the resulting endogenous variable change that corre-
sponds	 to	 a	 specific	 exogenous	 shock,	 or	 pre-specified	
group of exogenous shocks. Thus, when comparing each 
of the scenarios with the reference scenario, the compara-
tive ‘part-worth’ importance of the four policy indicators is 
evaluated in order to better understand the role that policy 
has to play (if any) in shaping bio-based market trends.
Employing the terminology of Harrison et al. (2000), for a 
simplistic	function	Z	=	F(X,Y),	where	Z	is	endogenous	and	
X and Y are exogenous, GEMPACK calculates the change in 
the	separate	values	of	the	first	derivatives	corresponding	
to	X	and	Y	within	the	total	derivative	dZ,	accumulated	over	
all	the	steps	specified	within	the	model	algorithm.	Further-
more, the part-worths of each exogenous variable are cal-
culated based on the GEMPACK assumption that the rate 
of progression in the set of exogenous shocks along the 
path is proportionally linear.
It is expected that, as a direct consequence of changes 
in exogenous policy shocks, their respective part-worths 
will change compared with the reference scenario. What 
is perhaps less obvious is that when changing the policy 
conditions of the experiment, the deviation in the solution 
path of the model from the reference scenario can also 
alter the part-worths of unchanged exogenous shocks 
(i.e. projections and fossil fuel world prices). For example, 
steeper	GHG	emissions	cuts	in	the	EU	in	would	affect	the	
entire macroeconomy, which implies additional impacts on 
(inter alia) factor prices. Thus, the set of unchanged pro-
jection	shocks,	with	a	different	vector	of	factor	prices,	will	
also	now	have	a	different	part-worth.
Appendix11
11.1 | Annex: decomposition method
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Ax
es # Measure title
Invest-
ment in 
physical 
capital
Invest-
ment in 
human 
capital
Wider 
rural 
devlpt. 
schemes
Support to 
LFAs 
Agri-
environ. 
measures
1 111 Vocational training and information actions  X    
 112 Setting up of young farmers  X    
 113 Early retirement  X    
 114 Use	of	advisory	services  X    
 115 Setting up of management, relief and advisory services  X    
 121 Modernisation of agricultural holdings X     
 122 Improvement of the economic value of forests X     
 123 Adding value to agricultural and forestry products X     
 124 Cooperation for development of new products X     
 125 Infrastructure related to the development and adaptation... X     
 126 Restoring agricultural production potential X     
 131 Meeting standards based on Community legislation  X    
 132 Participation of farmers in food quality schemes  X    
 133 Information and promotion activities  X    
 141 Semi-subsistence farming  X    
 142 Producer groups  X    
 143 Provision of farm advisory and extension services in BG and RO  X    
2 211 Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas    X  
 212 Payments to farmers in areas with h., other than mountain…    X  
 213 Natura 2000 AND Directive 2000/60/EC payments     X
 214 Agri-environment payments     X
 215 Animal welfare payments     X
 216 Non-productive investments     X
 221 First	afforestation	of	agricultural	land     X
 222 First establishment of agroforestry systems on...     X
 223 First	afforestation	of	non-agricultural	land     X
 224 Natura 2000 payments     X
 225 Forest-environment payments     X
 226 Restoring forestry potential and introducing prevention...     X
 227 Non-productive investments     X
3 311 Diversification	into	non-agricultural	activities   X   
 312 Support for business creation and development   X   
 313 Encouragement of tourism activities   X   
 321 Basic services for the economy and rural population   X   
 322 Village renewal and development   X   
 323 Conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage   X   
 331 Training and information   X   
 341 Skills acquisition, animation and implementation of ...   X   
4 411 Implementing local development strategies. Competitiveness X     
 412 Implementing local development strategies. Environment/land     X
 413 Implementing	local	development	strategies.	Quality	of	life   X   
 421 Implementing cooperation projects   X   
 431 Running the local action group, acquiring skills and ...   X   
5 511 Technical Assistance   X   
TABLE A.1. TREATMENT OF PILLAR 2 MEASURES BY MAGNET CATEGORIES (2007-2013).
Source: Boulanger & Philippidis (2014).
11.2 | Annex: Pillar 2
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Rural development measures
Payment type
SCT GCT ACT OTP
111. Vocational training and information actions   OBS  
112. Setting up of young farmers   Labour  
113. Early retirement   Land 
114.	Use	of	advisory	services   OBS  
115. Setting up of management, relief and advisory services   OBS  
121. Modernisation of agricultural holdings   Capital  
122. Improvement of the economic value of forests Capital F
123. Adding value to agricultural and forestry products   Capital F+PA  
124. Cooperation for development of new products, processes and technologies in the agriculture 
and food sector and the forestry sector
  Capital F+PA  
125. Infrastructure related to the development and adaptation of agriculture and forestry   Capital F+PA  
126. Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and introducing 
appropriate prevention actions
  Capital  
131. Meeting standards based on Community legislation   OBS  
132. Participation of farmers in food quality schemes   OBS  
133. Information and promotion activities   OBS  
141. Semi-subsistence farming   Land 
142. Producer groups   Land
143. Provision of farm advisory and extension services in Bulgaria and Romania   OBS  
144. Holdings undergoing restructuring due to a reform of a common market organisation   Capital  
211. Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas   Land 
212. Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than mountain areas   Land
213. Natura 2000 payments and payments linked to Directive 2000/60/EC (WFD)   Land
214. Agri-environment payments  Land
215. Animal welfare payments Capital
216. Non-productive investments    Land
221.	First	afforestation	of	agricultural	land Capital F
222. First establishment of agroforestry systems on agricultural land Capital PA
223.	First	afforestation	of	non-agricultural	land Capital F
224. Natura 2000 payments Capital F
225. Forest-environment payments Capital F
226. Restoring forestry potential and introducing prevention actions Capital F
227. Non-productive investments Capital F
311.	Diversification	into	non-agricultural	activities    Land
411. Implementing local development strategies. Competitiveness Mix
412. Implementing local development strategies. Environment/land management Mix
413.	Implementing	local	development	strategies.	Quality	of	life/diversification Mix
611. Complement to direct payment Land
TABLE A.2. TREATMENT OF PILLAR 2 MEASURES IN MAGNET BY GTAP SUBSIDY WEDGES AND PAYMENT CLASSIFICATIONS (2007-2013).
Notes: SCT, single commodity transfers; ACT, all commodity transfers (ACT); GCT, group commodity transfers; OTP, and other transfer payments; F, forestry sector; PA, primary 
agricultural sector (e.g. measure #123 is allocated to capital of both F and PA sectors).; OBS, other business services. For measures #411 #412 #413 (LEADER measures or 
support granted to local action groups to implement local development strategies), expenditures are redistributed to other measures between #111 and #311, weighted by 
measure expenditures.
Source: Boulanger & Philippidis (2015).
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# Measure title
Invest-
ment in 
physical 
capital
Invest-
ment in 
human 
capital
wider 
rural 
devlpt. 
schemes
Support 
to LFAs 
Agri-
environ. 
measures
 1 Knowledge transfer and information actions (Article 14) X
 2 Advisory services, farm management and farm relief services (Article 15) X
 3 Quality	schemes	for	agricultural	products	and	food-stuffs	(Article	16) X
 4 Investments in physical assets (Article 17) X
 5
Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and 
introduction of appropriate prevention (Article 18)
X
 6 Farm and business development (Article 19) X
 7 Basic services and village renewal in rural areas (Article 20) X
 8
Investments in forest area development and improvement of the viability of 
forests (Article 21)
X
 9 Setting up of producer groups and organisations (Article 27) X
10 Agri-environment-climate (AEC) (Article 28) X
11 Organic farming (Article 29) X
12 Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive payments (Article 30) X
13 Payments	to	areas	facing	natural	or	other	specific	constraints	(Article	31) X
14 Animal welfare (Article 33) X
15 Forest-environmental and climate services and forest conservation (Article 34) X
16 Cooperation (Article 35) X
17 Risk management (Article 36)
18 Financing of complementary national direct payments for Croatia (Article 40)
19 Technical Assistance (Articles 51-54). X
20
Support	for	Leader	local	development	(CLLD)	(Article	35	of	Regulation	(EU)	No	
1303/2013);
X
TABLE A.3. TREATMENT OF PILLAR 2 MEASURES BY MAGNET CATEGORIES (2014-2020).
Source: Expert opinion based on Boulanger & Philippidis (2014) together with:
– REGULATION (EU) No 1305/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005.
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1305&from=en.
– COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No 807/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and introducing transitional provisions
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0807&from=en.
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Rural development measures
Payment type
SCT GCT ACT OTP
 1. Knowledge transfer and information actions (Article 14) OBS
 2. Advisory services, farm management and farm relief services (Article 15) OBS
	 3.	Quality	schemes	for	agricultural	products	and	food-stuffs	(Article	16) OBS
 4. Investments in physical assets (Article 17) Capital
 5. Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and introduction  
   of appropriate prevention (Article 18)
Capital
 6. Farm and business development (Article 19) Land
 7. Basic services and village renewal in rural areas (Article 20) Land
 8. Investments in forest area development and improvement of the viability of forests (Article 21) Capital F
 9. Setting up of producer groups and organisations (Article 27) Land
10. Agri-environment-climate (AEC) (Article 28) Land
11. Organic farming (Article 29) Land
12. Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive payments (Article 30) Land
13.	Payments	to	areas	facing	natural	or	other	specific	constraints	(Article	31) Land
14. Animal welfare (Article 33) Capital GCT8
15. Forest-environmental and climate services and forest conservation (Article 34) Capital F
16. Cooperation (Article 35) OBS
17. Risk management (Article 36)
18. Financing of complementary national direct payments for Croatia (Article 40)
19. Technical Assistance (Articles 51-54). OBS
20.	Support	for	Leader	local	development	(CLLD)	(Article	35	of	Regulation	(EU)	No	1303/2013); Mix
TABLE A.4. TREATMENT OF PILLAR 2 MEASURES IN MAGNET BY GTAP SUBSIDY WEDGES AND PAYMENT CLASSIFICATIONS (2014-2020).
Notes: OBS, other business services; F, forestry sector; GCT8, Ruminant Group Commodity Transfer; ‘Input all’ means uniform input subsidy on all agriculture; ‘mix’ means that 
expenditures are redistributed to measures 1-16, weighted by measure expenditures.
Source: Expert opinion based on Boulanger & Philippidis (2015) together with:
– REGULATION (EU) No 1305/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005.
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1305&from=en.
– COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No 807/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and introducing transitional provisions
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0807&from=en.
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The IFM-CAP relies on expected utility maximising 
behaviour	and	attempts	to	find	the	optimal	land	allocation	
among production activities, taking into account resource 
(arable and grass land and feed requirements) and 
policy constraints such as greening requirements and 
environmental obligations. Land constraints are used to 
match the available land that can be used in a production 
operation	and	the	possible	use	by	the	different	agricultural	
activities. Constraints relating to feed availability and feed 
requirements of animal activities are used to ensure that 
the	total	energy,	protein	and	fibre	requirements	are	met	by	
farm-grown and/or purchased feed.
Farmers’	 expected	 utility	 is	 defined	 following	 the	mean-
variance approach (Markowitz, 2014) with a constant 
absolute risk aversion (CARA) specification	 (Pratt,	 1964).	
According	to	this	approach,	expected	utility	 is	defined	as	
expected income and the associated income variance. The 
expected	income	is	defined	as	the	sum	of	gross	margins	
minus	 a	 non-linear	 (quadratic)	 activity-specific	 function.	
The gross margin is the total revenue including sales 
from agricultural products and compensation payments 
(coupled and decoupled payments) minus the accounting 
variable costs of production activities. The accounting 
costs include the costs of seeds, fertilisers, crop protection, 
feeding	 and	 other	 specific	 costs.	 The	 quadratic	 activity-
specific	 function	 is	 a	 behavioural	 function	 introduced	
to calibrate the farm model to an observed base year 
situation, as is usually done in positive programming 
models.	 This	 function	 intends	 to	 capture	 the	 effects	 of	
factors that are not explicitly included in the model, such 
as farmers’ perceived costs of capital and labour, or model 
misspecification	(Paris	and	Howitt,	1998;	Heckelei,	2002;	
de Frahan et al., 2007).
The IFM-CAP is calibrated to the base year 2012 using 
cross-sectional analysis (i.e. multiple observations) and 
a highest posterior density (HPD) approach with prior 
information	on	NUTS	2	supply	elasticities	and	dual	values	
of resources (e.g. land rental prices). The calibration to the 
exogenous supply elasticities is performed in a non-myopic 
way, i.e. (for more details see Louhichi et al., 2017b).
11.3 | Annex: Main assumptions for the IFM-CAP model
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AVE Ad valorem equivalents.
AWU	 Annual	work	units.
BPS Basic Payment Scheme.
CAP Common Agricultural Policy.
CAPRI Common Agricultural Policy Regionalised Impact.
CATS Clearance Audit Trail System.
CES Constant elasticity of substitution.
CGE Computable general equilibrium.
CIF Cost, insurance and freight.
CNDP Complementary national direct payment.
CO2 Carbon dioxide.
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent.
COP Cereals, oilseeds and protein.
DG AGRI Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development.
EU	 European	Union.
EAFRD European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.
EAGF European Agricultural Guarantee Fund.
EFA Ecological focus area.
ESTAT	 EUROSTAT.
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme.
EV Equivalent variation.
FADN Farm Accountancy Data Network.
FAO	 Food	and	Agriculture	Organization	of	the	United	Nations.
FSS Farm Structure Survey.
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FTE Full-time equivalents.
GDP Gross domestic product.
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project.
GHG Greenhouse gas.
GMO	 Genetically	modified	organism.
HNV High nature value.
IFM-CAP Individual Farm Model for Common Agricultural Policy Analysis.
IIA Inception Impact Assessment.
Inc&Env Income & Environment.
JRC Joint Research Centre.
LDC Least developed country.
LFA Less favoured area.
LFS Labour Force Survey.
Lib&Prod Liberalisation & Productivity.
MAGNET Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool.
MS Member State.
NAFTA North America Free Trade Agreement.
NoCAP No Policy.
N-surplus Nitrogen surplus.
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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PMP Positive mathematical programming.
RDP Rural development programme.
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SDG Sustainable Development Goal.
SFP Single Farm Payment.
SO Standard output.
SPS Single Payment Scheme.
TRQ	 Tariff-rate	quota.
UAA	 Utilised	agricultural	area.
VCS Voluntary coupled support.
WTO World Trade Organization.
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